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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This appeal is about arbitrators' powers. The Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) be-

tween Idaho, other States, and most major tobacco companies provides for arbitration of disputes
over calculation of annual payments that tobacco companies make to the States under the MSA.
The MSA allows disputed payments to be escrowed pending resolution of the dispute. Some
tobacco companies escrowed funds associated with disputed payments for years 2003 on.
The MSA has a model statute (the MSA Act) that Idaho adopted. In 2006 the District
Court ordered Idaho (1) to arbitrate whether Idaho diligently enforced the provisions of its MSA
Act in 2003 (2) to determine whether Idaho was entitled to its full 2003 MSA payments as a
State that diligently enforced the provisions of an MSAAct.
Idaho, other States, and the tobacco companies agreed in writing to arbitrate issues of
2003 enforcement of their MSAActs and 2003 payments, but no issues for any other years. The
arbitration began. In mid-arbitration the tobacco companies and some States reached a settlement called the Term Sheet. Over the objections ofldaho and a majority of States, the arbitrators
issued a Partial Award that released escrowed MSA payment to Term Sheet States and to tobacco
companies for years 2003 through 2012, but not to Idaho or other States. The MSA has no
provision for releasing funds to some States but not to others under such circumstances. The
arbitration agreement did not provide for arbitrating or resolving issues for years after 2003.
Idaho moved to vacate the post-2003 parts of the Partial Award, which were a non-MSAbased selective release of funds to some States, but not to Idaho. Idaho appeals from the District
Court's denial of its Motion to Vacate post-2003 portions of the Partial Award, which denied
Idaho the right to pursue an MSA-based claim to its share of the released funds. Idaho argues
that the arbitrators had no power to use the Term Sheet to displace the MSA.
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B.

Course of the Proceedings

Statement of the Facts

The facts arise from proceedings before the District Court and before the arbitrators. The
Course of the Proceedings and Statement of the Facts are combined because they are the same.
1.

Background - Relevant Portions of the Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement
(MSA) Between the Participating Manufacturers (PMs) and the States

The MSA in General. In the 1990s Idaho and other States sued tobacco companies over

their marketing practices (e.g., targeting of youth), their denials of the addictiveness and health
consequences of smoking, the public health costs of smoking, and other issues. Idaho was one of
fifty-two Settling States 1 that joined a Master Settlement Agreement with four tobacco companies called Original Participating Manufacturers (OPMs). MSA § I(hh) (OPMs defined); R.,
p. 1017, App., p. 4. In 1998 then District Judge Eismann entered a Consent Decree and Final
Judgment under the MSA. R., pp. 31-40; MSA § II(o) ("Consent Decree" defined); R., p. 1014;
App., p. 3. Scores of tobacco companies later joined the MSA. They are called Subsequent Participating Manufacturers (SPMs). MSA § II(tt) (SPMs defined); R., p. 1023; App., p. 5.
Idaho is the only State that is a party before the District Court. OPMs and SPMs Gointly,
Participating Manufacturers, or PMs) are also parties before the District Court. MSA § II(p)
("Court" defined); § IIGj) (PM defined), § VII( a) (PMs agree to District Court's continuing jurisdiction over MSAand Consent Decree); R., pp. 1014, 1018-1019, 1055-1056; App., pp. 3, 4, 6.
The MSA is a public-health agreement that restricts PMs' sale and promotion of cigarettes. MSA Part III, Permanent Relief; R., pp. 1025-1043 (addressing advertising, youth access
to tobacco, etc.). The MSA also requires PMs to make payments to the States. The States in turn

This Brief capitalizes words like "Settling State" ( often shortened to "State") defined in the MSA.
A "Settling State" is one of fifty-two States and Territories that signed the MSA. MSA § II(qq) ("Settling
State" defined); R., p. 1022; App., p. 5. For the Court's convenience, an Appendix of Excerpts from the
Master Settlement Agreement (cited as App.) accompanies this Brief.
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released and dismissed past and future claims against the PMs. MSA § II(n) ("Claims" defined);
Part IX, Payments; Part XII, Settling States' Release, Discharge and Covenant; Part XIII, Consent Decrees and Dismissal of Claims; R., pp. 1014, 1061-1091, 1117-1129; App., pp. 7-16. The
MSA promotes State policies to reduce youth smoking, to promote the public health, and to
secure monetary payments. MSA Part I, Recitals; R., p. 1008; App., p. 2. See, generally, State

ex rel. Wasden v. Maybee, 148 Idaho 520, 523-524, 224 P.3d 1109, 1112-1113, cert. denied, 562
U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 150 (2010), for more background regarding the MSA.

MSA Base Payments. Original Participating Manufacturers make annual Base Amount
Payments to the States, beginning at $4.5 billion for calendar year 2000 and rising to $9 billion
(before adjustments) for 2018 and beyond. MSA § IX(c)(l); R., p. 1064; App., p. 7-8. Subsequent Participating Manufacturers also make Base Amount payments, unless MSA § IX(i)'s formulas grandfather them from payments. R., pp. 1085-1087; App., p. 12-13.
The PMs' Base Amount payments are subject to several adjustments. 2 Except for the
NPM Adjustment, each State receives adjusted Base Amount payments according to its Allocable
Share. MSA § II(f) ("Allocable Share" defined),§ IX(c)(l); R., pp. 1011, 1063-1064; App., pp.
3, 7-8. Idaho's Allocable Share of Base Payments is 0.3632632%. MSAEx. A; KittelmannAff.,
19 and Ex. 8; R., pp. 202, 263. The PMs' annual payments ranged from $5.9 to $7.6 billion
during 2003-2012. 3 Kittelmann Aff., 15 and Ex. 4; R., p. 201, 235-236. Idaho's payments
ranged from $20 to $31 million during 2003-2012. Id.

2

Base Amount payments are subject to adjustments for inflation, volume of cigarettes shipped, etc.
MSA § II(x) ("Inflation Adjustment" defined);§ Il(aaa) ("Volume Adjustment" defined);§ IX(c)(l) (base
payments subject to these and other adjustments); R., pp. 1015, 1025, 1064; App., pp. 4, 5, 8.

3

For 2008-2017 the States also received or will receive Strategic Contribution payments under MSA
§ IX(c)(2). These $861 million annual payments are subject to many of the same adjustments as Base
Payments, including the NPM Adjustment. Id. R., pp. 1064-1056; App., p. 8. There were no Strategic
Contributions payments for 2003.
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The NPM Adiustment Generally. Tobacco companies that have not joined the MSA are
called Non-Participating Manufacturers, or NPMs. MSA § II(cc) (NPMs defined); R., p. 16;
App., p. 4. NPMs do not make MSA payments or agree to advertising restrictions, but PMs do.
The MSA allows an NPM Adjustment, which can reduce the PMs' payments to the States under
two conditions. MSA § IX(d)(l); R., pp. 1065-1070; App., 8-10.
The first condition is that the PMs' national Market Share in a given year is more than
2% below the same PMs' national Market Share in 1997. The difference in the two Market
Shares, less a 2% buffer, is called Market Share Loss. MSA § II(z) ("Market Share" defined);
§ IX(d)(l)(B)(i)-(iii) ("Market Share Loss" and other terms defined); R., pp. 1016, 1067; App.,
pp. 4, 9-10. The second condition, known as "significant factor", is that a consulting economist
determines that disadvantages experienced as a result of the MSA were a significant factor contributing to the Market Share Loss. MSA § IX(d)(l )(C); R., pp. 1068-1069; App., p. 10.
When both conditions are met, the NPM Adjustment Percentage is three times the Market
Share Loss if the Loss is less than 16½ percent. MSA § IX(d)(l )(A)(i); R., p. 1066; App., p. 9.
For example, if the PMs' national market share were 99% in 1997 and 92% in Year Y, the Market
Share Loss for Year Y would be 99% minus 92% equals 7%, less the 2% buffer, equals 5%. The
NPM Adjustment Percentage would be three times 5%, i.e., 15%. During 2003-2012, Market
Share Losses ranged from a high of 5.94444% in 2003 to a low of 3.30751 % in 2007. NPM
Adjustment Percentages ranged from 17.83332% to 9.92253%. Kittelmann Aff.,

,r 7 and Ex. 6;

R., pp. 201,251. The significant factor condition also applied during 2003-2012.
Reallocation ofthe NPM Adiustmenl The NPM Adjustment does not necessarily apply
to all States: A "State's Allocated Payment shall not be subject to the NPM Adjustment" when
(1) the State "had a Qualifying Statute ... in full force and effect" and (2) "diligently enforced

APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 4

the provisions of such statute during the entire calendar year." MSA § IX(d)(2)(B); R., pp. 10701071; App., pp. 10-11. Also MSA § II(g) ("Allocated Payment" defined); R., p. 1011, App., p. 3.
The Idaho Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Act (Idaho MSA Act), Idaho Code
§§ 39-7801 et seq., 1999 Idaho Session Law, ch. 7, is Idaho's Qualifying Statute. 4 The Idaho
MSA Act provides that NPMs must escrow funds for each "unit sold" in Idaho. Idaho Code
§ 39-7803(b)(1 ). "Units sold" are defined as "cigarettes sold ... as measured by excise taxes
collected by the state on packs ... bearing the excise tax stamp of the state." Idaho Code § 3978020). Accord State v Maybee, 148 Idaho at 527-529, 224 P.3d at 1117-1118. Escrowed funds
"establish a reserve fund to guarantee a source of compensation" if Idaho were to sue the NPMs
and obtain judgments against them. R., pp. 1328-1329; App., p. 24; Idaho Code§ 39-7801(t).
When a State diligently enforces the provisions of its Qualifying Statute, it is not subject
to the NPM Adjustment, so its payment is not reduced, but its share of the NPM Adjustment does
not vanish. Instead, all diligently enforcing States' "Allocated Payments ... that are not subject
to an NPM Adjustment ... shall be reallocated among all other ... States ... and such other ...
States' Allocated Payments shall be further reduced accordingly."
p. 1071; App., p. 11.

MSA § IX(d)(2)(C); R.,

In other words, as a group States that did not diligently enforce the

provisions of a Qualifying Statute bear not only their own allocated shares of the NPM
Adjustment, but also bear the allocated shares of States that did diligently enforce.
To illustrate, assume an MSA payment of $10 billion and an NPM Adjustment of $1 billion offset against that payment. If no State diligently enforced the provisions of a Qualifying
Statute, every State would be subject to the NPM Adjustment, and every State's payment would
be reduced 10%. If States with Allocated Payments of $5 billion diligently enforced and would
4

MSA § 1X(d)(2)(E) provides that the "Model Statute" set forth in MSA Ex.Tis a Qualifying Statute. R., p. 1072; App., pp. 11-12. Ex.Tis at R., pp. 1328-1333, and App., pp. 24-28. Idaho's MSA Act
is the Model Statute. Compare Idaho MSA Act with Ex. T.
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not be subject to the NPM Adjustment, the $1 billion would be allocated to the other States' payments of $5 billion, which would be reduced by 20% ($1 billion divided by $5 billion), not 10%.
If States with Allocable Shares of 90% diligently enforced, their $9 billion in Allocated Pay-

ments would not be subject to the NPM Adjustment; the other States, with Allocated Payments of
$1 billion, would absorb the full $1 billion and lose their payments entirely. If States with Allocable Shares of 95% diligently enforced, their payments of $9.5 billion would not be reduced;
the other States would lose their $500 million of payments; and the PMs' "Available NPM Adjustment" would be half of the possible $1 billion NPM Adjustment. MSA § IX(d)(2)(D); R., pp.
1071-1072, 1075; App., p. 11 If every State diligently enforced, no State would be subject to the
NPM Adjustment, and there would be no Available NPM Adjustment. Id.

The Independent Auditor (IA) and Arbitration of IA Decisions. The MSA provides for
an Independent Auditor (IA) to oversee and calculate payments. The IA (1) "calculate[ s] and
determine[s]" (2) "payments ... adjustments, reductions, and offsets ... and ... carry-forwards"
and (3) "allocation of such payments, adjustments, reductions, offsets and carry-forwards" (4)
"among the Participating Manufacturers" and (5) "among the Settling States." MSA § II(b) (IA
defined),§ XI(a)(l) (IA duties); R., pp. 1015, 1093-1094; App., pp. 3, 16-17.
Disputes about the IA's calculations and determinations are subject to arbitration: Any
"dispute, controversy or claim rising out of or relating to calculations performed by, or any
determinations made by, the Independent Auditor (including ... the operation or application of
any of the adjustments ... ) shall be submitted to binding arbitration" before a panel of three
former Federal judges. MSA § XI(c); R., p. 1095; App., p. 17. Arbitrations under § XI(c) are
governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Id.

Amendment of the MSA. The MSA provides that it "may be amended by a written instrument executed by all [PMs] affected by the amendment and by all ... States affected by the
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amendment. The terms of any such amendment shall not be enforceable in any ... State that is
not a signatory to such amendment." MSA § XVIIIG); R., p. 1140; App., p. 21.

2.

The District Court Ordered Idaho to Arbitrate the 2003 NPM Adjustment

2003 was the frrst year for which application of the NPM Adjustment was not resolved.
April 2006 payments for calendar year 2005 were the first payments after the 2003 significant
factor determination satisfied the second condition for an NPM Adjustment. Some PMs withheld
from their April 2006 payments funds equal to 17.83332% of their payments for 2003; some paid
that percentage into the Disputed Payments Account; and some paid in full subject to a later
claim of offset. Kittelmann Aff., ,r 9 and Ex. 9; R., pp. 202, 263-268.
Idaho moved the District Court to declare that it diligently enforced the provisions of the
Idaho MSA Act and was not subject to the 2003 NPM Adjustment. R., pp. 60-61. The PMs
moved to compel arbitration because Idaho's Motion related to the IA's determination whether to
apply a 2003 NPM Adjustment. R., pp. 67-68. Former District Judge Williamson granted the
PMs' Motion and ordered Idaho to arbitration because "the need for uniformity is of paramount
concern." R., pp. 129-141, 139. Neither Idaho, the PMs, nor the District Court addressed NPM
Adjustments or diligent enforcement for any other year. R., pp. 60-141. 5

3.

The PMs, Idaho and Many Other States Signed an Agreement Regarding Arbitration (ARA) for the 2003 NPM Adjustment and No Other Years

The PMs, Idaho and many other States signed an Agreement Regarding Arbitration
(ARA) that listed matters to be arbitrated. Bouton Aff.,

,r 11 and Ex. I; pp. 405, 1368.

The ARA

referred to 2003 issues, but was silent on other years' issues. For example, the ARA:
5

The only NPM Adjustment or diligent enforcement mentioned in the State's Motion was for 2003.
R., pp. 60-61. The only NPM Adjustment or diligent enforcement mentioned in the OPMs' Motion or
briefing was for 2003. R., pp. 78, 84-86, 120, 122-123. The only NPM Adjustment or diligent enforcement mentioned by the District Court was for 2003. R., pp. 129-133, 140-141. E.g.: "The dispute before
the Court is ... over ... the 2003 NPM Adjustment." R., p. 140.
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•

recited that the PMs and the States "have agreed to proceed with the arbitration of the
2003 NPM Adjustment dispute before a single [arbitration] panel," R., p. 1356;

•

defined "Arbitration" as "binding arbitration . . . conducted to resolve the 2003 NPM
Adjustment dispute," ,r l(a), id.;

•

defined "diligent enforcement" as whether a "State diligently enforced a Qualifying Statute during 2003," ,r l(b), id.;

•

defined the "2003 NPM Adjustment dispute" as "whether the [PMs] are entitled to a 2003
NPM Adjustment," ,r l(f), id, p. 1357;

•

provided that the "NPM Adjustment dispute shall be resolved through arbitration pursuant to§ XI(c) of the MSA," ,r 2(a), id, p. 1357;

•

provided that the PMs would instruct the Independent Auditor to release certain funds in
the Disputed Payments Account to induce States to join the ARA, ,r 4, id, p. 1363; and

•

listed five "substantive matters that will be included in the arbitration," none of which involved release of post-2003 monies, id, Ex. A, p. 1368.

The ARA did not empower the arbitrators to address NPM Adjustment funds 6 for years other
than 2003. ARA

,r 4

provided for release of certain Disputed Payment Account funds to the

States, but had no provision for selective release to some States and not to others. R., p. 1363.

4.

Idaho Is Not Subject to the 2003 NPM Adjustment

The arbitration began in July 2010. In November 2011, the PMs contested 35 States and
did not contest 16 States, including Idaho. 7 Kittelmann A:ff.,

,r 10 and Ex.

10; R., pp. 202, 269-

271. Thus, Idaho is not subject to the 2003 NPMAdjustment.
6

The phrase "NPM Adjustment funds" refers to funds in two accounts set out in MSA § lX(c)(l)
and § 1X(c)(2): the "Subsection lX(c)(l) Account" (Base Payments) and the "Subsection 1X(c)(2) Account" (Strategic Contribution Payments). R., pp. 1063, 1064; App., p. 8.
7

Montana is missing from this count because it was not ordered to arbitration.
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5.

During the Arbitration, a Minority of States and the PMs Agreed to a Term
Sheet that Settled the NPM Adjustment for 2003-2014 and Asked the Arbitrators
to Direct Release of Funds/or 2003-2012 Only to the Term Sheet Parties

After receiving a no-contest, Idaho thought it was done with the arbitration, except to
await the arbitrators' issuance of awards for the contested States, after which the prevailing and
uncontested States would receive the rest of their 2003 payments. There was more to come.
In November 2012 the PMs and a cabal of seven contested States whose cases had not yet
been heard circulated a settlement called the Term Sheet, which had been negotiated without
Idaho. Kittelmann Aff.,

,r 11

and Ex. 11; R., pp. 202, 272-286. Among other things, the Term

Sheet:
•

settled the NPM Adjustment Claims for 2003-2014 with the Term Sheet States (those that
agreed to the Term Sheet) by those States taking 54% of their Allocable Shares of the
NPM Adjustment and the PMs taking the other 46%, all without the arbitrators finding
which contested Term Sheet States, if any, diligently enforced, Parts I-II; R., pp. 273-274;

•

created a new adjustment for the Term Sheet States for 2015 forward that used different
formulas and criteria from the NPM Adjustment, Part III; R., pp. 274-278;

•

had two conditions for settlement: joinder by critical masses of States and of PMs and
"approval of this Term Sheet's terms by the Arbitration Panel," Part IVE; R., p. 279; and

•

provided for release from the Disputed Payments Account solely to the PMs and to the
Term Sheet States of 2003 and post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds, Appendix A,

,r,r 2-4, 6;

R., pp. 284-286.
The release of NPM Adjustment funds from the Disputed Payments Account would be as
provided in the Term Sheet, not as provided in the MSA.
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6.

The Arbitrators (a) Held that the Term Sheet Did Not Affect Non-Term Sheet
States like Idaho, (b) Held that the Term Sheet Did Not Amend the MSA, and
(c) Ordered Payment of and Withholding of Post-2003 Funds Pursuant to the
Term Sheet, not Pursuant to the MSA

Idaho and a majority of States opposed the Term Sheet, in part because they contended
that the arbitrators had no power to order release of post-2003 funds from the DPA or to apply
the Term Sheet to Non-Term Sheet States or to rule whether the Term Sheet amended the MSA.
KittelmannAff., ,r 12 and Ex. 12; R., pp. 202-203, 287-330. Their Opposition was for naught.
The arbitrators' Stipulated Partial Settlement and Award (Partial Award) ordered payments of post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds to PMs and to Term Sheet States and forbade payments to Non-Term Sheet States, all based on the Term Sheet. KittelmannAff., ,r 13 and Ex. 13;

R., pp. 203, 331-368. The arbitrators claimed power to enter the Partial Award because they
ruled that MSA § XI(c) and court orders compelling arbitration gave them jurisdiction over "all
issues related to the 2003 NPM Adjustment dispute." Partial Award,

,r I. I;

R., p. 333 (internal

punctuation omitted). They also claimed power to implement post-2003 Term Sheet provisions:
"[D]irection to the [IA] includes implementation of the ... settlement ... beyond 2003 ... . . ..
Tribunals have jurisdiction to issue orders approving or giving effect to such broader settlements
even where they would lack jurisdiction to adjudicate the additional claims being resolved."

,r I.6, R., p. 335.
The Partial Award said that its provisions for payment of funds were based upon the Term
Sheet's settlement and that it gave effect to the Term Sheet only among the settling parties.
5. The Panel also has jurisdiction to incorporate and direct
the Independent Auditor to implement those provisions of the settlement that govern the amount and mechanism of monetary payments as among the Settling Parties, specifically ... the Disputed
Payments Account ("DPA)" funds to be released.
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7. .. . [T]he Panel is not "approving" the Term Sheet,
much less rendering it binding on absent class members [the
Non-Term Sheet States]. It is just giving effect to the Settling Parties' agreed settlement payments as among themselves, by directing the [IA] to implement the settlement provisions ...
Partial Award ,r,r I.5, I. 7; R. pp. 334, 335 (emphasis added).
The Partial Award also held that the PMs and Term Sheet States gave the arbitrators
power over post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds and that the Term Sheet's post-2003 provisions
did not adversely affect the legal rights of the Non-Term Sheet States:
8. . . . [I]f there any were [were any] questions about the
Panel's jurisdiction to give ... direction as to post-2003 years, the
Settling Parties can agree to give the panel jurisdiction to do so, as
long as the Panel concludes (as it has) that the direction to the
Independent Auditor does not adversely affect the legal rights of
the Non-Signatory States. . ..
Partial Award, ,r I.8; R., p. 336 (emphasis added).
The Partial Award further held that neither the Partial Award nor the Term Sheet adversely
affected the Non-Term Sheet States and did not amend the MSA:
4. The Panel concludes that the Stipulated Partial Settlement and Award and the Term Sheet do not legally prejudice or
adversely affect the Non-Signatory States ... as follows:
DPA ....
. . . Non-Signatory States have no entitlement to the favorable treatment that the PMs have afforded the Signatory States as
part of the consideration for settling their dispute. . ..
6. Neither this [Partial Award] nor the Term Sheet c011stitutes an amendment to the MSA that requires the consent of any
Non-Signatory States under MSA § XVIIIG).
[T]he Term
Sheet is not an "amendment" of the MSA at all. Rather, it is a
settlement of disputes that have arisen under the MSA . . . . . . . [I]f
an amendment were involved, the MSA provides that it only must
be signed by ". . . all Settling States affected by the amendment."

APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 11

. . . The Panel construes ... "affected by" to mean "materially prejudiced by." ... [N]one of the Term Sheet's provisions "affect" the
Non-Signatory States within the meaning of the contract. ...
Partial Award,

,i,r V.4 and V.6; R., pp. 343-344, 345-346 (emphasis added).

As noted, Idaho and other Non-Term Sheet States objected to the arbitrators considering
Term Sheet issues. Brief of the Majority States in Opposition to the Proposed Stipulated Partial
Award, R., pp. 295-301, especially pp. 300-301. Nevertheless, after ruling that the Term Sheet
did not affect Non-Term Sheet States and did not amend the MSA in a manner that required
Idaho or other Non-Term Sheet States' written consent, the Partial Award required Non-Term
Sheet States' Allocable Shares of post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds to remain in the DPA,
basing its decision solely on the Term Sheet and not upon the Master Settlement Agreement:
1. The Independent Auditor is directed to implement the
provisions of the Term Sheet incorporated in Section II above.
2. . . . [T]he [IA] will order the release of funds from the
DPA as described in the Term Sheet ... .... In doing so, the [IA]
will ensure that the Non-Signatory States' ... Share of both NPM
Adjustment funds now in the DPA ... and ... to be paid into the
DPA under ... the Term Sheet remains in the DPA.
3. The [IA] will ... (a) order the release of the funds in the
DPA as provided by ... the Term Sheet, (b) allocate those released
DPA funds solely among the Signatory States in the manner provided by ... the Term Sheet ....
4. [T]he [IA's] performance of the above requirements ...
will include: . . . (b) allocating the amount released solely among
the Signatory States ... as provided by ... the Term Sheet
5. There are NPM Adjustment amounts ... not yet in the
DPA .... If a PM ... pays ... into the DPA, the [IA] will ensure
that ... Non-Signatory States' aggregate Allocable Share ... remains in the DPA.
Partial Award, ,r,r III.1-III.5; R., pp. 337-339 (emphasis added).
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7.

Tlte District Court Denied Idaho's Motion to Vacate Post-2003 Portions of the
Partial Award on the Ground That Idaho Lacked Standing

Idaho moved the District Court to vacate the post 2003-portions of the Partial Award. R.,
pp. 189-190. Many PMs opposed Idaho's Motion. R., pp. 410-414, 420-445. The District Court
(by then District Judge Norton) summarized the issues before it as follows:
Idaho moved ... to vacate, modify, or correct the Partial Award to
the extent it gives effect to provisions of the Term Sheet which address issues beyond the 2003 NPM Adjustment and orders the release of funds associated with the NPM Adjustments for later
years. The [PMs] opposed the motion, contending: (1) Idaho
lacks standing to challenge the Partial Award; and (2) Idaho's arguments fail on the merits. . . . Idaho replied ... : (1) it did not
need to show injury to seek relief under the FAA; (2) even if it did
need to show injury, it could; and (3) it prevails on the merits.
R., p. 487. The District Court quoted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) sections under which
Idaho brought its Motion: 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (a court may vacate an award if arbitrators "exceeded their powers") and § ll(b) (a court may modify or correct an award if arbitrators
"awarded upon a matter not submitted to them"). Id.
The District Court did not decide the FAA issues. Instead, it held that Idaho lacked standing to pursue its Motion. The District Court quoted Young v. City of Ketchum, I 3 7 Idaho 102,
104, 44 P.3d 1157, 1159 (2003), for the Idaho law of standing. To have standing under Young:
. . . a litigant must "allege or demonstrate an injury in fact and a
substantial likelihood the relief requested will prevent or redress
the claimed injury." This requires a showing of a "distinct palpable injury" and "fairly traceable causal connection between the
claimed injury and the challenged conduct."
R., p. 488, quoting Young, 137 Idaho at 104, 44 P.3d at 1159.
Acknowledging that Idaho argued that "if a showing of injury is required, Idaho has suffered harm by the selective release ofpost-2003 funds from the DPA in a manner not provided by
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the MSA," R., p. 489, the District Court:
•

quoted the Partial Award's legal analysis, concluding that "Term Sheet and Partial Award
do not affect Idaho's rights to its share of the annual payments under the MSA," id;

•

quoted the Partial Award's legal conclusion that the Term Sheet and Partial Award "do not
legally prejudice or adversely affect the Non-Signatory State, id, p. 490; and

•

quoted the Partial Award's legal conclusion that "the Objecting States have not suffered
'plain legal' prejudice from and are not adversely affected by the Term Sheet," id
The District Court' concluded that Idaho lacked standing to move to vacate part of the

Partial Award because Idaho did not show "legal prejudice" or suffer "a cognizable injury":
Idaho has not alleged or shown ... any legal prejudice or adverse
effect ... as a result of the Panel's use of the Term Sheet to give
effect to its terms. The "selective release of post-2003 funds" from
the DPA is not a cognizable injury. The "selective release" excludes Idaho ... because Idaho did not enter into the settlement ....
. . . Nor does the selective release of funds affect Idaho's rights to
its share of the annual payments under the MSA. Idaho's share of
the dispute funds remains in the DPA and its right to future shares
is unaffected. . . . Therefore, Idaho has no standing to ask ... under
the FAA to vacate, modify, or correct the Partial Award.

R., pp. 490-491 (emphasis added).

8.

Idaho Timely Appealed the District Court's Judgment

The District Court entered Final Judgment Denying Motion to Vacate Award in Part on
November 20, 2013. R., p. 496. Idaho timely appealed on December 9, 2013. R., pp. 502-507.
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
After (a) the District Court ordered Idaho to arbitrate whe.ther it was subject to the 2003
NPM Adjustment (no other NPM Adjustment was mentioned), and (b) Idaho and the PMs signed
an Agreement Regarding Arbitration that dealt exclusively with the 2003 NPM Adjustment:

Issue 1. When the Partial Award provided that some States would share in release of post
2003 NPM Adjustment funds and others (including Idaho) would not, does Idaho have standing
to move to vacate or modify parts of the Partial Award that prohibited release of post-2003 NPM
Adjustment funds to Idaho on the ground that Idaho contends that the Partial Award contravened
provisions of the Master Settlement Agreement?

Issue 2. Did the Partial Award's direction based on the Term Sheet not to release post2003 NPM Adjustment funds to Idaho exceed the arbitrators' powers with regard to Idaho and/or
award on a matter not submitted to them with regard to Idaho?

Issue 3. Must Idaho show actual harm to vacate in part an award that exceeded the arbitrators' powers vis-a-vis Idaho and/or awarded on a matter not submitted to them by Idaho?

Issue 4. If so, did Idaho show actual harm because post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds
were released pursuant to directives contained in the Term Sheet, which excluded Idaho, and not
pursuant to the terms of the Master Settlement Agreement itself, which had no provisions for
excluding Idaho?
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STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Standing

The Court Has Free Review.

"Jurisdictional issues, like standing, are questions of law, over which this Court exercises
free review." In re Jerome County Bd. of Com'rs, 153 Idaho 298, 308, 281 P.3d 1076, 1086
(2012) (citations omitted).
Arbitration Awards - There Is Statutory Review Under the Arbitration Acts.
A court "must confirm the arbitrator's award unless it finds one of the enumerated

grounds for relief set forth in Idaho Code §§ 7-912 or 7-913." Norton v. California Ins. Guarantee Ass'n, 143 Idaho 922, 924, 155 P.3d 1161, 1163 (2007) (citations & internal punctuation

omitted). FAA"§§ 10 and 11 provide exclusive regimes for the review provided by the statute."
Hall Street Associates, LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 590, 128 S.Ct. 1396, 1406 (2008).

Scope of Arbitration

The Court Has Free Review.

"Arbitrability is a question of law to be decided by the court. . . . [W]e exercise free review over questions of arbitrability .... " Wattenbarger v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 150 Idaho
308,315,246 P.3d 961,968 (2010) (citations & internal punctuation omitted). "[W]hether a ...
binding arbitration clause applies to a certain type of controversy [is] presumptively for courts to
decide. . .. A court may ... review an arbitrator's determination of such a matter de nova absent
clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties wanted an arbitrator to resolve the dispute."
Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. - , - , n.3, 133 S.Ct. 2064, 2069, n.3 (2013)

(citations & internal punctuation omitted).

"[C]ourts have traditionally used their power to

determine whether a particular controversy was within the scope of the parties' agreement to
arbitrate, unless the parties specifically delegated this power to the arbitrator .... " DOMKE ON
COMMERCIALARBITRATION, § 15.2 (2013 on-line update).
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ARGUMENT
Idaho first explains what this appeal is and is not about. Idaho does not challenge that
the Term Sheet States and the PMs may settle post-2003 NPM Adjustment disputes among

themselves. Idaho does not seek to undo releases of post-2003 funds to the Term Sheet States.
Idaho is asking this Court to vacate the Term-Sheet-based, post-2003 parts of the Partial
Award as to Idaho so that Idaho may pursue its contractual rights under the MSA -

release of

Idaho's allocable shares of those funds according to MSA. Once the Partial Award is set aside in
part with regard to those post 2003-funds, Idaho will pursue its remedies under the MSA. Idaho
summarizes its Argument in four steps:
First, Idaho suffered an injury in fact when the Partial Award used the Term Sheet, not

the MSA, to prohibit Idaho from sharing in release of post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds. Thus,
Idaho has standing to challenge the Partial Award.
Second, the Partial Award's Term-Sheet-based direction to the Independent Auditor to

forbid release of post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds to Idaho exceeded the arbitrator's powers
with regard to Idaho and/or awarded on a matter that Idaho did not submit to the arbitrators and
may be remedied under FAA§ 10(a)(4) and/or§ ll(b).
Third, under the plain language of FAA § 10(a)(4) and § ll(b), Idaho need not show

actual injury to vacate an award that exceeded the arbitrators' powers and/or to modify an award
on a matter not submitted to the arbitrators.
Fourth, in any event, while not necessary under the FAA, Idaho suffered actual injury

and prejudice when the Partial Award displaced the MSA with the Term Sheet by forbidding the
MSA from applying to the release of post-2003 funds while ordering and prohibiting releases of
post-2003 funds pursuant to the Term Sheet.
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I. Idaho Has Standing to Challenge the Partial Award Because It Claims
a Right Under the MSA to Share in the Release of Post-2003 Funds, But
the Partial Award Prevented Idaho from Doing So
The District Court put the cart before the horse. It reached the merits (erroneously, Idaho
believes) before ruling on standing when it held that Idaho had neither "legal prejudice" nor
"cognizable injury" to conclude that Idaho had no standing to move to vacate. R., pp. 490-491.

Young directs the opposite order of analysis: "Standing is a preliminary question to be
determined ... before reaching the merits .... " 137 Idaho at 104, 44 P.3d at 1159. The District
Court also misapplied Young, which asks if a litigant (1) shows a distinct, palpable injury in fact
(2) fairly traceable to the conduct at issue (3) that is likely to be redressed by judicial relief:
To satisfy the ... requirement of standing, a litigant must allege or
demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood the relief
requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury. This requires
a showing of a distinct palpable injury and fairly traceable causal
connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct.
137 Idaho at 104, 44 P.3d at 1159 (citations & internal punctuation omitted). Youngs three-element test -

injury in fact, causal connection, and redressability

is still the law in Idaho. E.g.,

to have standing "litigants must allege [1] an injury in fact, [2] a fairly traceable causal connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct, and [3] a substantial likelihood
that the judicial relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury." Doe v. Doe, 155
Idaho 660, 662, 315 P.3d 848, 850 (2013) (citations & internal punctuation omitted; bracketed
numbers added). As shown below, Idaho satisfies all three elements

(1) Idaho alleged an injury in fact. The District Court conducted a legal analysis on
tlte merits to conclude, in effect, that Idaho had no injury in fact. Injury in fact and legal injury
are distinct, independent inquiries. E.g., Arambarri v. Armstrong, 152 Idaho 734, 738-740, 274
P.3d 1249, 1253-1255 (2012) (plaintiff seeking back pay and reinstatement had standing because
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his job loss was an injury in fact, although he lost on the merits); Ciszek v. Kootenai County Bd
of Com 'rs, 151 Idaho 123, 127-130, 254 P.3d 24, 28-31 (2011) (property owner opposing rezone

of adjacent property had standing because rezoning to mining uses was an injury in fact, although she lost on the merits). "[A] party can have standing to bring an action, but then lose on
the merits." Bagley v. Thomason, 149 Idaho 806,808,241 P.3d 979, 981 (2010).
Young quoted from the standing analysis of Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,

562, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2137 (1992): "[W]hen the plaintiff is not himself the object of the government action or inaction he challenges, standing is not precluded, but is ordinarily 'substantially
more difficult' to establish." 137 Idaho at 105, 44 P.3d at 1160. Lujan also addressed the converse

a plaintiff ordinarily has standing when he is the object of the action at issue:
When the suit is one challenging the legality of ... action ... , the
nature and extent of facts that must be averred ... or proved ... to
establish standing depends considerably upon whether the plaintiff
is himself an object of the action ... at issue. Ifhe is, there is ordinarily little question that the action ... has caused him injury, and
that a judgment preventing ... the action will redress it.

504 U.S. at 561-562, 112 S.Ct. 2130 at 2137.
Idaho was an object of the Partial Award -

its direction not to release NPM Adjustment

funds to Idaho (and other Non-Term Sheet States) because that is what the Term Sheet provided.
Thus, Idaho has shown injury in fact (exclusion from release of NPM Adjustment funds based
upon the Term Sheet, not upon the MSA) that satisfies the first element of Young-Doe standing
because Idaho contends that the MSA, not the Term Sheet, should govern release of funds.
The District Court did not rule on the other two Young-Doe elements. This Court may
address them because they "are questions of law . . . necessary to a final determination of the
case." Idaho Code § 1-205. The following analysis shows that Idaho also satisfies the second
and third Young-Doe elements and thus has standing to challenge the Partial Award.
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(2) Idaho's injury is caused by and directly traceable to the challenged conduct.
The Partial Award itself directed that Idaho and other States not receive post-2003 releases based
upon the Term Sheet. See quotations from Partial Award, p. 12, supra. Thus, the challenged
conduct (the Partial Award's Term-Sheet-based directives) are the cause of the injury in fact.
(3) There is a substantial likelihood that the relief requested will redress the claimed
injury. If the Partial Award's terms forbidding Idaho from sharing in the releases of post-2003
NPM Adjustment funds are vacated, there is a substantial likelihood that Idaho will receive post2003 funds from the DPA because that is what the MSA provides. See Part IV of the Argument,
pp. 27-31, infra. There is redressability.
Idaho satisfies all three Young-Doe elements of standing. The District Court's legal conclusion that Idaho did not have standing should be reversed and the case remanded to the District
Court for further proceedings. This Court may reach the merits of Idaho's Motion to Vacate in
Part the arbitrators' Partial Award before remanding. Idaho Code§ 1-205, supra. The rest ofthis
Argument addresses the merits ofldaho's Motion to Vacate.
II. The Partial Award's Use of the Term Sheet to Release and Deny Release
of Post-2003 Funds Exceeded the Arbitrators' Powers With Regard to Idaho
and/or Awarded on a Matter Not Submitted to the Arbitrators by Idaho
NPM Adjustment arbitrations "are governed by the United States Federal Arbitration
Act" (FAA). MSA § XI(c); R., p. 1095; App., p. 17. The FAA, not the Idaho Uniform Arbitration Act, therefore governs substantive review of the arbitrators' award. Wattenbarger v. A.G.
Edwards & Sons, Inc., 150 Idaho 308, 315-316, 246 P.3d 961, 968-969 (2010). However, "the

distinction between state and federal substantive arbitration law is largely a distinction without a
difference ... because the applicable legal principles are one and the same." Id. at 316,246 P.3d
at 969. This brief thus cites cases under both Idaho and Federal arbitration law because their
provisions are substantively identical.
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What issues are subject to arbitration? The answer is those issues that the parties agree to
arbitrate: "An arbitration agreement is a matter of contract," "a party cannot be required to
submit to arbitration any dispute which that party has not agreed to submit," and, "The parties
may limit by contract the issues which they will arbitrate." 8 DOMKE, § 15.3 (footnotes omitted).
When awards go beyond what the parties agree to arbitrate, FAA§§ 10(a)(4) and ll(b)
come into play. Under§ 10(a)(4) a Court may vacate an award "where the arbitrators exceeded
their powers." 9 Under § ll(b) a Court may modify or correct an award "Where the arbitrators
have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them." 10 This Court elucidated the meaning of the
phrases "exceeded their powers" and "a matter not submitted to them" in Norton v. CIGA, supra.
8

MSA § VII(a)(3) lists three issues subject to arbitration: "(3) except as provided in subsections
IX(d) [significant factor determinations], XI( c) [Independent Auditor calculations], XVII( d) and Exhibit
0 [attorneys' fees for cases pending in 1998]," Idaho's MSA Court (the District Court in Ada County)
"shall be the only court to which disputes under this Agreement or the Consent Decree are presented as to
such Settling State." R., pp. 1055-1056; App., p. 6. MSA § VII(a) has no exceptions to arbitrate whether
the Term Sheet or any other side agreement affected Idaho or amended the MSA.
9

FAA Section 10(a)(4), 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4), provides:

§ 10. Same; vacation; grounds; rehearing
(a) In any of the following cases the ... court ... may make an order vacating the
award upon the application of any party to the arbitration ( 4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers ....
Like FAA § 10(a)(4), Idaho Code§ 7-912(a)(3) provides that "the court shall vacate an award where ...
[t]he arbitrators exceeded their powers," so decisions under both statutes apply the same substantive law.
10

FAA Section ll(b), 9 U.S.C. § l l)(b), provides:

§ 11. Same; modification or correction; grounds; order
In either of the following cases the . . . court . . . may make an order modifying or
correcting the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration (b) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them, unless it
is a matter not affecting the merits of the decision upon the matter submitted.
Like FAA§ 1 l(b), Idaho Code § 7-913(a)(2) provides "the court shall modify or correct the award where
... [t]he arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them ... ," so decisions under both
statutes apply the same substantive law.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF -

21

A reviewing court shall modify an arbitration award where
the arbitrator has awarded upon a matter not submitted to him and
the award may be corrected without affecting the merits of the
decision upon the issues submitted. An arbitrator's authority is derived from the parties' arbitration agreement. An arbitrator exceeds his authority and jurisdiction when he rules on an issue not
submitted by the parties. . . . [C]ourts construe the phrase "exceeded his powers" to mean that the arbitrator considered an issue
not submitted to him by the parties, or exceeded the bounds of the
contract between the parties."
143 Idaho at 925, 155 P.3d at 1164 (citations & most internal punctuation omitted).
The District Court's 2006 Order required Idaho to arbitrate the 2003 NPM Adjustment.
R., pp. 140-141.

The Agreement Regarding Arbitration (ARA) established procedures for

arbitrating the 2003 NPM Adjustment. R., p. 1356. Neither covered any other year's NPM
Adjustment or funds. Nevertheless, see Part B.6 of the Statement of the Case, pp. 10-13, supra,
the arbitrators allowed Term Sheet States and PMs to receive post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds
and prohibited non-Term Sheet States (including Idaho) from receiving those funds, all pursuant
to the Term Sheet, not the MSA. As explained in more detail in Part IV.B of this Argument, pp.
27-31, infra, the arbitrator's Partial Award was inconsistent with the MSA.
Applying the plain meaning of the statutes, the arbitrators "exceeded their powers" with
regard to Idaho and "awarded upon a matter not submitted to them" by Idaho because:
(1)

the Partial Award held that the Term Sheet did not affect Idaho's or other

Non-Term Sheet States' legal rights, see quotations from Partial Award, p. 11, supra,
which was an issue of contract law that Idaho did not submit to the arbitrators;
(2)

the Partial Award held that the Term Sheet did not amend the MSA or re-

quire Idaho's or other States' written consent, see quotations from Partial Award, p. 11,

supra, another issue of contract law that Idaho did not submit to the arbitrators; and,
(3)

the Partial Award implemented the Term Sheet against Idaho by directing
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release of post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds to Term Sheet States and to the PMs and not
to Idaho or other Non-Term Sheet States, see quotations from Partial Award, p. 12, supra,
thus ignoring what the MSA itself provides for post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds.
Thus, under FAA§§ 10(a)(4) and ll(b), all post-2003 provisions of the Partial Award should be
vacated or modified as to Idaho. Idaho case law supports this position.
In Norton the insurer Reliance went into receivership while plaintiff's claim against it
was pending.

CIGA protected insureds of various insolvent companies, including Reliance.

CIGA agreed to arbitrate whether ''the accident in which [plaintiff] was involved ... caused [his]
injuries ... and ... any associated monetary damages." The arbitrator also determined CIGA's
liability to plaintiff. Norton affirmed the District Court's vacatur of that part of the award:
"Nowhere in the parties' agreement" did "they submit[] the issue of CIGA's liability to the
arbitrator," and the "agreement confined the arbitrator's authority ... to resolving ... Reliance's
liability." 143 Idaho at 925-926, 155 P.3d at 1164-1165. This case is like Norton because Idaho
never submitted to the arbitrators the issues of whether Idaho was affected by the Term Sheet,
whether the Term Sheet amended the MSA in a manner requiring Idaho's consent, or whether
the Term Sheet prohibited Idaho from sharing in release of post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds.
In Bingham County Comm 'n v Interstate Electric Co., 105 Idaho 36, 665 P .2d 1046

(1983), an arbitrator awarded on a matter of contract law submitted to him and also awarded
attorneys' fees for the arbitration. Because the contract with the arbitration clause had no provision for awarding attorneys' fees for the arbitration, "we hold that it was beyond the power of the
arbitrator to award such fees." Id. at 42-43, 665 P.2d at 1052-1053. This case is like Bingham

County because the arbitrators awarded on matters not submitted to them by Idaho - the effect
of the Term Sheet on Idaho's MSA contract and payment rights.

Norton and Bingham County are more than enough to show that the Partial Award should
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be vacated in part and/or modified where the arbitrators exceeded their powers and/or awarded
on matters not submitted to them. Cases from other jurisdictions are consistent. For example,

Burlington Resources O&G Co. v. San Juan Basin Royalty Trust, 249 S.W.3d 34 (Tex. App.
2007), held that an arbitrator exceeded his powers by ruling on issues arising after the arbitration
began. The fact that the Trust "did not learn of the underlying facts supporting its newly asserted
claim until after the commencement of arbitration establishes that such a claim was not one of
the 'existing' audit disputes ... to be resolved by the Arbitration Agreement." 249 S.W.3d at 45.

Burlington is like this case because the portions of the Partial Award that prevented Idaho from
sharing in releases of post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds were based on the Term Sheet, which
came into existence after the arbitration began.

Trustees ofAsbury United Methodist Church v. Taylor & Parrish, Inc., 249 Va. 144,452
S.E.2d 847 (1995), held that an arbitrator exceeded his power when he awarded quantum meruit
damages for performance not under the contract that called for arbitration: "The trial court's
referral [to arbitration] of the quantum meruit request was void ... because the trial court could
not confer jurisdiction on the arbitrator to adjudicate disputes that were not based on the parties'
contract." 249 Va. at 153. 452 S.E.2d at 852. Asbury is like this case because portions of the
Partial Award that prevented Idaho from sharing in releases of post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds
were based on the Term Sheet, not on the MSA or the Agreement Regarding Arbitration.

In re Melun Industries, Inc. v. Strange, 898 F.Supp. 990 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), arose from a
contract that set the purchase price of stock at 80% of book value on August 31, 1986, that
adjusted the price for changes to book value from September 1 to the closing date, and that called
for arbitration if the parties could not agree on adjustments to book value from September 1 on.

Melun held that the arbitrator exceeded his powers when he also arbitrated pre-September 1
adjustments to book value. Melun is like this case because the portions of the Partial Award that
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prevented Idaho from sharing in releases of post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds were outside the
temporal restrictions of the 2003 issues submitted to arbitration.
Consistent with the case law applying the plain language of the statutes, the Partial Award
should be vacated and/or modified as to Idaho because forbidding Idaho from sharing in releases
of post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds not only contravened the MSA, but also exceeded the arbitrators' powers as to Idaho and/or awarded on a matter not submitted to arbitration by Idaho.

III. Under the FAA's Plain Language, Idaho Need Not Show Actual Harm
to Vacate in Part an Award That Exceeded the Arbitrators' Powers and/or
to Modify an Award on a Matter Not Submitted to the Arbitrators
FAA§ lO(a) has four clauses listing grounds to vacate an award. Clause (1) (procuring
an award by corruption, fraud, or undue means), clause (2) (arbitrators' partiality or corruption),
and clause (4) (arbitrators exceeding their powers or issuing an incomplete award) address
"structural" errors not requiring a showing of prejudice to vacate an award. Only clause (3),
which lists "trial" errors (not postponing hearings on sufficient cause shown, not hearing pertinent, material evidence, etc.), requires a showing of prejudice to vacate an award. 11
FAA § 11 has three clauses, none of which requires a showing of prejudice to modify or
11

FAA§ lO(a) provides:
§ 10. Same; vacation; grounds; rehearing
(a) In any of the following cases the ... court ... may make an order vacating the
award upon the application of any party to the arbitration -

( 1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either
of them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the
hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and
material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any
party have been prejudiced; or
( 4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed
them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was
not made.
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correct an award, and all of which address errors that are structural or per se prejudicial (miscalculation, awarding on a matter not submitted, or awards imperfect in form). 12
The question becomes: Should§§ 10(a)(4) and ll(b) be construed to require a showing
of prejudice to vacate or modify an award subject to those sections' terms?, or may an award
subject to those sections' terms be vacated or modified with further ado? The plain language of
the statutes gives the latter answer.
"[S]tatutory interpretation begins with the literal language of the statute. If the statutory
language is unambiguous, this Court need not engage in statutory construction and should apply
the statute's plain meaning." Idaho Power Co. v. Idaho Dept. of Water Resources, 151 Idaho
266, 272, 255 P.3d 1152, 1158 (2011) (citations omitted). Also KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 565 U.S.
- , - , 132 S.Ct. 23, 26 (2011) (courts must give effect to plain meaning of a federal statute).
Thus, under the plain language of§§ 10(a)(4) and 11 (b), no prejudice need be shown to vacate or
modify an award for "structural" errors, including the ones at issue here

"where the arbitrators

exceeded their powers" and/or "awarded upon a matter not submitted to them." Under the plain
language of the statutes, these errors trigger automatic vacatur or modification.
Vacating and/or modifying parts of an award in excess of the arbitrators' powers and/or

12

FAA § 11 provides:
§ 11. Same; modification or correction; grounds; order

In either of the following cases the . . . court . . . may make an order modifying or
correcting the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration (a) Where there was an evident material miscalculation of figures or an evident material mistake in the description of any person, thing, or property referred to in the award.
(b) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them, unless it
is a matter not affecting the merits of the decision upon the matter submitted.
(c) Where the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of the controversy.
The order may modify and correct the award, so as to effect the intent thereof and promote
justice between the parties.
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on a matter not submitted to the arbitrators without an analysis of prejudice or harm is consistent
with the practice in Idaho. E.g., Norton, supra, 143 Idaho at 924-926, 155 P.3d at 1163-1165
(vacatur of part of award determining liability on an issue not submitted to arbitration affirmed
without addressing prejudice); Bingham County, supra, 105 Idaho at 42-43, 665 P.2d at 1052
1053 (vacatur of part of award granting attorneys' fees affirmed without addressing prejudice
when award of attorneys' fees was beyond arbitrator's powers).
Other jurisdictions are similar. As the New York Court of Appeals explained in Matter
of Salvano v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 85 N.Y.2d 173, 623 N.Y.S.2d 790, 647

N.E.2d 1298 (1995), in vacating part of an award made under an expedited procedure that exceeded the arbitrators' powers: "When the arbitrators act in excess of their powers, the award
can be vacated even in the absence of a specific showing that the rights of any party have been
prejudiced (see 9 USC§ 10[a][4])." 85 N.Y.2d at 183, cited by DOMKE,§ 38.12, n.14.
For the reasons stated above, the Court should apply the plain meaning of Federal Arbitration Act§§ 10(a)(4) and 1 l(b) and vacate as to Idaho those portions of the Partial Award that
address post-2003 funds and/or modify as to Idaho the Partial Award to remove those portions
the award that address post 2003 funds because the arbitrators exceeded their power and/or
awarded on a matter not submitted to them.
IV. In Any Event, Idaho Suffered Actual Prejudice and Legal Harm Because
the Partial Award Displaced the MSA and Prohibited Idaho from Sharing in
Release of Post-2003 Funds Pursuant to the MSA
A.

The Partial Award Displaced the MSA

The Term Sheet was a side deal between the PMs and the Term Sheet States in which the
latter (1) took on additional post-2014 enforcement obligations not in the MSA (2) in return for
(a) eliminating the risk of losing substantial portions of their 2003-2014 MSA payments for not
diligently enforcing the provisions of their Qualifying Statutes, and (b) obtaining a percentage of
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the NPM Adjustment funds for 2003-2012 without awaiting the results ofNPM Adjustment arbitrations for those years. See R., pp. 350-368 (Term Sheet), especially Part I (release of funds),
p. 350, and Parts II and III, pp. 350-355 (detailing the "revised NPM Adjustment").
The Term Sheet States' side deal with the PMs in and of itself is not reason to vacate the
Partial Award's incorporation of portions of the Term Sheet. If the Partial Award had done only
what it said it would do

implement the Term Sheet among the Settling Parties and not render

it binding on Non-Term Sheet States, see quotations on p. 10, supra

Idaho would not have

moved for partial vacatur. Without the Partial Award, releases of post-2003 funds would be
subject to the MSA, which has no provision for selective releases of post-2003 NPM Adjustment
funds in the Disputed Payments Account to a cabal of PMs and Term Sheet States while NonTerm Sheet States like Idaho are excluded from releases.
The arbitrators had options with respect to the Term Sheet and the Disputed Payments
Account that would have been consistent with the MSA. For example, they could have ordered
release of post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds not released to the Term Sheet States or to the PMs
as otherwise provided by the MSA. They did not. They could have been silent on the treatment
of those funds, in which case the MSA would still have governed. They were not silent. Instead,
the arbitrators affirmatively prohibited the release of post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds to NonTerm Sheet States based upon the Term Sheet, i.e., they displaced the MSA's treatment of those
funds for Idaho and other Non-Term Sheet States with the Term Sheet.
The arbitrators did more than implement the Term Sheet among the Term Sheet parties:
Like the arbitrators in Norton. Bingham County, Burlington Resources, Asbury United Methodist

Church, and Melun Industries, who decided issues not covered by their arbitration agreements,
the arbitrators' Partial Award decided two issues against Idaho that arose under the Term Sheet
after the arbitration began and that did not arise under the MSA or the Agreement Regarding
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Arbitration: (1) The Term Sheet did not affect the legal rights of Non-Term Sheet States, and (2)
the Term Sheet was not an amendment of the MSA requiring Idaho's written consent. 13 The
arbitrators then relied upon the Term Sheet, not the MSA or the ARA, to prohibit Idaho and other
Non-Term Sheet States from sharing in releases of post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds in the
Disputed Payments Account. See Statement of the Case, Part B.6, p. 12, supra.
The arbitrators' use of the Term Sheet rather than the MSA to decide that Idaho and other
Non-Term Sheet States were not entitled to release of post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds dis-

placed the MSA with the Term Sheet. That is reason enough for this Court to remand to the
District Court to vacate or modify as to Idaho those portions of the Partial Award that address
post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds in the Disputed Payments Account. The arbitrators had no
power to adjudicate Idaho's rights to post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds using the Term Sheet.
The Pennsylvania MSA court reached an analogous conclusion. It held that the arbitrators could not displace the MSA's NPM Adjustment reallocation provisions with a formula not in
the MSA that reflected the arbitrators' notions of how best to implement the Term Sheet:
When the [arbitrators] adopted the pro rata reallocation method
and instructed the Independent Auditor to treat all of the [Term
Sheet] States as diligent [they] effectively rewrote the MSA and
affected Pennsylvania's contractual rights.
While the PMs were free to settle with the [Term Sheet]
States ... , these parties could not do so in a way that "affected" the
rights of Pennsylvania. In entering the Partial Settlement Award,
the [arbitrators] should have done so in a way that would not even
potentially implicate the rights of the other Settling States as it was
beyond the authority of the [arbitrators] to enter the Partial Settle13

The Partial Award's legal conclusion - "the Term Sheet is not an 'amendment' of the MSA at all.
Rather it is a settlement," R., pp. 345-346 - is doubtful. E.g., Vanderford Co., Inc. v. Knudson, 150
Idaho 664, 670-671, 249 P.3d 857, 863-864 (2011) ("a settlement ... is a new contract settling an old
dispute"). The Pennsylvania and Missouri MSA courts have already ruled, see text above, pp. 29-30, that
the Term Sheet was an amendment of the MSA that did affect Non-Term Sheet States.
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ment Award in a way that affected the rights of any other Settling
State without that Settling State's consent....

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., Pennsylvania Court of Common
Pleas, Philadelphia County, Case No. 2443, p. 50 (April 10, 2014) (Opinion explaining why part
of arbitrators' award reallocating NPM Adjustment to Pennsylvania was vacated).
Likewise, the Missouri MSA court held that the Partial Award violated MSA § XVIII(i)'s
requirements that all States affected by an amendment agree to the amendment in writing:
[The arbitrators'] reallocation method ... violates the MSA's procedure for amending the MSA. . . . The Stipulated Partial Settlement and Award effectively amends § IX(d)(2), since the [Term
Sheet] states are no longer subject to the NPM Adjustment and do
not have to prove their diligent enforcement.
There is no question that Missouri is materially affected by
the Partial Settlement and the pro rata reallocation of the NPM Adjustment. Missouri, and the other non- signatory states, did not
agree to ... amendment of the calculation of their annual payment.

Missouri v. The American Tobacco Company, Cause No. 22972-01465, p. 7, Missouri Circuit
Court, St. Louis County (May 2, 2014) (Opinion explaining why part of arbitrators' award
reallocating NPM Adjustment to Missouri was vacated).
Idaho did not agree to the Term Sheet or the Partial Award's use of the Term Sheet to
override MSA's provisions for releasing funds in the Disputed Payments Account. The case law
shows that the arbitrators' awarding under the Term Sheet and not under the MSA was per se
beyond their power on a matter not submitted to them by Idaho. This Court should order the
District Court, as did the Pennsylvania and Missouri MSA Courts, to vacate and/or modify the
Partial Award where it displaced the MSA with the Term Sheet. That means the District Court
should vacate or modify the Partial Award's prohibition against Idaho's sharing in releases of
post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds under terms not found in the MSA. Vacating or modifying the
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Partial Award in part as to Idaho will allow Idaho to pursue its rights under the MSA.

B.

The Partial Award Was Contrary to the MSA

Idaho shows below that selective release of post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds was contrary to the MSA even though it need not do so to show that it is entitled to vacate or modify the
Partial Award to remove the Term Sheet's displacement of the MSA. MSA § IX(a) provides that
funds can be disbursed to the States or returned to PMs only as provided in the MSA:
(a) All Payments Into Escrow. All fayments ... pursuant to
this Agreement (except . . . section XVII) 1 shall be made into escrow ... and shall be credited to the appropriate Account . . . . Such
payments shall be disbursed to the beneficiaries or returned to the
[PMs] only as provided in section XI and the Escrow Agreement.
R., pp. 1061-1062; App., p. 7 (emphasis added). MSA § XI(e) also allows payment from an
MSA account "only if permitted ... by this Agreement [the MSA]." 15 R., p. 1101; App., p. 18
(emphasis added). But, post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds were not released to non-Term Sheet
States as provided in the MSA; they were denied release as provided by the Term-Sheet.
DPA funds may be released when the dispute for which the funds were put into the DPA
"is resolved with finality." MSA § XI(t)(2); 16 R., p. 1102; App., p. 19. In particular, DPA funds
may be released to PMs when a dispute "is resolved with finality in favor of a Participating

14

MSA § XVID dealt exclusively with costs and attorneys fees associated with cases settled by the
1998 Consent Decrees and the MSA itself. R., pp. 1131-1133. It is not at issue here.

15

MSA § XI(e) provides that funds may be disbursed only as permitted by the MSA:
( e) General Treatment of Payments. The Escrow Agent may disburse amounts from
an Account only if permitted, and only at such time as permitted, by this Agreement . . . . . ..

R., p. 1101; App., p. 18.
16

MSA § XI(f)(2) provides that DPA funds may be paid when the dispute is resolved with finality:
(2) Payments to and from Disputed Payments Account. The [IA] shall instruct the
Escrow Agent to credit funds ... to the [DPA] when a dispute arises ... and ... to credit funds
from the [DPA] to the appropriate payee when such dispute is resolved with finality.

R., p. 1102; App., p. 19.
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Manufacturer." MSA § XI(i)(2)(A); 17 R., p. 1114; App., p. 20. Likewise, DPA funds can be
released to a State when a dispute is "resolved with finality" against a PM. MSA § XI(i)(2)(B); 18
R., pp. 1111, 1113; App., pp. 20-21. But post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds were released by the
Partial Award before post-2003 NPM Adjustment issues were resolved with finality.
NPM Adjustment funds are "made or held for the benefit of each individual ... State"
according to "the results of clause 'Twelfth' of subsection IXG)." MSA § IX(i). MSA § XI(f)(6);

R., pp. 1109-111 O; App., p. 19 .19 Clauses Fifth, Sixth and Seventh have detailed allocations of an

17

MSA § XI(i)(2)(A) provides that DPA funds shall not be released to a PM until the dispute is resolved with finality:
(i) Miscalculated or Disputed Payments.
(2) Overpayments.
(A) If a dispute ... is resolved with finality in favor of a [PM] where the disputed amount has been paid into the [DPA] ... , the Independent Auditor shall instruct
the Escrow Agent to transfer such amount to such [PM].
R., p. 1111, 1114; App., p. 20.
18

MSA § XI(i)(l)(B)(i) provides that DPA funds shall not be released to a State until the dispute is
resolved with finality:
(i) Miscalculated or Disputed Payments.
(1) Underpayments.
(B) To the extent a dispute ... is resolved with finality against a [PM]: (i) ...
where the disputed amount has been paid into the [DPA] ... , the [IA] shall instruct the
Escrow Agent to transfer such amount to the applicable payee Account(s);
R., pp. 1111, 1113; App., pp. 19-20.
19
MSA § XI(f)(6) provides that Base Payments and Strategic Contribution Payments must be made
or held according to the results ofMSA § IX(i):
(6) Determination of amounts paid or held for the benefit of each ... State. For ...
subsections ... (i)(2) [Overpayments, see note 17], the portion of a payment ... made or held
for the benefit of each ... State shall be determined: ... (B) ... a payment credited to the
Subsection IX(c)(l) Account [Base Payments] or the Subsection IX(c)(2) Account [Strategic
Contribution Payments], by the results of clause "Twelfth" of subsection IXG) for each
individual ... State. . ..
R.,pp.1109-lll0;App.,p.19.
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NPM Adjustment among the States that feed into clause Twelfth, but they were not used in the
Partial Award because the Term Sheet was used instead. R., pp. 1088-1089; App., pp. 14-15.20
The PMs' alternative to waiting for finality, however, was releasing DPA funds according
to each State's Allocable Share, i.e., a PM may change its mind regarding maintaining funds in
the MSA. That is what happened under the Agreement Regarding Arbitration, where the PMs
released certain NPM Adjustment funds in the DPA to the States as a whole as an incentive to
join the arbitration. 21 See ARA ,r 4; R., p. 1363. And, pursuant to the MSA, Disputed Payments
Account funds were distributed to all States, even ones that had not signed the ARA. That is not
what happened here.
The ultimate issue of what will happen under the MSA if the post-2003 provisions of the
Partial Award are vacated or modified in part is an issue for another day. Idaho wants to reach a
20

Clauses Fifth, Sixth and Seventh of MSA § IX(i) provide specific rules for the NPM Adjustment:

Fifth: [for] payments due under subsections IX(c)(l) and IX(c)(2), the results of
clause "Fourth" ... shall be apportioned among the ... States ... in proportion to their ...
Allocable Shares, and ... be added together to form such ... State's Allocated Payment. ... ;
Sixth: the NPM Adjustment shall be applied to the results of clause "Fifth" pursuant
to subsections IX(d)(l) and (d)(2) ( or, [for SPMs], pursuant to subsection IX(d)( 4));
Seventh: .. . [for] payments ... to which clause "Fifth" applies: (A) the Allocated
Payments of all ... States ... shall be added together; ... (C) the Available NPM Adjustment
... shall be allocated among the [OPMs] ... ; (D) the ... result of step (C) ... shall be subtracted ... ; and (E) the resulting payment amount . . . shall then be allocated among the ...
States in proportion to the ... results of clause "Sixth" for each ... State. . ..
R., pp. 1088-1089; App., pp. 14-15. The Term Sheet did not follow Clauses Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh in
its allocation of the post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds among the States.
21

Paragraph 5 of the ARA provided for release of2005 NPM Adjustment funds in the DPA:
4.

Release of Certain Funds Paid into the Disputed Payments Account.

Each Signatory PM that paid ... the 2005 NPM Adjustment into the [DP A] will ...
instruct ... the [IA] to release ... (i) such amounts ... multiplied by (ii) the aggregate
Allocable Share percentage ... of all [States] that executed this Agreement ....... [I]n the
event the aggregate Allocable Share percentage of all [States] that executed this Agreement
... is 80% or more, each such [PM] will ... instruct ... the [IA] to release from that Account
all such amounts attributed to the 2005 NPM Adjustment.
R., p. 1363. This paragraph has no provision for selective release to some States and not to others.
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mutually agreeable resolution of that issue with the PMs. If not, Idaho can go to its MSA Court
to determine its appropriate remedy. That bridge need not be crossed in this appeal.
All that must be decided on this appeal is: (1) the arbitrators had no power to use the
Term Sheet to deny releases of post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds to Idaho, which was not bound
by the Term Sheet, (2) the Partial Award's denial of releases of post 2003-NPM Adjustment
funds to Idaho was based on an issue (the effect of the Term Sheet on non-Term Sheet States)
that Idaho did not submit to the arbitrators, and (3) that those portions of the Partial Award
denying release of post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds to Idaho should be vacated or modified.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiff-Appellant the State ofldaho prays that this Court:
(a)

reverse the judgment of the District Court denying the State of Idaho's Motion to

Vacate in Part the Partial Award of the 2003 NPM Adjustment Arbitration Panel, and
(b)

remand to the District Court with instructions to grant the State ofldaho 's Motion

to Vacate in Part the Partial Award of the 2003 NPM Adjustment Arbitration Panel. In particular,
the District Court should vacate and/or modify as to Idaho all provisions of the Partial Award that
deny release ofpost-2003 NPMAdjustment funds to Idaho.
Respectfully submitted this 16th day May, 2014.
STATE OF IDAHO
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
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Attachment 1
Order and Opinion of the Pennsylvania
MSA Court in Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.
Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia
County, First Judicial District of
Pennsylvania, Civil Trial Division, Case
No. 2443 (April 10, 2014)

n
.....__

.

'COPY
· IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPIDA COUNTY
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CIVIL TRIAL DIVISION

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :
BY KATHLEEN G. KANE, in her official
capacity as Attorney General of1:he
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,

APRIL TERM, 1997
NO. 2443

Plaintiff,

.

vs.
PIDLIP MORRIS USA,INC., ET AL.,

..

Defendants.

Control Nos.: 13110724 and 13121706

ORDER
AND NOW, this 10th day of April, 2014, upon consideration of the Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania's Motion toVacate Final Arbitration Award (filed under control number
13110724) and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's Amended.Motion to Modify, or Vacate in
Part, a Stipulated Partial Settlement and Award (filed und.er control number 13121706), all
responses in opposition or support, all replies, all matters of record, oral argument, and in accord
with the Opinion issued simultaneously hereto, it is hereby ORDERED and DECREED that:
1.

The Commonwealth ofPe~ylvania's Motion to Vacate Final Arbitration Award

is DENIED.
2.

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's ~ended Motion to Modify, or Vacate in

Part, a Stipulated Partial Settlement and Award is GRANTED and the Stipulated Partial
Settlement and Award dated March 12, 2013 in the matter entitled In the 2003 NPM Adjustment
Proceedings, JAMS Reference No. 1100053390, is MODIFIED. Notwithstanding section IV of

1

~
_J

the Stipulated Partial Settlement and Award, the Independent Auditor 1 shall treat each Settling
State that has signed the Term Sheet referenced in the Stipulated Partial Settlement and Award as
if such Settling State did not diligently enforce a Qualifying Statute for,purposes
of section IX(d)
-:
of the MSA when the Independent Auditor calculates the amounts owed to Pennsylvania under
the MSA for the sales year 2003, unless the diligence of such Settling State was not contested or
the arbitration panel issued a separate final award determining that such Settling State was
diligent.

BY THE COURT:

·M'~

Capitalized terms not defined herein have the meaning ascribed to them in the
Commonwealth's Amended Motion.

2

COPY
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY
FIRST
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
.
.
CIVIL TRIAL DIVISION

. COMMONWEALTH OFPENNSYLVANIA·:
RY KATHLEEN G. KANE~ in her official . :~:
capacity as Attorney General of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,

APRIL TERM, 1997
NO.2443

.

Plaintiff,
vs.
PIDLIP MORRIS USA, INC., ET AL.,
Defendants.

Control Nos.: 13110724 and 13121706

OPINION

BY:

Patricia A. Mcinemey, J..

I.

BACKGROUND

April 10, 2014

Inl997, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (the "Commonwealth" or "Pennsylvania")
..

.

filed a complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County against a nu.nib er of
tobacco companies. In its complaint, Pennsylvania asserted claims against these tobacco
companies seeking to recover for health care costs it had· incurred in connection with tobaccorelated illnesses, among other things.

In 1998, Pennsylvania settled its claims against those tobacco companies as well as
several other companies that were not named in the complaint as part of a master settlement
agreement between :the companies (referred to collectively as the "Participating Manufacturers"

1

I'")

<Jr the ''PMs'') 1 and Pennsylvania and 51 other U.S. States and Territories (including the District

\, ---- ..J

of Columbia) that had asserted similar claims against the PMs (referred to collectively as the
"Settling States" or "States''). Under the Master Settlement Agreement, or "MSA," the PMs
agreed to a number of practices aimed at decreasing smoking rates and to make annual payments
1o the Settling States in perpetuity in base amounts that in the aggregate total billions of dollars

every year. 2 These annual payments are referred to as "MSA Payment(s)." The MSA Payment
for 2003 is <4)proximately $6.435 billion. 3 The MSA Payments to the Settling States to date ·
exceed $70 billion.
The PMs do not make these payments directly to the individual Settling States. Rather,
each PM makes a single, aggregate payment to an "Independent Auditor'' in an amount
calculated and determined by the auditor. The Independent Auditor then allocates the sum of
those payments among the Settling States by making a single, annual payment to each Settling
State in an amount based on its pre-set "Allocable Share'' percentage. Pennsylvania's allocable
share of every MSA Payment is approximately 5. 75%.4 Thus, the base amount Pennsylvania
would receive from the 2003 MSA Payment would be approximately $370 million,
MSA Payments, however, are potentially subject to certain downward adjustments. This
case concerns the ''Non-Participating Manufacturer Adjustment" ("NPM Adjustment") and, in

The PMs fall into two categories: (1) the "Original Participating Manufacturers," or
"OPMs," that were original parties to the MSA and (2) the "Subsequent Participating
Manufacturers," or "SPMs," that later joined the MSA
2
In addition to the Non-Participating Manufacturer Adjustment that is at issue and
discussed at length herein, the MSA's annual base amounts are also subject to a number of other
adjustments that are irrelevant to the issues before this court or putting those issues in context.
Therefore, those other adjustments will not be addressed.
3
Using the base amount due to Pennsylvania for 2003 of$369,807,760.89 and its exact
allocation percentage provided below, the exact figure for the 2003 MSA Payment is:
$6,434,954,707.60.
4
Pennsylvania's exact allocation percentage is: 5.7468588%.
2

•
particular, the NPM Adjustment for 2003. The NPM Adjustment, which is provided for at
section IX(d) of the MSA, is a potential reduction of the PM's annual MSA Payment that was
designed to address the PMs' concern that they would incur a competitive disadvantage relative
to tobacco companies that did not sign the MSA. Tobacco companies that did not (or do not)
sign the MSA are referred to as ''Non-Participating Manufacturers" or ''NPMs" and, hence,. the
adjustment related thereto is referred to as the ''Non-Participating Manufacturer Adjustment."
For a given year, an NPM Adjustment can reduce a Settling State's MSA Payment if
certain conditions are met. First, the Independent Auditor compares the PMs' share of the
cigarette market for the relevant year to their market share in 1997 to determine whether the PMs
experienced a "Market Share Loss." A Market Share Loss is defined by the MSA to mean the
PMs' collective market share during that year decreased by more than two percentage points
compared to their collective market share in 1997. If there was a Market Share Loss, an
independent economic consultant is jointly selected and retained to determine wh~ther the
"disadvantages experienced as a result of the provisions" of the MSA were "a significant factor
contributing to the Market Share Loss for the year in question." MSA § IX(d)(l)(C). If the
economic consultant so finds, the NPM Adjustment is available to the PMs with one exception.
That exception is found at section IX(d)(2) of the MSA and provides that the Settling
States may avoid the NPM Adjustment if during the year at issue, they "diligently enforced" a
"Qualifying Statute" ( such as the "Model Statute" set forth as Exhibit T to the MSA) .. MSA §
IX(d)(2). Under the MSA, the Settling States are not required to either enact or diligently
enforce such a statute, but if they want the benefit of this contractual exemption from the NPM
Adjustment, they must do both. Following execution of the MSA, all of the Settling States
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enacted a Qualifying Statute. 5 Thus, for purposes of section IX(d)(2) of the MSA, the only issue
is whether the Settling States "diligently enforced" their statutes.
If a Settling State satisfies the requirement of diligent enforcement, its payment is not

subject to reduction; If all the States satisfy the requirement, the NPM Adjustment would not
result in a reduction of the MSA Payment for the PMs. However, if some or all of the States do
not satisfy the requirement, and are deemed "non-diligent," the NPM Adjustment will reduce the
MSA Payment for the PMs to the extent each non-diligent Settling State's payment is subject to
reduction as discussed below.
A Settling State that is non-diligent is subject to an initial reduction of its MSA Payment
in an amount equal to its Allocable Share of the aggregate NPM Adjustment. In contrast, a
Settling State that is diligent is spared an NPM Adjustment to its payment but, under the MSA' s
"Reallocation Provision," the amount of the NPM Adjustment that would have otherwise been
applied to that Settling State's MSA Payment is "reallocated among all [non-diligent] Settling
States pro rata in proportion to their respective Allocable Shares." MSA § IX(d)(2(C)
(italicization added). In this way, each non-diligent Settling State ultimately faces a two-tiered

A "Qualifying Statute" is defined in the MSA as a statute that "effectively and fully
neutralizes the cost disadvantages that the Participating Manufactures experience vis-a-vis NonParticipating Manufacturers within such Settling State as a result of [the MSA]." MSA §
IX(d)(2)(E). Following execution of the MSA, all of the Settling States enacted the Model
Statute. The Model Statute requires each NPM to make escrow deposits based on the number of
cigarettes it sells in the enacting Settling State in the year in question. Toe escrow deposits are to
be made into a "[q]ualified escrow fund," which is defined in the Model Statute as an escrow
arrangement with a qualifying fmancial institution in which the deposits are held for the benept
of the State. MSA, Ex. T. Toe deposits then are to remain in escrow for 25 years except insofar
as they are used to pay a judgment to or settlement with the State for liability on claims like
those the Settling States settled agajnst the PMs in the MSA. The escrow deposits thus guarantee
the Settling State a source of recovery should it subsequently sue or settle with that NPM on
claims like those the State settled against the PMs in the MSA, and avoid the risk that NPMs
would otherwise use their MSA-related "cost advantage to derive large, short-term profits ... and
then becom[e] judgment-proof before liability [to the State] may arise." M_SA, Ex. T.
5
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NPM Adjustment: first,

ail initial

reduction tied directly to that non-:diligent Settling State's

Allocable Share and, second, an additional reduction reallocated from any diligent Settling State
or States. Pennsylvania refers to these as the "First Tier" and "Second Tier" of the NPM
Adjustment. Depending on how many Settling States are determined to be diligent, the Second
Tier reallocation may be substantially greater than the First Tier reduction, subject to the limit
that each non-diligent Settling State can lose no more that its full share of the annual payment.
Despite the universal enactment of Qualifying Statutes by all of the Settling States, the
PMs experienced Market Share Loss. NPM Adjustments for 1999 through 2002 were resolved
by settlement as to all of the States. The NPM Adjustment for 2003 (and for subsequent years)
was not. Regarding 2003, the Independent Auditor determined that the MSA's first condition for
application of a NPM Adjustment was satisfied: the PMs experienced a Market Share Loss for
that year. Subsequently, an independent economic consultant was retained and determined
disadvantages experienced by the PMs as a·result of provisions of the MSA were a significant
factor contributing to the Market Share Loss in 2003. Following this determination, the PMs
requested that the Independent Auditor apply the NPM Adjustment as a credit against _their MSA
Payment. The Settling States, however, opposed the request, instead asking the Independent
Auditor to presume diligent enforcement and refuse to apply the 2003 adjustment. With the
absence of diligent enforcement determinations for the States, the Independent Auditor decided
not to apply the NPM Adjustment.
Given the impasse, the PMs requested the Settling States arbitrate the dispute pursuant to
the arbitration clause contained in the MSA, which provides that:
[a]ny dispute ... arising out of or relating to calculations performed by, or any
determinations made by, the Independent Auditor (including, without limitation,
any dispute concerning the operation or application of any adjustments,
reductions, offsets, carry...forwards and all allocations described in subsection
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IX(j) or subsection XI(j)) shall be submitted to binding arbitration before a panel
of three neutral arbitrators, each of whom shall be a former Article III federal
Judge. Each of the two sides to the dispute shall select one arbitrator. The two
arbitrators so selected shall select the third arbitrator.
MSA § XI(c). The clause further provides, "[t]he arbitration shall be governed by the United
States Arbitration Act." MSA § XI(c).
Pennsylvania and the other Settling States did not agree to submit their disputes to
arbitration and instead sought relief in their individual state courts. Pennsylvania, for example,
sought relief by filing a motion in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County in April
2006 seeking a declaration that it had diligently enforced its Qualifying Statute in 2003 and that
the Independent Auditor had properly determined the 2003 NPM Adjustment should not be
applied. Consistent with their request that the States arbitrate the issue, the PMs filed a motion
to compel arbitration in response, arguing the question of diligence was subject to arbitration and
should be resolved by a uniform set of rules.

In December 2006, a court of coordinate jurisdiction (the Honorable William J.
Manfredi) decided the PMs' motion to compel arbitration and "reluctantly" held the matter was
subject to arbitration. (Mem. Opinion p.7.) The court was reluctant to so hold in part because it
predicted ari arbitration proceeding under the MSA would compel up to 52 Settling States with
competing interests to join in the selection of a single arbitrator to decide an issue that it
determined was "very much a local one" based on its conclusion that "[t]he vagaries of
population size and distribution, geography, market penetration by NPMs, to name but a few
factors, must be taken into account in determining whether a state has been diligent[;]" a
conclusion the court highlighted by positing "that which constitutes diligence in our sister state
of North Dakota will assuredly be far different from diligence in our neighbor New York."

__/

(Mem. Opinion p. 7.) However, while noting "it almost inconceivable that a mechanism for
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determining activity so integral to the agreement--diligence of enforcement of a qualifying
statute-upon which question so many millions of dollars hang in the balance, was neither ...
defined in the MS.A,, nor the subject of specific, well-delineated means of ascertainment," the
court nevertheless concluded the law required the matter be arbitrated and the parties left "to
their bargain, however, flawed and ill-conceived it may be." (Mem. Opinion p. 7 n.4.)
With the courts of every Settling State but Montana similarly ordering arbitration of the
2003 NPM Adjustment dispute, the PMs and most of the Settling States, including Pennsylvania,
eventually entered into an Agreement Regarding Arbitration ("ARA"). When the Arbitration
Panel ("Panel") was seated on July 1, 2010, the only Settling State that was not a party to the

ARA was Montana. The Panel consisted of: the Honorable Abner J. Mikva (picked by the
Settling States); the Honorable William G. Bassler (picked by the PMs); and the Honorable Fem

¥

M. Smith (picked by the other two).
Initially, the Panel ruled on various threshold issues. In doing so, the Panel determined
that each Settling State would bear the burden of proving that it had diligently enforced its
Qualifying Statute for 2003. The Panel also determined that if any Settling State's diligence was
not contested by any party after the·conclusion of discovery on the issue and deadlines set to
contest the issue, the State would be deemed to have diligently enforced its Qualifying Statute
for2003.

·

Regarding its first determination, the Panel concluded the "plain language of [the MSA]
... and the context overall of [section] IX" show that "the diligent enforcement provision should
be construed as a contract exception, and the States should bear the burden of proving ... they
fall within the purview of such exception." (Panel's Order re: Burden of Proof pp. 6"".7.) In
rejecting the contention that the Settling States should presumptively be treated diligent, the
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Panel stated "no language in the MSA supports a finding that the States can by-pass an inquiry
regarding whether they satisfied their contractual obligation for avoiding a payment adjustment
through the NPM Adjustment .... " (Panel's Order re: Burden of Proof p. 11.)
Regarding its second determination, the Panel set a deadline of November 3, 2011 for the
PMs to contest the diligence of the States and a deadline of December 5, 2011 for the States to
c_ontest the diligence of other States if the PMs did not do so first. Having been asked to clarify
the effect of these deadlines, the Panel ruled that a State whose diligence was not contested by
either the PMs or another State after these deadlines would be deemed diligent. In so ruling, the
Panel stressed (1) that it was only deciding a "procedural" question of "[w]hether or not to
conduct an evidentiary hearing when a state's diligent enforcement is not challenged" and (2)
that "the only way to 'not be subject' to the otherwise applicable NPM Adjustment is to
7

diligently enforce a Qualifying Statute" and (3) that "the reallocation provisions of the MSA
[i.e., the Second Tier reduction] d(id] not apply unless and until 'diligent enforcement
determinations are made for those states whose diligence is contested by either the PMs or [a
State by the above-deadlines]." (Panel's Order re: PMs' Mot. for Clarification on No-Contest
Issue pp. 13-15.)
· Initially, the PMs challenged the diligence of every Settling State. After the conclusion
of discovery, the PMs filed detailed "Statements of Contest" against 35 of the States by the
above-mentioned deadlines, leaving the diligence of 17 of the States uncontested. In May 2012,
the Panel began holding individual hearings for the 35 States whose diligent enforcement for
2003 was contested as of the deadlines.
In November 2012, a hearing for Pennsylvania was held. Over the course of four days,
the Commonwealth and the PMs each had I 0.5 hours to present their case. The PMs principally
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introduced the testimony of three expert witnesses and one lay witness, while the
Commonwealth introduced the testimony of seven lay witnesses, one expert witness, and a Rule
1006 witness to summarize voluminous documents.
As this national arbitration process slowly progressed, a subset of the Settling States
entered into settlement negotiations with the PMs. As a result thereof, the PMs and 19 of the
Settling States entered into a term sheet agreement ("Tenn Sheet") in November 2012. This
occurred shortly after Pennsylvania's hearing but before all the individual State hearings had
been conducted. All of the other Settling States were invited to join the settlement and 3 more
ultimately did. Of these 22 "Compromising States," the diligence of 20 of them had been
contested by the PMs following discovery and the above-mentioned deadlines. Two Settling
States whose diligence was not contested also settled. In total, these 22 Compromising States
represent approxirnat~ly 46% of the aggregate allocable share of the MSA.
Under the Term Sheet, each of the Compromising States agreed to a reduction of their
MSA Payments in an amount equal to 46% of their Allocable Share of the NPM Adjustment.6
The Tenn Sheet did not address the MSA's Reallocation Provision at all, nor most significantly
did it consider how the Reallocation Provision would apply to the States that did not sign the
Term Sheet

The Term Sheet went well beyond settling just the 2003 NPM Adjustment dispute.
Under the Term Sheet, the PMs receive 46% of the Compromising States' Allocable Share of the
NPM Adjustments for the years 2003 through 2012, which will be funded by billions of dollars
in credits against the PMs' MSA Payments in the next five years. In addition, the Term Sheet
provided for the early release of part of the funds that certain PMs deposited into a "Disputed
Paym.ent Account," which allowed some of the Compromising States to balance their budgets in .
a time of need; imposed significant new enforcement obligations on the Compromising States for
future years; and created a·new formula for calculating the amount of future NPM Adjustments
for the Compromising States.
6

./
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In December 2012, the PMs informed the Panel of the Term Sheet. The next day,

J

Pennsylvania and other Settling States wrote the Panel to object to the settlement based on,
among other things, their concern that the PMs would argue the settlement alters how the MSA's
Reallocation Provision applies to them.

In January 2013, the Panel held a two-day status conference regarding the partial
settlement. Following the status conference, the PMs, in conjunction with the Compromising
States, filed a Proposed Stipulated Partial Award ("PMs' Proposed A ward"). The PMs'
Proposed Award presented two alternatives for how the MSA' Reallocation Provision would be
applied in light of the settlement. Both alternatives provided that the Compromising States
would be treated as "not subject to the 2003 NPM Adjustment for purposes of section
IX(d)(2)(B)-(C) of the MSA" even though the PMs had contested the diligence of20 of the
Compromising States for nearly a year after the deadlines for deciding which States diligence
would be contested and those States had not proven their diligence. (See PM's Proposed Award
pp. 9, 11.)
The Panel initially accepted briefs and then in March 2013 held a hearing on the PMs'
Proposed Award. Just two business days later, the Panel entered a Stipulated Partial Settlement
and Award (the "Partial Settlement Award"), which largely tracked the PMs' Proposed Award.

In the Partial Settlement Award, the Panel adopted the PMs' second alternative referred to as the
''pro rata" alternative for how the MSA's Reallocation Provision would be applied to the States
that did not join the Term Sheet.
To implement its adoption of the ''pro rata" alternative, the Panel directed the
Independent Auditor to treat the Compromising States as "not subject to the 2003 NPM
Adjustment for purposes of section IX(d)(2)(B)-(C) of the MSA." (Partial Settlement Award p.
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9.) Acknowledging "potential prejudice arising from the settlement's removal of
[Compromising] States from further contribution towards the 2003 NPM Adjustment," the Panel
further provided that any non-diligent non-Compromising States would receive the benefit of a

''pro rata reduction, under which the dollar amount of the [aggregate] 2003 NPM Adjustment
[would] be reduced by a percentage equal to the aggregate Allocable Shares of the
[Compromising] States." (Partial Settlement Award pp. 10, 13.) These holdings are sometimes
referred to collectively as the "Reallocation Determination."

In the Partial Settlement Award, the Panel asserted its belief that the "pro rata reduction"
would provide "appropriate and adequate protection" to the non-Compromising States. (See
Partial Settlement Award pp. 10, 11, 13.) In one of its few changes from the PMs' Proposed
Award, however, the Panel invited "any Objecting State, found by the Panel to be non-diligent,
[that has] a good faith belief that the pro rata deduction does not adequately compensate [it] for
a [Compromising] State's removal from the re-allocation pool ... [to] appeal to [its] individual
MSA court." (Partial Settlement Award p. i4.)
After the Panel issued the Partial Settlement Award, the arbitration continued with
respect to those Settling States that had not agreed to the Term Sheet, including Pennsylvania. In
September 2013, the Panel entered final awards for the 15 Settling States whose diligent
enforcement for 2003 remained contested after the initial deadlines for contesting diligence and
the settlement. The Panel found that Pennsylvania and five other Settling States were not
diligent and that the other nine States were diligent.

In the final award for Pennsylvania (the "Final Award"), the Panel began its analysis by
i'

addressing its findings/conclusions on certain issues it found to be common to all the parties,
including the general standard and specific factors that it used to assess diligent enforcement.

11

.~.,

f

\, i~ }j

-Uere, the Panel defined "Diligent Enforcement" as: "an ongoing and intentional consideration

of the requirements of a Settling State's Qualifying Statute, and a significant attempt by the
Settling State to meet those requirements, taking into account a Settling State's competing laws
and policies that may conflict with its MSA contractual obligations." (Final Award pp. 13-14.)
The Panel noted its definition is measured by an objective standard and that it considered
numerous factors, including eight that it specifically delineated, in determining whether its
definition was met The Panel also noted it had not ranked the factors, but rather "considered
them as a whole in making its determination." (Final Award p. 14.) The specific factors were:

(1) collection rate; (2) lawsuits filed; (3) gathering reliable data; (4) resources allocated to .
enforcement; (5) preventing future sales by non-compliant NPMs; (6) legislation enacted; (7)
actions short of legislation; and (8) efforts to be aware of other Settling State's enforcement
efforts:
The Panel then proceeded to make state-specific findings for Pennsylvania. Based on its
state-specific finding for Pennsylvania, the Panel concluded Pennsylvania did not diligently
enforce its Qualifying Statute in 2003 because it "had a low collection rate, failed to adequately
file and pursue lawsuits, and cavalierly declined to consider the impact of ["Roll Your Own"
("RYO")] sales on its obligations under the MSA" and that ''there were no counterbalancing
efforts or results that sufficiently outweighed [these] deficiencies." (Final Award pp. 20-25.)
On November 4, 2013, Pennsylvania filed a motion with this court to modify or vacate
the Final Award, which is presently before this court for disposition. Therein, Pennsylvania
initially addressed the issue of whether standards of review prescribed by Pennsylvania law or
;,::_,

the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") should be applied. Citing Trombetta v. Raymond James

Financial Services, Inc., 907 A.2d 550 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006), Pennsylvania stated that

12

·(_)

''[a]lthough section XI(c) of theMSA provides that arbitrations will be 'governed by' the FAA,
that section does not invoke the FAA' s standards of review, which [instead] apply only to federal
courts." (PA Mem.: re Final Award p. 22.) Rather, the Commonwealth advanced that the
Pennsylvania Uniform Arbitration Act ("UAA") standards of review apply here and, in
particular, section 7302(d)(2) of the UAA "requires this [c]ourt to modify an award involving the
Pennsylvania government where the award is contrary to law and is such that had it been a
verdict of a jury the court would have entered a different judgment or a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict" (PA Mem.: re Final Award p. 23 (quotations omitted).) Under this
standard, the Commonwealth argued this court has the power to correct the award where the
arbitration panel commits an error oflaw or the award is against the clear weight of the evidence.
Having argued for the above-standard, Pennsylvania proceeded to contend the Panel
committed an error of law by not applying the correct definition of diligence to section
IX(d)(2)(B). Citing cases addressing the standard of"due diligence" for speedy trials in the
state, the Commonwealth asserted Pennsylvania common law required it to be found to have
"diligently enforced" its Qualifying Statute if it made "reasonable efforts" to enforce the statute.
(PA Mem.: re Final Award p. 25 (emphasis removed).) The Commonwealth then argued this
court should modify the Final Award and find Pennsylvania was diligent in 2003 because "no
conclusion can be reached other than that Pennsylvania made reasonable efforts to enforce [its
statute]" based on its record of enforcement. (PA Mem.: re Final Award p. 26.) Pennsylvania,
however, also argued that it satisfied the Panel's definition of diligent enforcement, if that
definition had been rationally and consistently applied to its efforts, and, therefore, that the Final
Award should be modified under that definition as well.
Regarding its record of enforcement for 2003, the Commonwealth highlighted that:
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•. ''while Pennsylvania's overall collection rate was 44% ... , Pennsylvania either
collected or actively pursued 93% of the payable escrow funds for 2002 sales[;]"
•

while Pennsylvania did not have a blanket policy in 2003 regarding when to file
lawsuits and did not sue seven of the ten largest non-compliant NPMs, "Pennsylvania
did have a litigation strategy of targeting larger NMPs with an actual potential for
recovery[;]" and

•

"[a]lthough the Panel stated that its negative comments regarding RYO sales were not
material·or necessary to the Final Award, the Panel's decision making was ... flawed
... to that ... factor as [well]" because Pennsylvania does not tax RYO sales and the
MSA puts no demand on the Settling States to change their laws in such a manner.

(PA Mem.: re Final Award pp. 28-30.)

In the alternative, Pennsylvania argued the Final Award should be vacated because: (1)
the decisions the Panel reached were not consistent across states and/or (2) the Panel ignored
relevant evidence in the form of the enforcement records for the 20 Compromising States whose
diligence had been contested. Regarding the irrationality of the Panel's decisions, the
Commonwealth noted the following three apparent inconsistencies. First, the Panel described
Pennsylvania's 44% collection rate as "relatively low'' while it described Ohio's 44% collection
rate. as "in the mid-range" for the contested Settling States. (PA Mem.: re Final Award p. 36.)
Second, five States that did not file a single lawsuit in 2003 were found diligent while
Pennsylvania filed four lawsuits in 2003 and was found non-diligent. Finally, the Panel excused
Oregon's failure to collect escrow on RYO as "general confusion over RYO" and found Oregon
diligent while it refused to excuse Pennsylvania's failure to do the same and rather viewed this as
"circumstantial evidence of the Commonwealth's general attitude of compliance." (PAMem.: re
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Final Award pp. 36-37 (quotations omitted).) Having so argued, the Commonwealth asked that
tlte Final Award be vacated and remanded with the instruction that the Panel apply
Pennsylvania's definition of diligence (or its own definition of diligence) and "consider all
relevant evidence in a rational, consistent, and non-arbitrary manner[.]" (See PA Me~.: re Final
Award p. 43.)
In response, the PMs argued that the standard of review in this case should be the
standard of review supplied in the FM. Here, the PMs asserted that by agreeing at section XI(c)
of the MSA that "[t]he arbitration shall be governed by the United States Federal Arbitration
Act," "[tJhe parties were obviously agreeing upon the law that would govern the entire disputeresolution process-not just the conduct of the arbitration by the Panel, but also review and
enforcement of the arbitration by the courts of the [Settling States]."7 (OPM Mem.: re Final
Award p. 17.) The PMs, however, also· argued that the FM would preempt the UAA in this
case because, first, application of the UAA in this case would undermine the goals and policies
of the.FAA and, second, thatthe Commonwealth incorrectly interprets Trombetta 's reach.
Under the FAA, the PMs stated the standard of review is very narrow and '"the question
for a judge is not whether the arbitrator construed the parties' contract correctly, but whether [the
arbitrator] construed it at all."' (OPM Mem.: re Final Award p. 14 (quoting Oxford Health

Plans, LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2071 (2013)) (emphasis added).) Itis "[o]nly if'the
arbitrator[s] ... issu[ed] an award that simply reflects [their] own notions of economic justice
rather than.drawing its essence from the contract ... may a court overturn [their] decision.'"
(OPM Mem.: re Final A ward p.14 (quoting Oxford Health, 133 S. Ct at 2068).) If the
arbitrators were even arguably construing or applying the contract, the PMs asserted this court

While the opposition to the Commonwealth's motions was filed by certain OPMs and
certain SPMs, for ease of discussion we will referto these parties as 'The PMs."
7
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cannot overrule even grave errors of contract interpretation or application under the FAA.
Rather, the parties' are stuck with '" [t]he arbitrator[s '] construction [of the contract] ... , however
good bad, or ugly."' (OPM Mem.: re Final Award p. 14 (quoting Oxford Health, 133 S. Ct. at
2071-72).)

In terms of the Final Award, the PMs argued "the FAA indisputably forecloses the
Commonwealth's attacks on the Panel's good-faith legal and factual determinations." (OPM
Mem.: re Final Award p. 15.) The PMs noted the Panel was composed of three respected former
federal judges who "unanimously detemiined that the Commonwealth was not diligent in 2003
after considering the MSA and interpreting the evidentiary record." (OPM Mem.: re Final
Award p. 15.) The PMs then argued:
Not even Pennsylvania contends that.these arbitrators willfully ignored the law
and the facts in favor of their own notions of justice, as would be required to
vacate the award under the FAA.
Rather, ... the Commonwealth (incorrectly) argues that the Panel's legal
conclusions and factual findings are merely wrong-or, at worst, irrational. But
such arguments, even if they were correct, do not permit vacatur under the FAA.
(OPM Mem.: re Final Award pp. 15-16 (citations omitted).)
Alternatively, the PMs argued the Commonwealth's motion also fails under the UAA.
While acknowledging that section 7302(b) of"the UAA does provide a special modification
standard for some arbitrations involving the Commonwealth government," the PMs argued
''Pennsylvania ignores that the courts have repeatedly emphasized the limited scope of merits
review that this provision allows." (OPM Mem.: re Final Award p. 25 (quotations and citations
omitted).) Regarding the scope of review, the PMs stated the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
has h.eld that the 'judgment n.o.v./error oflaw concept set forth in the special standard in§
7302(d)(2) is the same as the 'essence test' that ... specially governs arbitrations concerning
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collective bargaining agreements." (See OPM Mero.: re Final Award pp. 25-26 (quotations,
citations, and brackets omitted).) Under the "essence test," "an arbitral award 'is to be respected
by the judiciary if [it] can in any rational way be derived from the agreement."' (OPM Mem.: re
Final Award p. 26 (quoting Cnty. of Centre v. Musser, 548 A.2d 1194, 1199 (Pa. 1998)).) The
PMs argued under this standard the most the Commonwealth is entitled to is "limited review of
whether the Panel's determinati?ns can in any rational way be derived from the MSA after
viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the PMs." (OPM Mem.: re Final Award p. 26
(citing Musser, 548 A2d at 1199 and Trombetta, 907 A2d at 571) (quotations and brackets
omitted).)

In terms of the Commonwealth's arguments for modifying the Final Award, the PMs
argued the Panel's determinations more than satisfied these low thresholds.
First, the PMs asserted:
Contrary to the Commonwealth's claim, it is utterly implausible to presume that,
when the parties to this national agreement used the general term "diligently
enforced" in MSA § IX(d)(2)(E), they intended for that term in Pennsylvania to
incorporate the random definition of"due diligence" that happens to be employed
in the Commonwealth's speedy-trial provisions governing criminal trials.

.

***

By contrast, the Panel's more stringent definition [of] "an ongoing and intentional
consideration of the requirements of a [Settling State's Qualifying Statute], and a
significant attempt by the ... State to meet those requirements";-is consistent
with common dictionary definitions of"diligence": e.g., "[c]onstant and earnest
effort to accomplish what is undertaken." IV The Oxford English Dictionary 665
(2d ed. 1989). In short, there is no basis whatsoever for setting aside the Panel's
interpretation of the "diligent enforcement" standard.
(OPM Mero.: re Final Award pp. 28-29.) Next, the PMs argued the Panel's determination that
Pennsylvania was not diligent in 2003 because "[t]he Commonwealth's record in this case is best
described as mediocre" cannot be second-guessed here. (OPM Mero.: re Final Award p. 29.)
Moreover, the PMs asserted Pennsylvania is clearly cherry-picking the record, highlighting:
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•

in terms of its collection rate, the Panel "expressly considered and rejected the
Commonwealth's assertion that it had actively pursued an additional 49% of the
escrow due in 2003 [;]"

•

in terms of it having a litigation strategy of targeting larger NPMs with an actual
potential for recovery, "abundanrevidence supported the Panel's conclusion that no
such strategy ever existed, and that the Commonwealth's escrow officials instead met
sporadically to discuss how to move forward with its cases[;]" and

•

in terms ofRYO sales, "[a]lthough the Panel did hold States are not required to
elevate their diligent-enforcement obligations above other statutory or rational policy
considerations, that plainly _did not foreclose the Panel from nevertheless holding that
it militates against a diligence :finding when States, like Pennsylvania, cavalierly
decline to consider the impact of their existing statutes on their escrow obligations."

(OPM Mem.: re Final Award pp. 31-32, 34, 36 (quotations and brackets omitted).)
Regarding the Commonwealth's arguments for vacating the Final Award, the PMs stated
the Panel did consider all relevant evidence in a rational, consistent, and non-arbitrary manner.
Rather, the PMs asserted the Commonwealth's three apparent inconsistencies were not
inconsistencies at all. First, regarding the collection rate in Ohio, the PMs noted ''the Panel·
concluded that the rate ha[d] to be adjusted substantially upwards because almost 50% of the
cigarettes on which escrow was not paid were sold by Carolina Tobacco Company, whose sales
the Panel decided generally should not be held against the States." (OPM Mem.: re Final Award
p. 38 (quotations omitted).) Second, in terms of the diligence :findings for five States that did not
file lawsuits in 2003, the PMs noted ''the Panel found that each of those States, unlike
Pennsylvania, carried its burden of proving its lack of lawsuits in 2003 was based on legitimate
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strategic reasons, such as focusing instead on settlement negotiations with the largest noncompliant NPMs" and that "the Panel also found those States had substantially higher collection
rates than Pennsylvania did, ranging from 60%to 99% ...." (OPM Mem.: re Final Award pp.
38-39 (citations omitted).) Third, regarding Oregon's failure to collect escrow on RYO, the PMs
noted ''the Panel found that, unlike Pennsylvania's cavalier approach, 'much time was spent in
[Oregon] discussing the subject' and 'the State formally changed its position in 2007. "' (OPM
Mem.: re Final Award p. 39 (quoting OR Final Award pp. 20-21).) Finally, the PMs argued the
enforcement records for the 20 Compromising States whose diligence had been contested were
not material because the Panel was making objective determinations of diligence for each State.
On December 13, 2013, Pennsylvania filed a motion with this court to modify, or vacate

in part, the Partial Settlement Award, which is also presently before this court for disposition.
Therein, Pennsylvania made the same arguments regarding standard of review. After again
advocating for application of section 7302(d)(2) of the UAA in this case, the Commonwealth
argued modification of the Partial Settlement Award is required because the Panel's adoption of
the pro rata reallocation method proposed by the PMs violates the clear language of section
IX(d)(2) of the MSA. While the Panel found "the MSA does not directly speak ... to the process

to be used when some States settle diligent enforcement and some do not[,]" (Partial Settlement
Award p. 14), the Commonwealth argued:
Section IX(d)(2) of the MSA explicitly provides that the 2003 NPM Adjustment
"shall apply" to "all" states "except" those states that "continuously had a
Qualifying Statute ... in full force and effect ... and diligently enforced the
provisions of such statute during such entire calendar year." That section contains
no exceptions and therefore applies eqruµly to all factual situations that may arise,
includmg a partial settlement.
(PA Mem.: re Partial Settlement p. 20 (quoting MSA § IX(d)(2)).) Moreover, "[b[ecause section
IX(d)(2) of the MSA is unambiguous, the Panel had no authority to 'interpret' the MSA
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differently to facilitate the PMs preferred implementation of the Tenn Street or for any other

J'

:reason[,]" according to the Commonwealth. (PA Mem.: re Partial Settlement p. 20.)
The Commonwealth furtherargued the Partial Settlement Award amounted to an
amendment of the MSA in violation of section XVIII(j), which prohibits amendment unless it is
"'by a written instrument executed by all ... settling States affected by the amendment."' (PA
Mem.: re Partial Settlement p. 22 (quoting MSA § XVIIIG) (emphasis added by the
Commonwealth).) Here, the Common.wealth argued:
While the PMs were free to settle with the Compromising States as to the amounts
of their annual payments that will be recovered by the PMs, under section
XVIII(j) of the MSA they could not do so in a fashion that "affected" the rights of
Pennsylvania.

***

The only way to accomplish that would have been to treat as non-diligent the 20
Compromising States whose diligence was contested and riot proved when
calculating the NPM Adjustment for the other Settling States.
(PA Mem.: re Partial Settlement pp. 23-24.)
In terms of vacating the Partial Settlement Award, Pennsylvania also argued the Panel
exceeded its powers under the ARA with the Reallocation Determination. "Therefore, if the
Partial Settlement A ward is not modified by this Court as described above, then it must be
vacated in part to strike the Reallocation Determination as· it relates to Pennsylvania[,]"
according to the Commonwealth. (PA Mem.: re Partial Settlement p. 24.)

In response, the PMs made the same argument regarding standard of review. After again
advocating for application of the FAA in this case, the PMs argued modifying or vacating the
Partial Settlement Award would be inappropriate under any standard. First, the PMs argued
"under any standard of review, this [c]ourt cannot second-guess the merits of the Panel's
reasonable contractual interpretation of how to apply the MSA's NPM Adj'us1ment reallocation
provisions after a partial settlement, especially given the unreasonableness of the
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Commonwealth's contrary interpretation." (OPM Mem.: re Partial Settlement p. 6 (emphasis

'

original).) Viewing Pennsylvania's interpretation as unreasonable because there is no factual
basis to support the position that none of the Compromising States would have been found
diligent by the Panel absent the settlement, the PMs argued the MSA is silent on reallocating the
NPM Adjustment among non-Compromising States ~'where the diligence of [Compromising]
States is no longer contested by the PMs due to a settlement and it therefore remains unknown
whether or not those ... parties were diligent." (OPM Mem.: re Partial Settlement p. 9
(emphasis removed).) And based on this supposed silence, the PMs argued the Panel's
conclusion that the Compromising States should be deemed diligent, but that the nonCompromising States should receive a pro rata reduction of their liability on the First Tier
adjustment, does not amount to an improper amendment of the MSA and is unassailable under
any standard of review.
Finally, the PMs argued "the Panel indisputably had jurisdiction to determine how the
2003 NPM Adjustment should be reallocated among the non-diligent [non-Compromising]
States in light of the PMs' settlement with the [Compromising] States." (OPM Mem.: re Partial
Settlement p.13.) Here, the PMs noted that it had already been decided in compelling the
Commonwealth to arbitrate the 2003 NPM Adjustment dispute that "a 'dispute is arbitrable'
under 'the plain language of[section XI(c) of the MSA]' when 'it concerns ... the operation [or]
application of the NPM Adjustment.'" (OPM Mem.: re Partial Settlement p. 14 (quoting Mem.
Opinion p. 6).) Moreover, the PMs noted ''the Panel explained, once a dispute is committed to
arbitration, the arbitrators normally have the authority to decide all matters necessary to dispose
of the claim, including authority to determine the existence or effect of a settlement." (OPM
Mem.: re Partial Settlement p. 14 (quotations and brackets omitted).) Thus, under section XI(c)
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of the MSA, ''the Panel's authority to dispose of the 2003 NPM Adjustment dispute clearly
include[d] determining how the partial settlement affects the allocation of the 2003 NPM
Adjustment among the [non-Compromising] States[,]" according to the PMs. (OPM Mem.: re
Partial Settlement p. 14.)
Having held a hearing on March 7, 2014, this court now has before it for disposition both
the Commonwealth's motion to vacate or modify the Final Award and its motion to vacate in
part or modify the Partial Settlement Award. The base amount owed to Pennsylvania for 2003 is

$369,807,760.89. If the Final Award is upheld, the reduction thereto will be $116,457,190.73 for
Pennsylvania, for a total amount payable of$253,350,570.16. If the Final Award and the Partial
Settlement Award are upheld, the reduction will be $242,309,663.54 for Pennsylvania, for a total
amount payable of$127,498,097.35. Thus, at stake for the Commonwealth is over $242 million
it would otherwise use to fund numerous state programs at the Departments of Health, Public
Welfare, Aging, and Community & Economic Development that support or provide things such
as: medical assistance for workers with disabilities; home and community-based care; long-term
care; and biomedical research in the fight against cancer.
II.

DISCUSSION
A.

Standard of Review

A major point of contention and a preliminary issue that needs-to be resolved is what
standard or standards of review should be applied in disposing of the Commonwealth's motions.

In the opinion of this court, Trombetta and the facts of this case dictate review is governed by
standards set forth in the UAA.
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1.

An overview of Trombetta v. Raymond James.

In that case, the Trombettas and Raymond James arbitrated a securities litigation dispute
before a three-member National Association of Securities Dealers arbitration panel. 907 A.2d at
554. Following an unfavorable ruling, the Trombettas filed a petition for vacatur in the Court of
Common Pleas of Allegheny County and argued they were entitled to factual and legal de novo
review of the panel's rulin~ pursuant to a passage in the parties' agreement that addressed
arbitration. Id. at 554,556. Raymond James,on the other hand, filed a petition to confirm the
panel's ruling and argued the Trombettas were not entitled to de novo review because the de
novo review clause they cited was no longer applicable as it was subsequently modified by a
newsletter it sent to all Raymond James investors. Id. at 554, 557-58. The lower court, the
Honorable Stanton Wettick, denied the Trombettas' petition for vacatur and granted Raymond
James' petition to confirm the arbitration award. Id. at 556.
On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed, holding the clause providing for de novo review
governed as a matter of contract as it had not been subsequently modified, but that under the
applicable Pennsylvania standards of review set forth in the UAA ''de novo review clauses
contained in arbitration agreements are unenforceable as a matter oflaw in Pennsylvania'' Id. at
577. In reaching this holding, the court addressed a number of preliminary issues including
''whether federal or Pennsylvania standards of review govem[ed] [the] dispute." Id.
Before answering the issue, the Trombetta court made a number of observations. First,
the court noted the parties stipulated that the arbitration agreement was created under the FAA

Id. at 562-63. Next, the court stated that if it concluded the FAA standards of review were
controlling, it would be bound by Supreme Court and Third Circuit case law interpreting whether
de novo review clauses are enforceable and if it found Pennsylvania standards of review were
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controlling, it would "need to develop a rule oflaw in Pennsylvania answering the question of
whether de novo review clauses are enforceable." Id. at 563. Finally, the court observed
Pennsylvania appellate courts had "never addressed the issue of whether the federal or state
standards of review govern a petition filed in the Pennsylvania state courts to enforce or vacate
,

,

,

an arbitration award entered in an arbitration proceeding governed by the Federal Arbitration
Act." Id..
To answer the issue, the Superior Court first looked to United States Supreme Court
cases applying the doctrine of preemption in the context of the FAA. Id. at 564. After careful
analysis of these cases~ the Sup~rior Court concluded a dichotomy has emerged whereby the
FAA preempts state laws that are "inherently substantive in the sense they affectO the
enforceability of the underlying arbitration agreement" whereas it does not preempt state laws
that are "inherently procedural and d[ o] not affect the enforceability of the underlying arbitration
agreement." See id. at 564-67 (emphasis original). Thus, the court held:
the FAA standards of review cannot pre-empt the Pennsylvania standards of
review for arbitration awards unless the Pennsylvania standards of review
:frustrate the underlying objectives of the FAA, as standards of review are an
inherently procedural mechanism used to facilitate judicial resolution of
controversies after the underlying arbitration agreement already has been
enforced in accordance with the FAA.
Id. at 568 (emphasis original).

Next, the court looked at the language of section 10 of the FAA, which provides the
circumstances by which an arbitration award may be vacated under the FAA. ·As that section
, explicitly states that it is "the United States court in and for the district wherein the award was
made, ... " that may vacate an arbitration award under these enumerated circumstances, 9 U.S.C.

§ 10, the Superior Court concluded that by its plain language section 10 only applies to
proceeding in United States district courts and "[t]he FAA standards of review do not apply to a
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state trial court's review over an arbitration award created and enforced under the FAA[,r id. at

569.
Next, the Superior Court addressed whether the common law standards of review set

forth in section 7341 of the UAA "violate the core objective and principles underlying the FAA."
Id. In concluding that they did not, the court stated "the primary purpose of the FAA is to

overcome judicial hostility towards arbitration, without displacing state arbitration schemes, by
giving arbitration agreements equal standing with other contractual agreements" arid
"Pennsylvania common law arbitration standards of review are on par with those outlined in

FAA § 10, and promote the goals of enforcing arbitration agreements and placing arbitration
agreements upon the same footing as contracts." Id. (quotations omitted).
Finally, the court stated "[i]n Pennsylvania, contracting parties are not free to impose
their own standards of review on a court and the parties to an arbitration agreement receive no
support for doing so under the guise of arbitration, thereby putting those agreements in a superior
position" and held it was state standards ofreview.at section 7341 of the UAA that were
applicable and Pennsylvania case law that would dictate ''whether parties can impose de novo
review on our trial courts by virtue of contractual agreements." Id.

2.

The MSA does not expressly adopt the FAA's standards of review.

Here, the PMs argued that by agreeing at section XI(c) of the MSA that "[t]he arbitration
shall be governed by the United States Federal Arbitration Act," "[t]he parties were obviously
agreeing upon the law that would govern the entire dispute-resolution process-not just the
conduct of the arbitration by the Panel, but also review and enforcement of the arbitration by the
courts of the [Settling States]." (OPM Mem.: re Final Award p. 17.) This court does not agree.
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While section XI(c) of the MSA provides "[t]he arbitration shall be governed by the
United States Arbitration Act[,]" MSA § XI(c), thatsection only speaks tohowthe arbitration
was to be conducted, it does not speak to what standards of review should be applied in postarbitration proceedings. That question is answered by other sections of the MSA. First, section
XVIII(n) of the MSA states that the MSA "shall be governed by the laws of the relevant Settling
State, without regard to the conflict oflaw rules of such Settling State." MSA § XVIII(n). Next,
at sections II(p) and VII(a) the MSA provides it is "the respective court

of each Settling State"

that has exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising out of the MSA. MSA §§ II(p), VII(a).
Therefore, under the plain language of the MSA, while section XI(c) requires the arbitration
itself be conducted in accordance with the FAA, sections II(p), VII(a), and XVIII(n)-and, as
will be discussed below, Pennsylvania law-dictate it is the law of the Commonwealth that
provides the standards of review for post-arbitration proceedings in this court.

3.

The appropriate standards of review for this case are found at
. sections 7302(d)(2) and 7314 of the UAA.

In the opinion of this court, the laws of the Commonwealth that provide the standards of
review are sections 7302(d)(2) and 7314 of the UAA and associated case law. As a preliminary
matter, there are two types of contractual arbitration under Pennsylvania law: statutory
arbitration under subchapter A of the UAA and common law arbitration under subchapter B of
. the UAA. 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 7301-20, 7341-42. An agreement to arbitrate on a contractual basis is
conclusively presumed to provide for common law arbitration under subchapter B "unless the
agreement to arbitrate is in writing and expressly provides for arbitration pursuant to ...
subchapter [A] or any other similar statute," in which case the agreement is conclusively
presumed to provide for statutory arbitration under subchapter A. See 42 Pa C.S. § 7302(a).
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Here, the agreement to arbitrate was in writing. Additionally, as will be discussed in.
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more detail below, the FAA and the UAA are similar in that they both mandate enforcement of
arbitration awards and only provide for limited review of those awards. Thus, as section XI(c) of
th.e MSA provides for arbitration pursuant to the FAA and the FAA and the UAA are similar
statutes, it brings the MSA with.in the purview of statutory arbitration under subchapter A of the

UAA.
Sections 7302(d)(2) and 7314 of the UAA are both in subchapter A. As relevant here,
section 7302(d)(2) provides that when "[t]he Commonwealth government submits a controversy
to arbitrationL] ... a court in reviewing an arbitration award ... shall ... modify or correct the

award where the award is contrary to law and is such that had it been a verdict of a jury the court
would have entered a different judgment or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict." 42 Pa. C.S.
§ 7302(d). -Section 7314, on the other hand, provides the general circumstances under which a

court must vacate a statutory arbitration award. See 42 ia. C.S. § 7314. These circumstances
include when the "arbitrators exceed[] their powers" or refuse to hear evidence material to the
controversy that substantially prejudices the rights of a party. 42 Pa. C.S. § 7314(a)( 1)(iii)-(iv).

In regard to section 7302(d)(2), the Commonwealth argued th.is court has the power to·
modify the award where the arbitration panel commits an error of law and the award is against
the clear weight of the evidence. The PMs, on the other hand, argued the Commonwealth
ignores that the courts have repeatedly emphasized the limited scope of merits review that this
provision allows and the error oflaw/judgment n.o.v. concept set forth in section 7302(d)(2) is
the same as the "essence test," which requires a court to uphold an arbitrator's award if it
represents a reasonable interpretation of the contract between the parties. The Commonwealth,
however, countered the issue of the essence test is a ''red herring" as that test has only been
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applied to collective bargaining agreements and the MSA is not a collective bargaining
agreement. (PA Reply re: Final Award p. 10.)
Here, we agree with the PMs. While the essence test was adopted by our Supreme Court

in the context of a collective bargaining agreement in Community College ofBeaver County v.
Community College ofBeaver College, Society of the Faculty, 375 A.2d 1267 (Pa. 1977), in
doing so the Court made clear that when modification of an award is sought as being "against the
law and ... such that had it been the verdict of the jury, the court· would have entered different or
other judgment notwithstanding the verdict[,]" the standard does not dictate "a closer or different
scrutiny of an arbitration award [than] would be available than under the ["essence" test]." State

Sys. ofHigher Educ. v. State Coll. Univ. Prof'/ Ass'n, 743 A.2d 405,411 (Pa 1999) (analyzing
Community College ofBeaver County). Moreover, in adopting the "essence" test standard, the
Court stated where a task of the arbitrators "has been to determine the intention of the parties as
evidenced by their [contract] and the circumstances surrounding its execution, then the
. arbitrator[ s '] award is based on a resolution of a question of fact" and the s~andard of review .is
the "essence" test whereunder the arbitrators' award "is to be respected by the judiciary if the
interpretation can in any rational way be derived from. the agreement, viewed in light of its
language, its context, and any other indicia of the parties' intention[.]" Cmty. Coll., 375 A.2d at
1275 (quotations omitted). Under this approach, the arbitrators' "interpretation of the contract
must be upheld ifit is a reasonable one." Cmty. Coll., 375 A.2d at 1275 (quotations omitted).
While the essence test was adopted and has only been applied in the context of collective
bargaining agreements, it is this court's opinion that the logic of our Supreme Court in

Community College ofBeaver County is equally applicable here as a task of the Panel was to
determine the intention of the parties as evidenced by the MSA and, thus, in this case, the
/
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essence test is the appropriate standard to be applied under section 7302(d)(2) of the UAA. See
Cmty. Coll., 375 A.2d at 1273-75. See also Musser, 548 A.2d at 1200 (stating "the 'essence' test

remains the standard of judicial review for arbitration awards which, like the one at bar, are
subject to section 7302(d)(2) ... and are challenged under that provision.").
However, as the Commonwealth made a colorable argument that the essence test should
only be applied to collective bargaining agreements, this court also looked at the issues under the
judgment n.o.v}error oflaw standard. But in keeping with our Supreme Court's pronouncement

that "that the judgmentn.o.v./error oflaw standard and the essence test are essentially the same,"
Tunkhannock Area Sch. Dist. v. Tunkhannock Area Educ. Ass 'n, 992 A.2d 956, 958 (Pa

Cornrow. Ct. 2010), it did not lead to any different results in this case.
Under the judgment n.o. v. /error of law standard, a court will modify an award "if, and
only if, viewing all the evidence (including inferences reasonably to be drawn therefrom) most
favorable to the [award] winner, the elements of the cause of action or defense asserted have not,
as a matter oflaw, been established." Cmty. Coll., 375 A2d at 1273. "Although a court may
modify .... the award for errors of law by the arbitrators, [a court] may not disturb their findings
unless they are against the clear weight of the evidence." Pennsylvania Tpk Comm'n v. Litton
RCS, Inc., 20 Pa Cmwlth. 577,583,342 A.2d 108, 112 (1975). ''In passing on a motion for

judgment n.o. v., findings of fact will not be disturbed if supported by evidence." Cmty. Coll.,
375 A2d at 1273. Thus, as explained by the court in Trombetta,judgment n.o.vJerror oflaw
review "is still very limited." 907 A.2d at 571.
Based on the above, the Commonwealth is not entitled to plenary review of the law
nor broad review of the facts. Rather, at most, it is entitled to limited review of whether the
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:Panel's determinations can in any rational way be derived from the MSA after viewing the

J

evidence in the light most favorable to the PMs.

4.

The standards of review outlined in sections 7302(d)(2) and 7314 of
the UAA are not preempted by the FAA.

The FAA does not expressly preempt state arbitration laws. Trombetta, 907 A.2d ~t 564,

citing Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. ofLeland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477
(1989). Nor does it "reflect a Congressional intent to occupy the entire field of arbitration.''

Trombetta, 907 A.2d at 564, citing Volt, 489 U.S. at 477. However, "[e]ven when Congress has
not completely displaced state regulation in an area, ... state law may nonetheless be pre-empted
to the extent that it conflicts with federal law; that is, to the extent that it 'stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.'" Trombetta,
907 A.2d at 564, quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at 477. It was in this vein that the PMs argued the FAA
preempts the UAA.
To prevail on this argument, the PMs must show the UAA "stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Volt, 489 U.S.
at 4 77. Here, the PMs made two arguments. First, the PMs argued the primary purpose of the
FAA is to ensure '"that private agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their terms"'
and that application of the UAA in this case "would thwart the FAA's primary purpose by
nullifying the parties' agreed-upon standard for judicial review of their arbitration." (OPM
Mem.: re Final Award p. 18 (quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at 470) (emphasis original)).) Second,
quoting Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576,588 (2008), the PMs argued
the F AA's standards of review "substantiat[e] a national policy favoring arbitration with just the
limited review needed to maintain arbitration's essential virtue of resolving disputes
straightway" that would not be met if even one Settling State could second-guess the merits of
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the Panel's determinations under a laxer state law standard. (See OPM Mem.: re Final Award

. ./

pP. 19-20.)

Regarding the PMs first argument, as addressed above, the MSA does not expressly
adopt the FAA 's standards of review, but rather looks to the law of the Commonwealth to
provide the standards for review. And, "[i]nterpreting a choice-of-law clause to make applicable
state rules governing [post-arbitration judicial review]- ... does [not] offend any ... policy
embodied in the FAA." See Volt, 489 U.S;· at 476. Thus, application oftheUAA would not
nullify the parties' agreed-upon standard for post-arbitration judicial review in this case, but
rather enforce it under circumstances that do not offend any policies embodied in the FAA. Thus,
we concluded the PMs' first argument is not a basis for preemption.
Regarding the PMs' second argument, if this was a basis for preemption, the FFA would
preempt any state law that provided for a more searching review than allowed by the FAA,
regardless of the parties' intent via any particular agreement regarding arbitration. But the Court
in Hall Street passed on this very issue when it said:

In holding that §§ 10 and 11 provide exclusive regimes for the review provided by
the [FAA] statute, we do not purport to say that they exclude more searching
review based on authority outside the statute as well. The FAA is not the only
way into court for parties wanting review of arbitration awards: they may
contemplate enforcement under state statutory or common law, for example,
where judicial review of different scope is arguable.
552 U.S. at 590. Moreover, in Volt, the Court held "'[t]here is no federal policy favoring

arbitration under a certain set ofproceduralrules[,]," Mocatiello v. JJB. Hilliard, 939 A.2d
325,329 (Pa. 2007), quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at 476 (emphasis added), and "standards of review
are an inherently procedural mechanism used to facilitate judicial resolutions of controversies

after the underlying arbitration agreement has already been enforced ... [,]" Trombetta, 907 A.2d
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at 568 (emphasis original). Therefore, we concluded the PMs' second argument is not a basis

for preemption.
The primary purpose of the FAA is to ensure that agreements to arbitrate are enforced in
the first instance and treated like any other contracts, not to ensure limited judicial review. See,
e.g., Moscatiello, 939 A.2d at 328 ("Congress enacted the FAA to overrule the judiciary's

longstanding refusal to enforce arbitration agreem~nts; its purpose is to place arbitration
agreements on equal legal ground with other contracts.") "'[T]he federal policy is simply to
ensure the enforceability, according to their terms, of private agreements to arbitrate."'
Moscatiello, 939 A.2d at 329, quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at 476. Thus, "[t]he federal policy ... is

limited to Congress's intent to make arbitration agreements enforceable [and] [t]he FAA does
not preempt the procedural rules governing arbitration in state courts, as that is beyond its
reach." Moscatiello; 939 A.2d at 329. That is why only section 2 of the FAA, which demands
that an arbitration provision be treated like any other contractual term, has been held to preempt
state law. See Volt, 489 U.S. at 477 n.6. See also 9 U.S.C. § 2 (providing "[a] written provision
in any ... contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract ... or an agreement in writing to submit to
arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract ... shall be valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.").
However, even if a "national policy" of limited review of arbitration decisions could be
said to preempt state law to the contrary, the UAA would remain unaffected. Unlike the standard
to which the parties agreed to in Hall Street, the UAA standards applicable here do not provide

de novo review. Under section 7302(d)(2), the UAA adopts the judgment n.o.v./error oflaw
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standard and Pennsylvania state courts apply the "essence" test to arbitration awards like those at

bar. These standards of review are very limited and do not "standO as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Volt, 489 U.S.
at 4 77; Trombetta, 907 A.2d at 571. Thus, they do not trigger preemption.

5.

Even if the MSA expressly called for post-arbitration judicial review
to be governed by the FAA, contracting parties are not free to impose
their own standards of review on a Pennsylvania state trial court.

Finally, even if the MSA expressly called for post-arbitratiori:jU:dicial review to be
governed by the FAA, Trombetta dictates that we not allow parties to arbitration to contractually
mandate what standards of review are applied to their awards by Pennsylvania's state trial courts.
While the parties in Trombetta purported to agree to a broader standard of review than was
provided for by the FAA or the UM-namely, de novo review-the statement in Trombetta
could not have been clearer:

·In Pennsylvania, contracting parties are not free to impose their own standards of
review on a court and the parties to an arbitration agreement receive no support
for doing so under the guise of arbitration, thereby putting those agreements in a
superior position.
907 A.2d at 569. As a trial court, this court is bound to apply binding precedent from
Pennsylvania's appellate courts. Rudisill v. Com., Dep't ofTransp., 2011 WL 10876936 (Pa
Commw. Ct. 2011). Thus, even if the MSA expressly required or it was the parties' intent that
post-arbitration judicial review be governed by the FAA. this court would be duty-bound to
apply the UAA's standards ofreviewper Trombetta.
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B.

The Motion to Modify or Vacate the Final Award8

{

Because the Panel did not apply the wrong definition of diligence and its determination
that Pennsylvania was not diligent in 2003 can rationally be derived from the MSA and is not
.

.

against the clear weight of the evidence, its detennination cannot be ~odified by this court. Nor
can i~ determination be vacated by this court as the Panel didconsiderrelevant evidence in a
rational, consistent, and non-arbitrary manner and the failure to also consider the enforcement
record for the 20 Compromising States whose diligence had been contested was not shown to (1)
· have been the result of the Panel refusing to consider the evidence or to (2) have substantially
prejudiced the Commonwealth.

1.

The Panel did not apply the wrong definition of diligence.

Given that the MSA does not define "diligent enforcement," the Panel interpreted those
words to mean that there was "an ongoing ~d intentional consideration of the requirements of a
Settling State's Qualifying Statute, and a significant attempt by the Settling State to meet those
requirements, talcing into account a Settling State's competing laws and policies that may
conflict with its MSA contractual obligations." (Final Aw~d pp. 13-14.) The Panel further
noted its definition was an objective one and included eight factors it thought "provide[d] a
reliable and objective metric to assess" whether an individual State diligently enforced its

The PMs also argued with respect to the Commonwealth's November 4, 3013 motion to
modify or vacate the Final Award that if the UAA standards of review applied (as this court has
determined), the Commonwealth's motion was untimely because it was not filed within 30 clays
of the Panel's September 11, 2013 decision, but rather within 30 days of the Panel's denial of the
Commonwealth's motion for correction of the September 11 th decision.
The Commonwealth's motion regarding the Final Award was timely under the UAA. In
preliminary proceedings, the Panel ruled that the Conflict Prevention.& Resolution Procedures
and Clauses ("CPR") would be used as guidelines for the arbitration. The CPR specify that if a
correction of an award is sought, the award is not "final and binding on the parties" until "such
clarification, correction or additional award is made." (PA Mot re: Final Award Ex: 51.) Thus,
in the context. of this arbitration, the Final Award did not become "final" until the Panel denied
the Commonwealth's motion for correction.
8
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Qualifying Statute giv~n its "existing policies and circumstances in 2003." (Final Award pp. 1314, 20.)
Here, the Commonwealth argued the Panel erred because the words "diligently enforced"
in the MSA equate with the words "due diligence" in Pennsylvania's rule for speedy trials in

criminal cases. As a result, Pennsylvania law required the Panel to have found the
Commonwealth diligently enforced its Qualifying Statute if it made "reasonable efforts" to
enforce its statute as that is all that is required in the criminal context to satisfy the requirement
of due diligence. The Commonwealth further took exception to the eight factors the Panel
identified as none "are found in the MSA or Pennsylvania law" and they ''were not disclosed to
Pennsylvania or the other States until the Final Awards were handed down ...." (PA Mem. re:
Final Award p. 27.).
In developing its standard for determining diligent enforcement, the Panel did not make
an error of}aw and its interpretation is a reasonable one. First, the Panel's definition of diligent
enforcement is in keeping with common dictionary definitions of"diligence." See, e.g., N The
Oxford English Dictionary 665 (2d ed. 1989) (defining diligence as "[c]onstant and earnest effort
to accomplish what is undertaken."). Second, cases interpreting the phrase "due diligence" used
in Pennsylvania's rule for speedy trials in criminal cases have not created a common law
definition that should have been used to interpret the different phrase "diligent enforcement"
used in the MSA.
Finally, regarding the factors the Panel came up with, while preferable for the
Commonwealth to know in advance what evidence the Panel was going to focus on in making its
diligence determinations, the Panel had to utilize some framework to decide the issue of
diligence and the factors seem to be derived from evidence the Panel was receiving from the
,/
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various parties on the issue. As such, this court cannot say that the Panel erred as matter of law

in coming up with its factors or that its factors are not in any way rationally derived from the
MSA or Pennsylvania law.

2.

The Panel's determination that Pennsylvania was not diligent in 2003
can rationally be derived from the MSA and is not against the clear
weight of the evidence.

While this court is sympathetic to the efforts the Commonwealth made to diligently
· enforce its Qualifying Statute in 2003, the major· flaw with the Commonwealth's attack on the
Panel, s non-diligence finding is that it ignores (1) adverse evidence upon which the Panel relied
and (2) that the Panel explained its decision required weighing the evidence and making
"determinations as to the credibility of witnesses" and considering "inferences that could or
could not be drawn from the testimony and documents." (See Final Award pp. 20:-25.)
Regarding its record of enforcement for 2003 and the Panel's findings, the
Commonwealth highlighted the following:
•

"while Pennsylvania's overall collection rate was 44% ... , Pennsylvania either
collected or actively pursued 93% of the payable escrow funds for 2002 sales[;]"

•

while Pennsylvania did not have a blanket policy in 2003 regarding when to file
lawsuits and did not sue seven of the ten largest non-compliant NPMs, "Pennsylvania
did have a litigation strategy of targeting larger NMPs with an actual potential for
recovery[;]" and

•

"[a]lthough the Panel stated that its negative comments regarding RYO sales were not
material or necessary to the Final Award, the Panel's decision ,making was ... flawed
... to that ... factor as [well]" because Pennsylvania does not tax RYO sales and the
MSA puts no demand on the Settling States to change their laws in such a manner.

/
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(PA Mero..: re Final Award pp. 28-30.)
However, as highlighted by the PMs:
•

regarding the collection rate, the Panel "expressly considered and rejected the
Commonwealth's assertion that it had actively pursued an additional 49% of the
escrow due in 2003[;]"

•

regarding having a litigation strategy of targeting larger NPMs with an actual
potential for recovery, "abundant evidence supported the Panel's conclusion that no
such strategy ever existed, and that the Commonwealth's escrow officials instead met
sporadically to discuss how to move forward with its cases[;]" and

•

regarding RYO sales, "[a]lthough the Panel did hold States are not required to elevate
their diligent-enforcement obligations above other statutory or rational policy
considerations, that plainly did not foreclose the Panel from nevertheless holding that
it militates against a diligence finding when States, like Pennsylvania, ... decline to
consider the impact of their existing statutes on their escrow obligations."

(OPM Mem.: re Final Award pp. 31-32, 34, 36 (quotations and brackets omitted).)
When "there [wa]s no blanket policy regarding when to file lawsuits and whom to target"
(or for much of anything else); (see Final Award pp. 21, 24); those tasked with enforcing
Pennsylvania's statute would only "meet sporadically to discuss how to move forward with
cases[;]" (Final Award p. 21); and the ''primary attorney tasked with NPM enforcement spent
less than 100 hours in 2003 in ... pursuit of' the three NPMs against whom suit was filed; (PMs
Mem. re: Final Award pp. 32-33) (emphasis and quotations removed)); this court was unable to
conclude there was "an ongoing and intentional consideration of the requirements of [its]
Qualifying Statute, and a significant attempt by [it] to meet those requirements, taking into
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account [its] competing laws and policies that may conflict with its MSA contractual
obligations[,]" (Final Award pp. 13-14), such that this court should modify the award of three
respected former federal judges who found otherwise. In the end, while sympathetic to the
efforts the Commonwealth did make in 2003 (including those of the Commonwealth's
investigator, Kenneth Bateman, who was lauded by the Panel for his diligence), this court
ultimately concludes the Panel's determination that Pennsylvania was not diligent in 2003 can be
rationally derived from the MSA and is not against the clear weight of the evidence and; thus,
should not be modified.

3.

The Panel considered relevant evidence in a rational, consistent, and
non-arbitrary manner.

In the context of the "essence" test, an award may be vacated when it is irrational. See

Del. Cnty. v. Del. Cnty. Prison Emps. Indep. Union, 713 A.2d l 13~, 1137-38 (Pal998)
(applying the essence test and finding vacatur appropriate where there is "no rational manner" in
which the arbitrators could have reached their decision, and the decision is "a plain departure
from the terms of the agreement."). Noting three apparent inconsistencies, the Commonwealth
argued the Final Award was irrational and inconsistent when compared to awards for other States
and, thus, should be vacated. The three apparent inconsistencies are: the Panel describing
Pennsylvania's 44% collection rate as relatively low while describing Ohio's 44% collection rate
. as middle of the range for the contested Settling States; the Panel finding five States that did not
file a single lawsuit in 2003 were diligent while finding Pennsylvania that filed four lawsuits in
2003 was non-diligent; and the Panel excusing Oregon's failure to collect escrow on RYO as
general confusion over RYO while refusing to excuse Pennsylvania's failure to do the same.
Here, the PMs adequately explained away the Commonwealth's three apparent
/

inconsistencies. First, regarding the collection rate in Ohio, as PMs noted ''the Panel concluded
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that the rate ha[d] to be adjusted substantially upwards because almost 50% of the cigarettes on
which escrow was not paid were sold by Carolina Tobacco Company, whose sales the Panel
decided generally shoul_d not be held against the States." (OPM Mem.: re Final Award p. 38
(quotations omitted).) Second, in terms of the diligence findings for five States that did hot file
lawsuits in 2003, the PMs explained ''the Panel found that each of those States, unlike
Pennsylvania, carried its burden of proving its lack of lawsuits in 2003 was based on legitimate
strategic reasons, such as fo·cusing instead on settlement negotiations with the largest noncompliant NPMs" and that ''the Panel also found those States had substantially higher collection
rates than Pennsylvania did, ranging from 60% to 99% .... " (OPM Mem.: re Final Award pp.
38-39 (citations omitted).) Finally, regarding Oregon's failure to collect escrow on RYO, the
PMs explained "the Panel found that, unlike [in Pennsylvania], 'much time was spent in
[Oregon] discussing the subject' and 'the State formally changed its position in 2007."' (OPM
Mem.: re Final Award p. 39 (quoting OR Final Award pp. 20-21).) With their above-analysis,
the PMs further satisfied this court that the Final Award was rational and (in addition to not
being modified) should not be vacated.
4.

Any failure to also consider the enforcement record for the 20
Compromising States whose <l:iligence had been contested has not
been shown to have been the result of the Panel refusing to do so or to
have substantially prejudiced the Commonwealth.

Under section 7314 of the UAA, an award may be vacated when the arbitrators refuse fo
hear evidence material to the controversy that substantially prejudices the rights of a party. 42
Pa C.S. § 7314(a)(l)(iv). In its motion, Pennsylvania argued that it met that standard and the
Final Award should be vacated because:
the Panel engaged in a comparative analysis in reaching its conclusion that
Pennsylvania was non~diligent. But that analysis was fundamentally flawed
because, even if it was appropriate to compare the States to each other, the Panel
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did so by reference to only 14 other States and wrongly excluded evidence from at
least 20 other allegedly non-diligent States.
(PA Mem. re: Final Award p. 39.) If the Panel considered this evidence, Pennsylvania argu.ed its
''position on the broader spectrum would have been dramatically [better]" because these 20
Compromising States "h~d the most substantial ... compliance issues." (PA Mem. re: Final
Award p. 42.)
The Commonwealth's arguments fail for two reasons. First, the_ Commonwealth failed to
show it requested, but the Panel refused to hear, evidence of the enforcement records for the 20
Compromising States whose diligence had been contested. Pennsylvania acknowledged this, but
argued that it only failed to request the Panel consider this evidence because it did not know until
the final awards were issued that the Panel was going to be "making comparisons between the
States .... " (PA Reply re: Final Award p. 23.) In the opinion of this court, that does not
necessarily mean the onus was not upon Pennsylvania to make the request in the first place. But
regardless, in making its diligence determinations, the Panel explained it was deciding "each
State's diligence ... individually, based on the factual and legal determinations specific to that
State." (Panel Order re: Deposition Procedures p. 3.) Accordingly, even assuming that most or
all of these Compromising States were less diligent than Pennsylvania as it contends, that does
not mean the Panel would have. found Pennsyivania to have been diligent. Rather, the Panel
would just have found that many more States to have been non-diligent. It is not axiomatic that
the Panel would have changed its decision and found Pennsylvania was objectively diligent
simply upon deciding that all or most of these 20 Compromising States were relatively less
diligent or non-diligent
Second, the Commonwealth failed to show it was substantially prejudiced by the Panel
not considering evidence of the enforcement records for the 20 Compromising States whose
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diligence had been contested. While the Commonwealth's assertion that all or most of these 20

f

Compromising States had more substantial compliance issues than Pennsylvania could be valid,
without evidentiary support of prejudice this court is not in a position to vacate the award
Accordingly, it is the opinion of this court that the Final Award should not be vacated as
the Panel did consider relevant evidence in what must be considered a-rational, consistent, and
non-arbitrary manner and the failure to also consider the enforcement record for the 20
Compromising States whose diligence had been contested was not shown to (I) have been the
result of the Panel refusing to consider the evidence or to (2) have substantially prejudiced the
Commonwealth.

C.

The Motion to Modify, or Vacate in Part, the Partial Settlement Award

While the Panel had jurisdiction to determine how the 2003 NPM Adjustment should be
allocated among the non-diligent non-Compromising States, the Panel's adoption of the ''pro

rata" reallocation method cannot rationally be derived from the MSA and amounts to an error of
law as it violates the unambiguous language of section IX(d)(2), which provides the NPM
Adjustment "shall apply" to "all" Settling States unless they prove their diligence. As 20 of the
Compromising States diligence was contested, but not proven, the only way for the Partial
Settlement Award to not affect Pennsylvania's rights-.and amount to an unauthorized
amendment of the MSA-.is for these 20 Compromising States to be treated as non-diligent when
calculating the NPM Adjustment for Pennsylvania. Accordingly, for these reasons and the
reasons that follow, this court will order the "independent Auditor to treat the 20 Compromising
States whose diligence was contested but not proven as non-diligent when calculating the NPM
Adjustment applicable to the amount owed to Pennsylvania for 2003.
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The Panel had jurisdiction to determine how the 2003 NPM
Adjustment should be allocated among the non-diligent nonCompromising States.

It is the Commonwealth's position that the Panel exceeded its powers under the ARA
with its Reallocation Determination. Specifically, the Commonwealth argued that "although the
ARA states that the arbitration would proceed pursuant to [s]ection XI(c) .of the MSA," ''the
ARA's plain language states that the consolidated arbitration would only address the '2003 NPM
Adjustment Dispute,' which the ARA defines as 'the dispute regarding whether Participating
Manufacturers are entitled to a 2003 NPM Adjustment, including the diligent enforcement of
individual Settling States.'" (PA Mem. re: Partial Settlement p. 24 (quoting ARA §§ l(f), 2(a))
{some quotations omitted).) This limited the scope of the arbitration to "determination of the
PM's entitlement to a 2003 NPM Adjustment and the Settling State's diligenceL]" according to
l,

the Commonwealth. (PA Mem. re: Partial Settlement p. 24.) Moreover, the Commonwealth
argued with section 2(j)(i) of the ARA, "the parties themselves resolved how the Reallocation
Provision would be applied .... " (PA Mem. re: Partial Settlement p. 25.) That section
provides:
In the event the Arbitration panel determines that a Signatory State did not
diligently enforce a Qualifying Statute during 2003 (a ''Non-Diligent Signatory
State"), for purposes ofthe 2003 NPM Adjustment, such determination will give
rise to transfers from the Disputed Payments Account or offsets as provided in
Section XI(i)(2) of the MSA as follows.
(i) Upon the disclosure of such determination ... , the Parties shall jointly
and promptly instruct the Independent Auditor to calculate for each NonDiligent Signatory State the aggregate amount of the 2003 NPM
Adjustment that would be allocated pursuant to [s] ections IX(d)(2) and
IX(d)(4) of the MSA to that Non-Diligent Signatory State's Allocable
Shar.e of the MSA payments from all Signatory PMs. In performing that
calculation, the Independent Auditor shall (A) regard as imal the
Arbitration panel's ... determination as to any Settling State's diligent
enforcement, (B) assume that a Settling State diligently enforced a
Qualifying Statute during 2003 in the event the Signa.tory :eMs have
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given written notice to all Notice Parties (as identified by NAAG) that
they are no longer contesting that Settling State's diligent
enforcement, and (C) assume that a Settling State did not diligently
enforce a Qualifying Statute during 2003 in the event its diligent
enforcement both continues to be contested by the Signatory PMs and
has not yet been determined by the Arbitration panel .... The Parties
shall jointly and promptly provide the Independent Auditor with all
determinations and notices necessary to perform those calculations ....
(ARA§ 2(j)(i) (emphasis added).) The Commonwealth contended that the 20 Compromising
States whose diligence was contested but not proven fit into category "C," and the ARA required
all the parties join together after the partial settlement was reached to inst:ru.ct the Independent.
Auditor to assume these 20 "Compromising States were non-diligent for purposes of applying
the MSA's Reallocation Provision to the other Settling States, including Pennsylvania." (PA
Mem. re: Partial Settlement pp. 26-27.)

It is the court's position that the Panel had jurisdiction to determine how the 2003 NPM
Adjustment should be allocated among the non-diligent non:-Compromising States as "it is
·beyond reasonable debate" that: (1) ''the Panel had authority under the MSA to determine how
the 2003 NPM Adjustment should be reallocated among the [non-diligent non-Compromising]
States given the partial settlement" and (2) ''the ARA does not purport to strip the Panel of its
power to perform this central aspect of its job in resolving the 2003 NPM Adjustment dispute."
(OMPs Mero. re: Partial Settlement p. 13.)
Regarding the first point, in compelling arbitration of the 2003 NPM Adjustment dispute,
Judge Manfredi has already held a dispute is arbitrable under the plain language of section XI(c)
of the MSA when "it concerns ... the operation [or] application of the NPM Adjustment."
(Mem. Opinion p. 6).) And the Panel has already explained, "[o]nce a dispute is committed to
· arbitrationt "the arbitrators normally have the authority to decide all matters necessary to
dispose of the claim," "includ[ing] [the] authority to determine the existence or effect of a
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settlement." (Partial Settlement Award pp. 2-3 (citing cases).) Thus, under section XI(c) of the
NSA, "the Panel's authority to dispose of the 2003 NPM Adjustment dispute clearly include[d]
determining how the partial settlement affect[ed] the allocation of the 2003 NPM Adjustment
among" the non~diligent non-Compromising States. (OMPs Mem. re: Partial Settlement p. 14.)
Regarding the second point, the ARA does not resolve the issue nor strip the Panel of its
power to address this aspect of the 2003 NPM Adjustment dispute. The Commonwealth does
not cite "a single provision of the ARA that affirmatively purports to remove reallocation ·
disputes from the Panel's jurisdiction." (OMPs Mem. re: Partial Settlement p. 15.) Rather, the
Commonwealth argued section 2G)(i) of the ARA "resolved how the Reallocation Provision
would be applied." (PA Mem. re: Partial Settlement pp. 25-27.) While creative, the
. Commonwealth's argument was not convincing.
As will be discussed below, there are ramifications under the MSA to the fact that the

Partial Settlement Agreement was reached after "[t]he deadline imposed by the Panel for the
[PMs] to decide not to contest [the diligence of] Settling States[,]" (PA Reply re: Partial
Settlement p. 19.) That does not mean the PMs continued to contest the diligence of these 20
Compromising States once the settlement was reached, and these States plainly fit into
subsection C of section 2G)(i) of the ARA; a section that also arguably only addressed "the
procedural issue of how NPM Adjustment funds would.be distributed during the interim period
after the Panel began making determinations as to which States were subject to the 2003 NPM
Adjustment but before all those determinations had been made and judicially reviewed," (OMPs
Mem. re: Partial Settlement p. 16 (emphasis removed)).
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2.

The Panel's adoption of the "pro rata" reallocation method cannot
rationally be derived from the MSA and amounts to an error of la:w as
it violates the unambiguous language of section IX(d)(2), which
provides the NPM Adjustment "shall apply" to "all" Settling States
·
unless they prove their diligence.

The Commonwealth argued the Panel's ~doption of the ''pro rata" reallocation method
violated the clear language of section IX(d)(2), which provides an NPM Adjustment "shall
apply" to "all" Settling States "except" those States that "continuously had a Qualifying Statute .
.. . in full force and effect ... and diligently enforced the provisions of such statute during such
entire calendar year." MSA § IX(d)(2). It is the Commonwealth's position that the "section
contains no exceptions and therefore applies equally to all factual situations that may arise,
including a partial settlement." (PA Mem. re: Partial Settlement p. 20.) It is also the
Commonwealth's position that the only way for the Partial Settlement Award not to amount to
an improper amendment of the MSA would be to ''to treat as non-diligent the 20 Compromising
States whose diligence was contested and not proved when calculating ~e NPM Adjustment for
the other Settling States." (PA Mem. re: Partial Settlement p. 24.) If these 20 Compromising
States are treated as non-diligent and the Panel's pro rata reduction is removed from the
equation, Pennsylvania's MSA Payment for 2003 would be reduced by $116,457,190.73 rather
than $242,309,663.54.9
The PMs, on the other hand, argued ''under any standard of review, this [c]ourt cannot
second-guess ... the Panel's reasonable contractual interpretation of how to apply the MSA's
NPM Adjustment reallocation provisions after a partial settlement, especially given the
unreasonableness of the Commonwealth's contrary interpretation." (OPM Mem.: re Partial

For ease of reference and as a helpful illustrative tool, diagrams from the
Commonwealth's brief that depict these calculations are attached hereto as "Attachment I.'~ (Or
see PA Mem. re: Partial Settlement pp. q-14.)
9
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Settlement p. 6.) The PMs viewed Pennsylvania's interpretation of the MSA as unreasonable
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because there is no factual basis to support the position that none of these 20 Compromising
States would have been found diligent by the Panel absent the settlement. Rather, the PMs
argued the MSA is silent on reallocating the NPM Adjustment among non-Compromising States
"where the diligence of [Compromising] States is no longer contested by the PMs due to a
settlement and it therefore remains unknown whether or not those ... parties were diligent" and
"a reasonable mind could derive the pro rata method from the MSA's reallocation provision and
default judgment-reduction principles in a rational way" and, thus, the Panel's interpretation
cannot be second-guessed here. ( OPM Mem.: re Partial Settlement p. 8-9 ( emphasis, brackets,
and quotations removed).)
The problem with the PMs' opposition is that it "suffers from the same flaws as the
Partial Settlement Award itself: It ignores the plain language of the MSA." (PA Reply re:
Partial Settlement p. 4.) It is a fundamental principle of Pennsylvania contract law that when the
language of a contract is unambiguous, there is no basis to look beyond its express language, as
the Panel did here. See Steuart v. McChesney, 444 A.2d 659,661 (Pa 1982) (holding that "when
a written contract is clear and unequivocal, its meaning must be determined by its contents alone.
It speaks for itself and a meaning cannot be given to it other than that expressed.").
The PM's opposition failed to identify any ambiguity in the language of section IX(d)(2).
Rather, the PMs argued the MSA is silent on reallocating the NPM Adjustment among nonCompromising States '\¥here the diligence of [Compromising] States is no longer contested by
the PMs due to a settlement and it therefore remains unknown whether or not those ... parties
were diligent." (OPM Mem.: re Partial Settlement p. 9 (emphasis removed).) That type of
argument, however, does not create ambiguity where there is none. See, e.g., Del. Cnty. v. Del.
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Cnty. Prison Employees Jndep. Union, 713 A.2d 1135 (Pa. 1998) (holding that because "[n]o
limits on [the county's] power [to subcontract work and lay off employees] were set forth in the
agreement" at issue, the arbitrator "was obliged to apply the agreement as written, without
:imposing additional terms that modify and limit what the parties expressed."). As aptly
explained by the Commonwealth:
The MSA does not address many specific permutations. That does not render it.
ambiguous and subject to the Panel's reading in new terms. For example, it does
not specifically address how reallocation should be handled in regardto·an
arbitration ruling issued on a Wednesday. It would be absurd, of course, to
suggest that this is an ambiguity that would allow an arbitration panel to create
special rules for rulings on Wednesdays. That is because there are clear and
generally applicable terms that cover all scenarios, regardless of what day it is.
Likewise, the terms of the MSA explicate that the default status quo rule is that all
States are subject to the NPM Adjustment. *** [T]he MSA provides only one way
for a State to escape the Adjustment for a given year ... : prove its diligence. That
clear governing rule applies in all contexts. It does not depend on what day of the
week it is, what the temperature is outside~ or whether the State has decided to
settle rather than litigate its diligence.
(PA Reply re: Partial Settlement p. 6 (citations omitted).)

In its entirety, section IX(d)(2) of the MSA provides:
'
(A)
The NPM Adjustment set forth in subsection (d)(l) shall apply to the
Allocated Payments of all Settling States, except as set forth below.
(B) A Settling State's Allocated Payment shall not be subject to an NPM
Adjustment: (i) if such Settling State continuously had a Qualifying Statute (as
defined in subsection (2)(E) below) in full force and effect during the entire
calendar year immediately preceding the year in which the payment in question is
due, and diligently enforced the provisions of such statute during such entire
calendar year; or (ii) if such Settling State enacted the Model Statute (as defined
in subsection (2)(E) below) for the first time during the calendar year
immediately preceding the year in which the payment in question is due,
· continuously had the Model Statute in full force and effect during the last six
. months of such calendar year, and diligently enforced the provisions of such
statute during the period in which it was in full force and effect.

MSA § IX(d)(2)(emphasis added). Thus, under the plain language of the MSA, the default rule
is a Settling State is treated as subject to the NPM Adjustment. And in order to earn an
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ex.emption, the State must show it "diligently enforced" its qualifying statute during the year in
qu.estion; no exceptions.
This is not just the court's and the Commonwealth's reading of the MSA, it was the
Fanel's reading as well. As examples, this court agrees with the Panel's statement in its burden
of proof order that "no language in the MSA supports a finding that the States can by-pass an
inquiry regarding whether they satisfied their contractual obligation for avoiding a payment
adjustment through the NPM Adjustment[,]" (Panel's Order re: Burden of Proof p. 11 ), and the
Panel's statement in the Final Award that "States are ... not required either to enact or enforce [a
Qualifying Statute], but if they want the benefit of the contractual exemption from the NPM
Adjustment, they must do both." (Final Award p. 6.)
Thus, there is no ambiguity as to how the 20 Compromising States whose diligence was
contested, but not proven, are to be treated for the purposes of the NPM Adjustment. In the
language of the Panel's Final Award, these 20 Compromising States failed to "demonstrateO that
they enacted and 'diligently enforced' a 'Qualifying Statute."' (Final Award p. 6.) Therefore,
they are not entitled to "the benefit of the contractual exemption from the NPM Adjustment[,]"
(Final Award p. 6), and they must be treated as non-diligent when calculating the NPM
Adjustment applicable to the amount owed to Pennsylvania for 2003.

3.

The Panel's use of a judgment reduction method borrowed from tort
law confirms that the Panel was not properly interpreting the MSA.

Moreover, there was no basis for the Panel to consider "standard" judgment reduction
methods derived from tort law. Neither the Partial Settlement Award nor the PMs' opposition
cited legal authority for importing tort law to "interpret'' the parties' contractual rights under the

MSA.
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Indeed, looking at cases regarding allocation of damages is improper here. ***
[T]he NPM adjustment bears no relation to a damage action for breach of the
MSA. Rather, applying the NPM Adjustment is simply a question of carrying out
a contract in accord with its terms. The contract specifies that all States are
subject to the NPM Adjustment, unless a State satisfies the contractual exception
by proving its diligence. The operation of the reallocation terms of the contract
has dramatic implications for the finances of the States and must be strictly
followed. Neither an arbitration panel nor a court has the right to rewrite or revise
those terms based on its own concepts of fairness.
(PA Reply re: Partial Settlement pp. 12-13.)
As previously explained, the NPM Adjustment is allocated using a two-tiered process. If

a Settling State fails to prove its diligence, it is subject to an initial reduction of its MSA
Payment in the First Tier equal to its Allocable Share of the total NPM Adjustment amount.
MSA § IX(d)(2). That same Settling State is then subject to an additional reduction of its MSA
Payment in the.Second Tier based on the Allocable Share(s) of any diligent Settling State(s),
whose shares are "reallocated among all [non-diligent] Settling States pro rata in proportion to
their respective Allocable Shares." MSA § IX(d)(2(C) (italicization added). As stated by the
Commonwealth, "(t]his complex system involves concepts completely foreign to tort law: a
fixed Allocable Share for each 'defendant' and a two~tiered built-in reallocation provision
separate and apart from any pro rata reallocation regime. These features of the MSA make it
impossible to coherently apply a generalized 'pro rata' judgment reduction method to this case."
(PA Reply re: Partial Settlement p. 13 (italicization added).) But in any event, there was no basis
for the Panel to consider "standard" judgment reduction methods derived from tort law and the
Panel was not properly interpreting the MSA when it grafted its pro rata reallocation method
ontotheMSA
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In sum, the Panel's adoption of the pro rata reallocation method is contrary to the plain
language of the MSA, is not rationally derived therefrom, and amounts to an error oflaw that
nust be modified by this court.

4.

The Panel's adoption of the ''pro rata" reallocation. method violates
section XVIIl(j) of the MSA, which prohibits amendments to the MSA
that are not signed by all Settling States "affected" by such
amendment.

In adopting the "pro rata" reallocation method, the Panel also violated section XVIII(j)
of the MSA, which provides the MSA can only be amended ''by a written instrument executed

by all ... Settling States affected by the amendment." MSA § XVIII(j) (emphasis added).
When the Panel adopted the pro rata reallocation method and instructed the Independent Auditor
to treat all of the Compromising States as diligent it effectively rewrote the MSA and affected

Pennsylvania's contractual rights.
While the PMs were free to settle with the Compromising States as to the amounts of
their annual payments, these parties could not do so in a way that "affected" the rights of
Pennsylvania. In entering the Partial Settlement Award, the Panel should have done so in a way
that would not even potentially implicate the rights of the other Settling States as it was beyond
the authority of the Panel to enter the Partial Settlement Award in a way that affected the rights
of any other Settling State without that Settling State's consent. Modifying the Partial
Settlement Award so that the Independent Auditor is instructed to treat the 20 Compromising
States whose diligence was contested but not proven as non-diligent, when calculating the NPM
Adjustment applicable to the amount owed to Pennsylvania for 2003, will ensure that the Partial
Settlement Award does not "affect" Pennsylvania's rights and will bring the Partial Settlement
Award in line with the plain language of sections XVIII(j) and IX(d)(2) of the MSA.
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It is also worth noting here that, in terms of"affecting" Pennsylvania's contractual rights,
the Panel's No-Contest Order and the Partial Settlement Agreement are not at all comparable. In

its No-Contest Order, the Panel decided the "procedural question" of ''whether or not to conduct

an. evidentiary hearing when a [S]tate's diligent enforcement is_ not challenged" by "[]either the
JlMs, []or any State." (Panel's Order re: PMs' Mot. for Clarification oii No-Contest Issue p. 13.)

Tu determining that a Settling State whose diligence was never contested by any PM or any sister
State would be deemed diligent without undergoing an evidentiary heariug, the Panel did not
affect the contractual rights of any of the parties. The decision was "procedural" because all of
the parties had a timely opportunity to contest diligence, and if they failed to do so, there was
agreement as to the diligence of any particular State. (See Panel's Order re: PMs' Mot. for
Clarification on No-Contest Issue p. 13 ("Ifno PM or [S]tate challenges the diligent enforcement
(

of a particular [S]tate, when all have had the opportunity to do so, there is no rational basis for
conducting a hearing. Where there is no challenge to a [S]tate' s claim to diligent enforcement, a
No Contest decision can be interpreted by the Panel as the functional equivalent of diligent
enforcement by the uncontested [S]tate. Such construction of diligent enforcement would comply
with the terms of the MSA that require diligent enforcement by a [S]tate before that [S]tate is
exempted from the NPM Adjustment").)
However, with the Partial Settlement Award, the Panel's deadlines for both the PMs and ·
other Settling States to decide not to contest, or "no contest," a State's diligence had long passed
Here, the PMs had contested and then vigorously litigated (or prepared to vigorously litigate) the
non-diligence of20 oftlie Compromising States before the Panel. And faced with the
evidentiary submissions and arguments made by the PMs, these 20 Compromising States agreed
to forgo their claims of diligence and instead entered into the Tenn Sheet with the PMs under
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"Which they lose millions of dollars every year to the PMs. As explained by the Commonwealth,
the PMs and these 20 Compromising States entering into the Term Sheet was ''hardly analogous
to a timely 'no contest' decision, where all of the parties are in agreement as to the diligence of

the particular State." (PA Reply re: Partial Settlement p. 10.) With a timely "no contest"
decision by the PMs, another Settling State would have had the opportunity to make a timely
challenge to its sister State's diligence. The Panel's Partial Settlement Award ruling denied the
Commonwealth the right to exercise that contractual right.
The reallocation determination in the Partial Settlement Award requiring that ·
the[se] 20 States be deemed diligent for the purposes of the MSA's Reallocation
Provision undeniably concerned more than just procedure. In so ruling, the Panel
invented an answer to a question already answered by the MSA. The MSA
explains how to handle the NPM Adjustment allocation and reallocation when a
State decides to abandon its efforts to prove its diligence. All States are subject to
the NPM Adjustment, unless they prove their diligence. Without the agreement
of all of the PMs and all of the other States that a State was diligent, if that State
aban<;Ions its hearing and no longer seeks to litigate and prove its diligence, then,
under the unambiguous terms of the MSA, it must be treated as non-diligent.
The Panel here, instead, decided that for the purposes of the M:SA' s Reallocation
Provision 20 such States should be treated as "diligent." That dramatic deviation
from the terms of the contract cannot be brushed off as "procedural."
For the purposes of calculating its payment and its share of the NPM Adjustment,
the Commonwealth has a contractual right under the MSA to have the[ se] 20
Compromising States that joined the Term Sheet treated as non-diligent. The
Panel took away that right ... [and this] is hardly procedural.
(PAReplyre: Partial Settlementpp. 10-11.)
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5.

The PMs' speculation that at least some of the Compromising States
might have been found diligent by the Panel is irrelevant in light of
the plain language of the MSA.

Lastly, the PMs' speculation that at least some of the 20 Compromising States whose
diligence was contested but not proven might have been found diligent by the Panel is irrelevant
in light of the plain language of the MSA. Under the MSA, each Settling State must bear its
Allocable Share of the NPM Adjustment unless it affirmatively proved its diligence. And
another State's share of the NPM Adjustment cannot be reallocated to the Commonwealth under
the MSA without such a finding. 20 Compromising States failed to sustain that burden. thus,
under the contract, they must be treated as non-diligent for the purposes of the NPM
Adjustment's Reallocation Provision.
The PMs contended that at least some of the 20 Compromising States initially contested
by the PMs "probably would have been found diligent by the Panel absent the settlemen~."
OPMs Mem. re: Partial Award p. 10.) Maybe, maybe not. There remains that possibility,
however, there is no way of knowing what the outcomes of those Compromising States'
diligence proceedings would have been because the PMs and those States ceased litigating their
diligence after the Partial Settlement A ward was entered But having never proven their
diligence, these 20 Compromising States may not be exempted from the calculation of NPM
Adjustment applicable to the amount owed to Pennsylvania for 2003. The PM's speculation of
what might have happened absent the settlement is irrelevant to this contractual issue.

BY THE COURT:
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Attachment 1

FIRST TIER
ALLOCATION

$528,079,358.78

·-------------------,
I

6NONDILIGENT
STATES
--(1~of

,.....

AdJ.ustrent)

-,
,I

..

I

I
I
I

:

I
I
f

I
I
I

22 COMPROMISING
STATES
(Removed from Pool)

I
:

24 DILIGENT/
- NO CONTEST STATES

I

(O¾ of Adjustment)

I

I
I

I
I

I

I

I

I

'-----------------·

SECOND TIER
REALLOCATION

I

I

I

I'

I

$528,079,358.78

PENNSYLVANIA
$242,309,663.54
{39.15¾ of Adjustment)

AGGREGATE 2003
NPM ADJUSTMENT
$1,147,566,064.87

FIRSTTIER
ALLOCATION

$649,859,708.29'.

26 NON-DILIGENT/
----..COMPROMISING STATES

26D1UGENT/
NO CONTEST STATES

I• (100% of Adjustment)
,-..
,
' I

I

•'
•

$497,706,356.58

(O¾ of Adjustment)

"'-

SECOND TIER
REALLOCATION

I

I

I

$497,706,356.58

PENNSYUIANIA

$116,457,190.73
(10,15" of Adjustment)

_,/

Neither the PMs nor the Settling States contested the diligence of two of the
Compromising States-New Jersey and Wyoming-by the dea4lines prescribed by the Panel.
Thus,. for ·purposes of these calculations, Pennsylvania treats those two states as diligent.

Attachment 2
Order and Judgment of the Missouri MSA
Court in State ofMissouri vs. the
American Tobacco Company
Missouri Circuit Court, Twenty-Second
Judicial District (City of St. Louis), Cause
No. 22972-01465 (May 2, 2014)

ir~;=:~im

STATE OF MISSOURI

~o JUOIOtAL CIRCUIT
CIRCUIT CLERK'S OFFICE
BY .
DEPUTY

ss
CITY OF ST. LOUIS
MISSOURI CIRCUIT COURT
TWENTY-SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
(City of St. Louis)

STATE OF MISSOURI, ex rel.
JEREMIAH W. (JAY) NIXON,

)

Plaintiff,
vs.
THE AMERICAN TOBACCO
COMPANY, et al.,

)
)
)

Cause No.22972-01465

)
)
)

Division No. 19

)
)

Defendants.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
The Court has before it the State of Missouri's Amended Motion
for Vacatur and Declaratory Relief, and Motion to Compel a SingleState Arbitration to Determine Whether Missouri Diligently Enforced
its Qualifying Statute in 2004. The Court now rules as follows.
In

1998,

Missouri

{collectively,

and

"states") ,

Agreement

Settlement
Manufacturers

of
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other

entered

tobacco

into

with

{ "MSA")

products

states

and

the

tobacco

certain

("PMs").

territories
Master

Participating

Under

the

MSA,

in

exchange for a release of liability from the states' consumer fraud
and

products-liability

payments

to

percentage

of

the
the

states
PMs'

claims,
in

the

PMs

perpetuity.

annual

payments,

agreed
Each

to

state

called its

Share." Missouri's Allocable Share is 2.2746011%.

make

annual

receives

a

"Allocable

The annual payments are subject to a reduction called the "NPM
Adjustment" if the PMs lose more than 2% of national market share
to "Non-Participating Manufacturers" ("NPMs") due to the MSA. When
an NPM Adjustment applies, it can reduce each state's payment for
that year.

But a

state can avoid having its payment reduced by

proving it "diligently enforced" its "qualifying statute," which is
legislation each state successfully enacted to avoid giving NPMs an
advantage in the marketplace. It is the individual state's burden
to

prove

it

diligently

enforced

its

qualifying

statute.

Those

states who cannot prove diligent enforcement are then hit twice
with a reduction in their annual payment: first,

their payment is

reduced by the pro rata amount of the NPM Adjustment allocable to
that state, and then the state's payment is reduced again because
the amount of the NPM Adjustment that would have otherwise been
allocated pro rata to those states who prove diligent enforcement
is reallocated to the non-diligent states. Therefore, the greater
the number of diligent states, the further the payments are reduced
to the non-diligent states.
In 200 3,

the PMs lost more than 2%- of their 1997 national

market share to NPMs. The Independent Auditor determined that no
NPM Adjustment should be applied, but the PMs objected, resulting
in arbitration of the issue of whether the PMs were entitled to an
NPM Adjustment and the issue of whether any state was entitled to

2

an exemption to the NPM Adjustment due to ~diligent enforcement" of
its qualifying statute.
Missouri volunteered to have its hearing first,

and a four-

and-a-half day hearing was held on Missouri's diligent enforcement.
After Missouri's

hearing,

but before the arbitration panel

had

completed all the hearings, nineteen states and the PMs agreed to a
settlement (the "partial settlement"). Three more states have since
joined the partial settlement.

The 22 "signatory statesn to the

partial settlement had a combined allocable share of approximately
46%.
The 27 ~non-signatory states," including Missouri, objected to
the partial settlement. On March 12, 2013,

the arbitration panel

entered a "Stipulated Partial Settlement and Award" rejecting the
objections. The panel determined that the signatory states

l ' oe
•
WOU..1..0

treated as "not subject to the 2003 NPM Adjustment," but that the
reallocation

among

any

non-signatory

states

found

to

be

non-

diligent would be reduced by the signatory states' "pro rata share"
of approximately 46%. The panel determined that the non-signatory
states would not be prejudiced by the partial settlement if their
NPM Adjustment was reduced accordingly.
Following the

close of Missouri's

hearing,

eighteen other

states tried their cases before the arbitration panel. In twelve of
the

eighteen

hearings,

statements

3

and

arguments

regarding

Missouri's enforcement efforts were heard. Missouri's counsel was
not present during these other states' hearings.
On September llr

2013,

the arbitration panel issued final

fteen states that had had hearings. Nine states were

awards for

found diligent.

Six states,

including Missouri,

were found

not

diligent.
Missouri's annual payment, which was to be payable on April
15, 2014,

would have been $130 million if there had been no NPM

Adjustment for 2003. Instead, Missouri's payment was reduced by $20
million

due

to

attributable

to

the

pro

Missouri,

rata

amount

and

then

it

of

the

was

NPM

Adjustment

further

reduced by

another $50 million due to the reallocation of the NPM Adjustment
attributable to the diligent states, resulting in a net payment to
the state of $60 million.
VACATUR- MARCH 12, 2013 STIPULATED PARTIAL SETTLEMENT AND AWARD
The Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") permits vacatur "where the
arbitrators were guilty of misconduct ... in refusing to hear evidence
pertinent

and

material

to

the

controversy;

or

of

any

other

misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced,"
9

U.S.C.

§l0(a) (3);

or

"where

the

arbitrators

exceeded

their

powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and
definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made."
Id., §l0(a) (4). Under Missouri's Uniform Arbitration Act, vacatur
is required where the arbitrators engage in "misconduct prejudicing

4

the

rights

of

a

party,"

or where

the

arbitrators

conduct

the

hearing "so as to prejudice substantially the rights of any party.u
Section

4 3 5. 4 0 5. l

RS Mo.

The

Court

cannot

reweigh

the

evidence

presented to the arbitration panel, but can only look to whether
there was misconduct in the proceedings. Crawford Group,

Inc. v.

Holekamp, 543 F.3d 971, 978 (8th Cir. 2008).
Missouri first contends that the arbitration panel exceeded
its authority in approving the "Stipulated Partial Settlement and
Award" and applying a "pro rata adjustment" to the non-signatory
states. Missouri argues that the partial settlement must be vacated
to the extent that it affected Missouri's allocation, because the
arbitrators exceeded their authority in entering such an award.
Missouri argues that the partial settlement caused Missouri to bear
a greater portion of the 2003 NPM Adjustment than it should have
under the MSA. Missouri argues that the Signatory States should be
treated as non-diligent for the purpose of calculating Missouri's
share, otherwise Missouri is allocated a disproportionate amount of
the NPM adjustment.
On April

10,

2014,

a

Pennsylvania court decided this very

issue in favor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. It held that
"the Independent Auditor shall treat each Settling State Lhat has
signed

the

Term

Sheet

referenced

in

the

Stipulated

Partial

Settlement and Award as if such Settling State did not diligently
enforce a Qualifying Statute for purposed of section IX(d) of the

5

MSA when the Independent Auditor calculates the amounts owed to
Pennsylvania under the MSA for the sales year 2003,
diligence

of of

such

Settling

Stat:e

was

not

unless the

contested or

t:he

arbitration panel issued a separate final award determining that
such Settling State was diligent."
The PMs acknowledge that Missouri is worse off under the pro
rata reallocation than it would be if there had been no partial
settlement,

unless the signatory states were "disproportionately

diligent." Specifically, if more than 27% of the signatory states
would have been found non-diligent, Missouri would be disadvantaged
under the pro-rata reduction applied by the panel pursuant to the
partial settlement. The PMs had contested the diligence of 20 out
of 22 of the signatory states,

or over 90%. Nonetheless, the PMs

argue that the panel's decision to apply the pro rata adjustment
cannot be disturbed.
The MSA does not expressly address how to reallocate the NPM
Adjustment among the non-signatory states where the diligence of
the signatory states is no longer contested due to a settlement;
however, the issue is clearly within the scope of the arbitration
agreement.
Adjustment,

Because

the

any disputes

partial

settlement

regarding the

related

to

the

partial settlement

NPM
were

themselves subject to arbitration. See United Steel Union v. Trirnas
Corp., 531 F.3d531, 539 (7th Cir. 2008).

6

The arbitration panel concluded that the pro rata adjustment
complied with the MSA and was the equitable way to determine the
reallocation. The Signatory States were treated as diligent for the
purposes

of

the

pro-rata

adjustment,

even

though

the

PMs

had

contested the diligence of 20 of the 22 Signatory States prior to
the partial settlement.
Although

the

panel

reallocation method,

had

the

authority

to

determine

the

s pro rata reallocation method is clearly

erroneous as it violates the MSA's procedure for amending the MSA.
The MSA prohibits amendment unless it is "by a written instrument
executed by all ... Settling States affected by the amendment." MSA
§XVIII (j).
"shall

MSA section

apply"

to

"all"

IX (d) (2)

states

Settling

that

States

an NPM Adjustment

"except"

those

that

"continuously had a Qualifying Statute ... in full force and effect ...
and diligently enforced the provisions of such statute during such
entire calendar year." The Stipulated Partial Settlement and Award
effectively amends §IX(d) (2)r

since the signatory states are no

longer subject to the NPM Adjustment and do not have to prove their
diligent enforcement.
There is no question that Missouri is materially affected by
the Partial Settlement and the pro rata reallocation of the NPM
Adjustment. Missouri, and the other non-signatory states, did not
agree to such amendment of the calculation of their annual payment.
The Court believes that the only way for the Partial Settlement

7

Award to not af feet Missouri's rights

is

for

the

20

signatory

states whose diligence was contested, but not proven, to be treated
as non-diligent when calculating the NPM Adjustment for Missouri.
Accordingly, this Court will order the Independent Auditor to treat
the

20

proven

signatory states

whose

diligence was

as

when

calculating

non-diligent

contested but

the

NPM

not

Adjustment

applicable to the amount owed to Missouri for 2003.
VACATUR- SEPTEMBER 11, 2013 FINAL AWARD RE: STATE OF MISSOURI
Missouri next argues that the Final Award must be vacated as
to Missouri, because the arbitration panel engaged in misconduct
and misbehavior and exceeded its authority by relying on ex parte
communications rather than evidence in the Missouri record.
Section 435.370(2) RSMo states that parties to an arbitration
"are entitled to be heard,
controversy

and

to

to present evidence material to the

cross-examine

witnesses

appearing

at

the

hearing." It is a fundamental principle of fairness in arbitration
that awards must be based solely on evidence presented at the
hearings, with all parties in attendance. Totem Marine Tug & Barge,
Inc. v. North American Towing,

Inc.,

607 F.2d 649, 653

(5th Cir.

1979). Therefore, the ex parte receipt of evidence by arbitrators
from

one

party,

wi t:hout

notice

to

the

other

party,

is

"misbehavior" prejudicial to the innocent party's rights. Id.
However,

communications

are

not

generally

considered

"ex

parte" when they occur in "open court,« even if a party is not

8

present. See United States v. Barta, 888 F.2d 1220, 1226 (8th Cir.
1989).

Further,

ex

parte

contacts

do

not

justify

vacatinq

an

arbitration award per se; there must also be a showing of improper
intent or influence. Hahn v. A. G. Becker Paribas,
App. 3d 660,

667

Inc., 164 Ill.

(Ill.App. 1987).

Missouri was found in the Final Award to be not diligent. The
panel defined "diligent enforcement" as ~an ongoing and intentional
consideration of the requirements of a Settling State's Qualifying
Statute,

and

a

significant attempt

to meet

those

requirements,

taking into account a Settling State's competing laws and policies
that

may

conflict

with

s

MSA

contractual

obligations."

The

factors considered by the panel in making the determination were
{l)

collection rate;

data;

(4)

(2)

lawsuits

filed;

(3)

resources allocated to enforcement;

sales by non-compliant NPMs;

( 6)

gathering reliable
(5) preventing future

legislation enacted;

( 7) act ions

short of legislation; and (8) efforts to be aware of other Settling
States' enforcement efforts.
The panel found Missouri to be not diligent based on evidence
that demonstrated that "NPM non-compliance was extensive and that
it persisted throughout 2003, with NPMs continuing to sell large
volumes of cigarettes without l:aving paid the escrow due on them."
The panel further found that Missouri's collection rate "was among
the

lowest collection rate

among all

the States whose diligent

enforcement is now being decided," that Missouri ~did not
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le any

lawsuits in 2003," and that Missouri "took no action on the pending
suits filed in prior years."
Missouri

argues

that

the

arbitration

panel's

findings

of

Missouri's non-diligence were based on ex parte testimony procured
after the close of Missouri's state-specific case.
Missouri argues that in the Connecticut hearing,
testified

that

there

had been

underreporting in Missouri.

a

high

incidence

For example,

the PMs' expert
of distributor

In the Kentucky hearing,

the panel

heard testimony from an employee of a wholesaler who admitted to
intentionally underreporting sales in Missouri.
In the Indiana hearing, Indiana's counsel argued that Missouri
had

filed

cigarettes

no
sold

lawsuits
in

in

2003

Missouri,

regarding

while

Indiana

non-compliant
had

filed

13.

NPM
In

Missouri's hearing, Missouri presented evidence that it had filed
eight lawsuits in 2003. Missouri argues that the panel's finding
that Missouri had filed no lawsuits could only have come from the
statements made at the Indiana hearing,

which Missouri was not

given the opportunity to rebut.
The PMs argue that because Missouri's case was first, certain
information was repeated later, but nothing was brought up in later
states' cases that was not brought up during Missouri's hearing.
The PMs further argue that there is no evidence that the panel
actually considered and relied upon those references to Missouri in
other hearings in determining Missouri's diligence. The PMs state

10

that "Missouri's 24 % compliance rate is ... clearly supported by the
Missouri

record.

The

panel

performed by the PMs'

based

this

finding

on

calculations

expert for the Missouri hearing using the

data provided by Missouri." Regarding the number of lawsuits filed,
the Missouri record is clear that Missouri filed eight seizure and
forfeiture actions against distributors in 2003, but there is no
dence of lawsuits against non-compliant NPMs.
After
parties,

review of the

arguments

the Court finds

arbitration

panel

communications
evidence

in

was

in

the

and

the

submissions

that Missouri

has

not

shown

influenced

by

any

unduly

other

states'

Missouri

hearings.

record

to

There

support

the

of the

that the
ex

is

parte

abundant

finding

that

Missouri failed to diligently enforce its escrow statute in 2003.
The motion to vacate the final award is denied.
SINGLE-STATE ARBITR.P,TION
For

the

sales

year

2004,

the

Independent

Auditor

again

determined not to apply an NPM adjustment, and the PMs again have
disputed

the

arbitration.

auditor's
Missouri

determination

concedes

that

the

and

have

issue

of

asked
its

for

diligent

enforcement is subject to arbitration. However, Missouri moves this
Court

to

nationwide

compel

a

"single-state

arbitration.

Missouri

arbitrationu
argues

that

rather

than

the MSA does

a
not

require a nationwide arbitration, and Missouri therefore cannot be
compelled into a nationwide arbitration.

11

Missouri points to the

issues that occurred in the nationwide arbitration regarding the
2003 NPM Adjustment as further argument against compelling another
nationwide arbitration.
"Arbitration is a matter of contract, and a party cannot be
required

to

arbitrate

a

dispute

that

it

has

not

agreed

to

arbitrate." Dunn Industrial Group, Inc. v. City of Sugar Creek, 112
S.W.3d 421,

435

(Mo. bane 2003). A party may not be compelled to

submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for
concluding that the party agreed to do so. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v.
AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684 (2010). The goal

the

FAA is to enforce the agreement of the parties, not to effect the
most e:zpedi t ious resolution of claims.

Dorniniuin Aust in Partners,

L.L.C. v. Emerson, 248 F.3d 720, 728 (8th Cir. 2001). As such, an
arbitration agreement should be enforced nin accordance with its
terms." Id.
The parties disagree on whether the MSA explicitly authorizes
a single, nationwide arbitration. The MSA's

tration Provision

provides:
Resolution of Disputes: Any dispute, controversy or claim
arising out of or relating to calculations performed by,
or any determinations made by, the Independent Auditor
{including without limitation, any dispute concerning the
operation or application of any of the adjustments,
reductions,
offsets,
carry-forwards and allocations
described in subsection IX(j) or subsection XI{i)) shall
be submitted to binding arbitration before a panel of
three neutral arbitrators, each of whom shall be a former
Article III federal judge. Each of the two sides to the
dispute shall select one arbitrator. The two arbitrators
so selected shall select the third arbitrator. The

arbitration shall be governed
Federal Arbitration Act.

the

by

United

States

The Agreement refers to "two sides" to the dispute. Missouri
argues

that

it

is one

"side"

to

a

dispute about

its diligent

enforcement, and the PMs are the other "side." It argues that no
other state can be said to be on its "side,,, since the states'
interests

are

adverse.

There

is

no

question

that

the

states'

interests are not the same; if shown to be non-diligent, each state
has a vital and conflicting interest to show that other states are
also non-diligent.
The Court does not believe that this necessarily means the
states are not on one "side." The court frequently sees cases where
there are more than two parties involved.
defendants,

for

instance,

adverse to each other.

whose

There may be numerous

interests

Nonetheless,

are

conflicting

and

they are "aligned" as party

defendants, and, in that sense, are "one side."
The

two

"parties"

to

the

MSA

are

the

"Participating

Manufacturers" and the "Settling States." See MSA p.3,

and terms

defined on p.11-12 and p.15. It is clear that these two groups are
the "two sides" envisioned by the arbitration provision, and all
the Settling States collectively comprise one side.

By

ordering

"consolidating"

a

nationwide

arbitrations

as

arbitration,
was

the

criticized

Court
in

is

Baesler

not
v.

Continental Grain Co.r 900 F.2d 1193 (8th Cir. 1990). In Baesler,
each safflower producer had a separate contract with an arbitration

agreement with Continental Grain, and one of the producers wanted
to consolidate their separate arbitration proceedings.
contrast,

Here,

by

there is only one agreement i:::o arbi t_i::-ate to which all

states are a party.
Missouri acknowledges that the NPM Adjustment is a "zero sum
game"

and

that

each

non-diligent

state's

annual

payment

is

deoendent on the diligence or non-diligence of each other state.
Because

of

enforcement

the

interconnectedness

determinations,

the

of

Court

the

states'

believes

that

diligent
a

single

decisionmaker has the best chance of producing consistent awards.
The Court finds that a nationwide arbitration was envisioned by the
parties in drafting i:::he MSA, and it is the most logical mechanism
for the resolution of the dispute. The motion to compel a singlestate arbitration is denied.

THEREFORE,

it is Ordered and Decreed that Missouri's Amended

Motion for Vacatur and Declaratory Relief is GRANTED IN PART.
The Stipulated Partial Settlement and Award dated March 12,
2013 is MODIFIED as

to how Missouri's award is calculated.

The

Independent Auditor shall treat each Settling State that has signed
the Term Sheet referenced in the Stipulated Partial Settlement and
Award as

if

such

Settling

State

did not

diligently

Qualifying Statute for purposes of section IX(d)

enforce

a

of the MSA when

the Independent Auditor calculates the amounts owed to Missouri
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under the MSA for the sales

2003, unless the diligence of such

Settling State was net contested for the arbitration panel issued a
separate

final

award

determining

that

such

Settling

State

was

diligent.
The

Motion

to

Vacate

DENIED

is

in

all

other

respects.

Missouri's Motion to Compel a Single-State Arbitration to Determine
Whether Missouri Diligently Enforced its Qualifying Scatute in 200~
is DENIED.

SO ORDERED:

EDWARDS, Judge
Dated: May 2, 2014
cc:

counsel of record
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APPENDIX
EXCERPTS FROM THE

MASTER
SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT

Explanation for Changes from the Original

The excerpts in this Appendix came from a word processing version of the Master Settlement Agreement. The following changes have been made from that document.
(a)

Yellow highlighting has been added by the Attorney General's Office; there is no

highlighting in the original.
(b)

Bracketed section designations have been added by the Attorney General's Office

before each subsection; there is no bracketing in the original MSA to show what section a
subsection belongs to.
(c)

Some long provisions with internal subdivisions have been reformatted by the Attor-

ney General's Office by starting internal subdivisions on a new line. This reformatting is indicated by a bracketed, bolded virgule("[/]") symbolizing a line break that is not in the original.
(d)

Page references to the page of the Clerk's Record at which the provision is found are

indicated by the bolded symbol "l." followed by the page reference: E.g., "l.RlO0l" would
indicate that the materials that followed are found at page 1001 of the Clerk's Record. The
Attorney General's Office has added these references.
(e)

The Attorney General's Office has added ellipses(" ... ") to show omitted text. In

some cases the Attorney General has added a bracketed explanation of the subject matter of the
omitted text.
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.lR1007
MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
This Master Settlement Agreement is made by the undersigned Settling State officials (on
behalf of their respective Settling States) and the undersigned Participating Manufacturers to
settle and resolve with finality all Released Claims against the Participating Manufacturers and
related entities as set forth herein. This Agreement constitutes the documentation effecting this
settlement with respect to each Settling State, and is intended to and shall be binding upon each
Settling State and each Participating Manufacturer in accordance with the terms hereof.

I.

RECITALS
WHEREAS, more than 40 States have commenced litigation asserting various claims for

monetary, equitable and injunctive relief against certain tobacco product manufacturers and
others as defendants, and the States that have not filed suit can potentially assert similar claims;
WHEREAS, the Settling States that have commenced litigation have sought to obtain
equitable relief and damages under state laws, including consumer protection and/or antitrust
laws, in order to further the Settling States' policies regarding public health, including policies
adopted to achieve a significant reduction in smoking by Youth;
WHEREAS, defendants have denied each and every one of the Settling States' allegations
of unlawful conduct or wrongdoing and have asserted a number of defenses to the Settling
States' claims, which defenses have been contested by the Settling States;

.lR1008
WHEREAS, the Settling States and the Participating Manufacturers are committed to reducing underage tobacco use by discouraging such use and by preventing Youth access to
Tobacco Products;
WHEREAS, the Participating Manufacturers recognize the concern of the tobacco grower
community that it may be adversely affected by the potential reduction in tobacco consumption
resulting from this settlement, reaffirm their commitment to work cooperatively to address concerns about the potential adverse economic impact on such community, and will, within 30 days

1

after the MSA Execution Date, meet with the political leadership of States with grower communities to address these economic concerns;
WHEREAS, the undersigned Settling State officials believe that entry into this Agreement
and uniform consent decrees with the tobacco industry is necessary in order to further the Settling States' policies designed to reduce Youth smoking, to promote the public health and to
secure monetary payments to the Settling States; and
WHEREAS, the Settling States and the Participating Manufacturers wish to avoid the further expense, delay, inconvenience, burden and uncertainty of continued litigation (including
appeals from any verdicts), and, therefore, have agreed to settle their respective lawsuits and
potential claims pursuant to terms which will achieve for the Settling States and their citizens
significant funding for the advancement of public health, the implementation of important tobacco-related public health measures, including the enforcement of the mandates and restrictions
related to such measures, as well as funding for a national Foundation dedicated to significantly
reducing the use of Tobacco Products by Youth;

.lR1009
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT KNOWN THAT, in consideration of the implementation of
tobacco-related health measures and the payments to be made by the Participating Manufacturers, the release and discharge of all claims by the Settling States, and such other consideration as
described herein, the sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, the Settling States and the
Participating Manufacturers, acting by and through their authorized agents, memorialize and
agree as follows:

II.

DEFINITIONS
[II](a) "Account" has the meaning given in the Escrow Agreement.

.lR1010
[II](e) "Agreement" means this Master Settlement Agreement, together with the exhibits
hereto, as it may be amended pursuant to subsection XVIIIG).
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[II](f) "Allocable Share" means the percentage set forth for the State in question as listed
in Exhibit A hereto, without regard to any subsequent alteration or modification of such State' s
percentage share agreed to by or among any States; or, solely for the purpose of calculating payments under subsection IX(c)(2) (and corresponding payments under subsection IX(i)), the percentage disclosed for the State in question pursuant to subsection IX(c)(2)(A) prior to June 30,
1999, without regard to any subsequent alteration or modification of such State's percentage
share agreed to by or among any States.
[Il](g)

Allocated Paymen means a particular ettling tate s Allocable hare of th sum

of all of the payments to be made by th Original Participating Manufactur rs in th year in que -

tion pursuant to ub ctions IX c 1 and IX c 2 as such pa ments ha e be n adjusted reduced
and allocated pu.r uant to clause First· through th first en nee of claus

IXG

ifth ofsub

but before application of the other offsets and adjustments described in clauses "Sixth"

through "Thirteenth" of subsection IXG).

l.R1014

[II]( o) "Consent Decree" means a state-specific consent decree as described in subsection
XIIl(b)( 1)(B) of this Agreement.
[II](p) "Court" means the respective court in each Settling State to which this Agreement
and the Consent Decree are presented for approval and/or entry as to that Settling State.
[II](q) "Escrow" has the meaning given in the Escrow Agreement.
[II](r) "Escrow Agent" means the escrow agent under the Escrow Agreement.

l.Rl015
[II]( s) "Escrow Agreement" means an escrow agreement substantially in the form of
Exhibit B.

[II](w) "Independent Auditor" means the firm described in subsection XI(b).

3

[II](x) "Inflation Adjustment" means an adjustment in accordance with the formulas for
inflation adjustments set forth in Exhibit C .

..LR1016

[II](z) "Market Share" means a Tobacco Product Manufacturer's respective share (expressed as a percentage) of the total number of individual Cigarettes sold in the fifty United
States, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico during the applicable calendar year, as measured by excise taxes collected by the federal government and, in the case of sales in Puerto
Rico, arbitrios de cigarillos collected by the Puerto Rico taxing authority. [Formulas for rollyour-own tobacco omitted.]

[II](cc) "Non-Participating Manufacturer" means any Tobacco Product Manufacturer that
is not a Participating Manufacturer.

..LR1017

[II](ft) "NPM Adjustment" means the adjustment specified in subsection IX(d).
[II](gg) "NPM Adjustment Percentage" means the percentage determined pursuant to subsection IX(d).
[II](hh) "Original Participating Manufacturers" means the following: Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation, Lorillard Tobacco Company, Philip Morris Incorporated and R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, and the respective successors of each of the foregoing.

1-R1018

[II]Gj) "Participating Manufacturer" means a Tobacco Product Manufacturer that is or
becomes a signatory to this Agreement . . . . . . . [Details for Subsequent Participating Manufacturers omitted.]
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J_R1019
[II](kk) "Previously Settled States Reduction" means a reduction determined by multiplying the amount to which such reduction applies by 12.4500000%, in the case of payments due in
or prior to 2007; 12.2373756%, in the case of payments due after 2007 but before 2018; and
11.0666667%, in the case of payments due in or after 2018.

J_R1022

[II]( qq) "Settling State" means any State that signs this Agreement on or before the MSA
Execution Date. . . . "Settling State" shall not include (1) the States of Mississippi, Florida,
Texas and Minnesota; and (2) any State as to which this Agreement has been terminated.

J_R1023

[II](tt) "Subsequent Participating Manufacturer" means a Tobacco Product Manufacturer
(other than an Original Participating Manufacturer) that: (1) is a Participating Manufacturer, and
(2) is a signatory to this Agreement, regardless of when such Tobacco Product Manufacturer became a signatory to this Agreement.

ffi1025

[II](aaa) "Volume Adjustment" means an upward or downward adjustment in accordance
with the formula for volume adjustments set forth in Exhibit E.

J_R1055
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VII. ENFORCEMENT
[VII](a) Jurisdiction. Each Participating Manufacturer and each Settling State acknowledge that the Court:
[/] (1) has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action identified in Exhibit Din such

Settling State and over each Participating Manufacturer;
[/] (2) shall retain exclusive jurisdiction for the purposes of implementing and enforcing
this Agreement and the Consent Decree as to such Settling State; and
[/] (3) except as provided in subsections IX(d), XI(c) and XVII(d) and Exhibit 0, 1-Rl056
shall be the only court to which disputes under this Agreement or the Consent Decree are
presented as to such Settling State.
[Provisions regarding Escrow Agreement and Escrow Court omitted.]
[VII](b) Enforcement of Consent Decree. Except as expressly provided in the Consent
Decree, any Settling State or Released Party may apply to the Court to enforce the terms of the
Consent Decree (or for a declaration construing any such term) with respect to alleged violations
within such Settling State. A Settling State may not seek to enforce the Consent Decree of another Settling State; provided, however, that nothing contained herein shall affect the ability of
any Settling State to (1) coordinate state enforcement actions or proceedings, or (2) file or join
any amicus brief. In the event that the Court determines that any Participating Manufacturer or
Settling State has violated the Consent Decree within such Settling State, the party that initiated
the proceedings may request any and all relief available within such Settling State pursuant to the
Consent Decree.
[VII](c) Enforcement of this Agreement.
[VIII(c)](l) Except as provided in subsections IX(d), XI(c), XVII(d) and Exhibit 0,
any Settling State or Participating Manufacturer may bring an action in the Court to enforce the terms of this Agreement (or for a declaration construing any such term ("Declaratory Order")) with respect to disputes, alleged violations or alleged breaches within such
Settling State.
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1-R1061

IX.

PAYMENTS
[IX](a) All Payments Into Escrow. All payments made pursuant to this Agreement ...

shall be made into escrow ... , and shall be credited to the appropriate Account 1-Rl 062 established pursuant to the Escrow Agreement.

uch payments shall be disbursed to the beneficiaries

or r turned to the Participating Manufacturer only as provided in section XI and th E cro
gr ment.

1-R1063

[IX](c) Annual Payments and Strategic Contribution Payments.
[IX(c)]( l) On April 15 , 2000 and on April 15 of each year thereafter in perpetuity,
each Original Participating Manufacturer shall severally pay to the Escrow Agent (to be
credited to the Subsection IX(c)(l) Account) its Relative Market Share of the base amounts
specified below, as such payments are modified in accordance with this subsection (c)(l):
1-R1064

Year

Base Amount

2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

$4,500,000,000
$5,000,000,000
$6,500,000,000
$6,500,000,000
$8,000,000,000
$8,000,000,000
$8,000,000,000
$8,000,000,000
$8,139,000,000
$8,139,000,000
$8,139,000,000
$8,139,000,000
7

2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018 and each year thereafter

$8,139,000,000
$8,139,000,000
$8,139,000,000
$8,139,000,000
$8,139,000,000
$8,139,000,000
$9,000,000,000

The payments mad by th Original Parti ipating

anufa turers pursuant to thi

ubsec-

tion (c l shall be subject to the Inflation djustmen the Volume Adjustment, the Pr viou I

ettJed tates Reduction th

on-

tiling tate Reduction the PM Adjustm n

the offset for miscalculated or disputed payments described in subsection XI(i), the Federal
Tobacco Legislation Offset, the Litigating Releasing Parties Offset, and the offsets for
claims over described in subsections XII(a)(4)(B) and XII(a)(8).
[IX(c)](2) On April 15, 2008 and on April 15 ... through 2017, each Original Participating Manufacturer shall severally pay ... (to be credited to the Subsection IX(c)(2)
Account) its Relative Market Share of the base amount of $861,000,000, as such payments
are modified in accordance with this subsection (c)(2). The payments made ... 1-R1065 ...
pursuant to this subsection (c)(2) shall be subject to the Inflation Adjustment, the Volume
Adjustment, the NPM Adjustment, the offset for miscalculated or disputed payments described in subsection XI(i), the Federal Tobacco Legislation Offset, the Litigating Releasing Parties Offset, and the offsets for claims over described in subsections XII(a)(4)(B) and
XII(a)(8). [Provisions for Non-Settling States Reduction omitted].
[IX](d) Non-Participating Manufacturer Adjustment.
[IX(d)](l) Calculation ofNPM Adjustment for Original Participating Manufacturers. To protect the public health gains achie ed by this Agreement, certain paym nts mad

pursuant to this greement shall be subject to an

M l.R1066 Adjustment. Payments by

the Original Participating Manufacturers to which the NPM Adjustment applies shall be
adjusted as provided below:

[IX(d (1)] A)

ubj ct to the provisions of sub

(d 2) below each llocated Payment shall be adjusted by ubtracting from uch
8

Allocated Payment the product of such Allocated Payment amount multiplied by the
NPM Adjustment Percentage. The "NPM Adjustment Percentage" shall be calculated as follows:
[IX(d)(l)(A)](i) If the Market Share Loss for the year immediately preceding the year in which the payment in question is due is less than or equal to
0 (zero), then the NPM Adjustment Percentage shall equal zero.
[IX(d)(l)(A)](ii) If the Market Share Loss ... is greater than O (zero) and
less than or equal to 16 2/3 percentage points, then the NPM Adjustment Percentage shall be equal to the product of (x) such Market Share Loss and (y) 3
(three).
[IX(d)(l)(A)](iii) If the Market Share Loss ... is greater than 16 2/3 percentage points, then the NPM Adjustment Percentage shall be equal to the sum
of(x) 50 percentage points and (y) the product of (1) the Variable Multiplier
and (2) the result of such Market Share Loss minus 16 2/3 percentage points .

..LR1067
[IX(d)(l)](B) Definitions:
[IX(d)(l)(B)](i) "Base Aggregate Participating Manufacturer Market
Share" means the result of (x) the sum of the applicable Market Shares (the
applicable Market Share to be that for 1997) of all present and former Tobacco
Product Manufacturers that were Participating Manufacturers during the entire
calendar year immediately preceding the year in which the payment in question
is due minus (y) 2 (two) percentage points.
[IX(d)(l)(B)](ii) "Actual Aggregate Participating Manufacturer Market
Share" means the sum of the applicable Market Shares of ... Participating
Manufacturers during the entire calendar year immediately preceding the year
in which the payment in question is due ....
[IX(d)(l)(B)](iii) "Market Share Loss" means the result of (x) the Base

9

Aggregate Participating Manufacturer Market Share minus (y) the Actual Aggregate Participating Manufacturer Market Share.
[IX(d)(l)(B)](iv) "Variable Multiplier" equals 50 percentage points divided by the result of (x) the Base Aggregate Participating Manufacturer Market Share minus (y) 16 2/3 percentage points .

...LR1068
[IX( d)( 1)]( C) On or before February 2 of each year following a year in which

there was a Market Share Loss ... , a nationally recognized firm of economic consultants (the "Firm") shall determine whether the disadvantages experienced as a result
of the provisions of this Agreement were a significant factor contributing to the Market Share Loss for the year in question. If the Firm determines that th disad an-

tages ... were a ignificant factor contributing to the Marki

t

hare Lo

... , th

M

Adjustment ... shall apply. If the Firm determines that the disadvantages ... were
not a significant factor ... , the NPM Adjustment ... shall not apply.

1-R1069

[IX(d)(l)](D) [Provision that there is no NPM Adjustment if PM sales increase from 1997 levels omitted.]

1-R1070

[IX( d)] (2)

Jlocation among

Participating Manufacturers.
[IX(d)(2)](A) The NPM Adjustment set forth in subsection (d)(l) shall apply
to the Allocated Payments of all Settling States, except as set forth below.
[IX(d)(2)](B) A ettling tate s Allocated Payment hall not be subject to an

NPM Adju tinent: i) if uch ettling tate continuously had a Qualifying tatute (as
defined in subsection 2 (E) belo

in full force and effe t during the entire calendar

10

year immediately preceding the year in .lRl 071 which the payment in question is

due, and diligently enforced the provisions of such statute during such entire calendar year; ....
[IX(d)(2)](C) The aggregate amount of the NPM Adjusonents that would have

applied to the Allocated Payments of those ettling tate that are not subject to an
M Adjustment pursuant to subsection (2 (B shall be reallocated among all other

ettling tates pro rata in proportion to their respective Allocable Shares . . . and
uch other

ttling tates Allocated Payments shall be further reduced ac ordingly.

[IX(d)(2)](D) This subsection (2)(D) shall apply if the amount of the NPM
Adjustment applied ... to any Settling State plus the amount of the NPM Adjustments reallocated to such Settling State ... would ... (i) exceed such Settling State's
Allocated Payment in that year .... For each Settling State ... described in the preceding sentence, the excess amount ofNPM Adjustment shall be further reallocated
among all other Settling States ... subject to an NPM Adjustment ... that do not have
such an excess, pro rata ... , and such other Settling States' Allocated Payments
1-R1072 shall be further reduced accordingly . ... [f]his sub ection (2 (D hall be

repeatedly applied ... until either i) the aggregate amount of
been fully reallocated or (ii) the full amount of the

M djustment has

M Adjustments ... cannot be

fully reallocated ... because (x) the Allocated Pa ment in that year of each

ttling

tate that is ubject to an NPM Adjustment ... has been reduced to zero ... .
[IX(d)(2)](E) A "Qualifying Statute" means a Settling State's statute ...
(applicable everywhere the Settling State has authority to legislate) that effectively
and fully neutralizes the cost disadvantages that the Participating Manufacturers
experience vis-a-vis Non-Participating Manufacturers within such Settling State as a
result of the provisions of this Agreement. Ea h Participating Manufacturer and

each ettling tate agree that the model statute in the form et forth in Exhibit T th
'Model tatute

if enacted without modification or addition (except for particular-

11

ized state procedural or technical requir ments) and not in conjunction with any
other legislative or regulatory proposal, shall constitute a Qualifying Statute.

J_R1082

[IX(d)](4) NPM Adjustment for Subseguent Participating Manufacturers. Subject to
the provisions of subsection IX(i)(3), a ub equent Participating Manufacturer hall be en-

titled to an NPM Adjustment. .. in an y ar during which an

M dju tm nt is applic-

able ... to pa ment due ..LRl 083 fr m the Original Participating

anufacturers. The

amount of such NPM Adjustment shall equal the product of (A) the NPM Adjustment
Percentage ... multiplied by (B) the sum of the payments due ... from such Subsequent
Participating Manufacturer that correspond to payments due from Original Participating
Manufacturers pursuant to subsection IX(c) ( .. . adjusted and allocated pursuant to clauses
"First" through "Fifth" of subsection IX(j)). The NPM Adjustment to payments by each
Subsequent Participating Manufacturer shall be allocated and reallocated among the
Settling States in a manner consistent with subsection (d)(2) above.

J_R1085

[IX](i) Payments by Subsequent Participating Manufacturers.

[IX(i)](l) A Subsequent Participating Manufacturer shall have payment obligations
under this Agreement only in the event that its Market Share in any calendar year exceeds
the greater of ( 1) its 1998 Market Share or (2) 125 percent of its 1997 Market Share . . . . In
the year following any such calendar year, such ub equ nt Participating Manufacturer
hall make payments corresponding to those due ... from the Original Participating Manu-

facturers pursuant to sub ctions ... IX c 1 [and] IX c 2) ... . The amounts of such . ..
payments . .. are in addition to the ... payments that are due from the Original Participating

12

Manufacturers and shall be determined as described in subsections (2) and (3) below.
Such payments by a Subsequent Participating Manufacturer shall ... (C) be paid, allocated
and distributed in the same manner as such corresponding payments.
[IX(i)](2) The base amount due from a Subsequent Participating Manufacturer ...
shall be determined by multiplying (A) the ... base amount due ... from all of the Original
Participating Manufacturers 1-R1086 (as such base amount ... is adjusted by the Volume
Adjustment ... , but before such base amount is modified by any other adjustments, reductions or offsets) by (B) the quotient produced by dividing (i) the result of (x) such Subsequent Participating Manufacturer's applicable Market Share ... minus (y) the greater of ( 1)
its 1998 Market Share or (2) 125 percent of its 1997 Market Share, by (ii) the aggregate
Market Shares of the Original Participating Manufacturers ....
[IX(i)](3) Any payment due from a Subsequent Participating Manufacturer under
subsections (1) and (2) above shall be subject ... to the Inflation Adjustment, the NonSettling States Reduction, the NPM Adjustment, the offset for miscalculated or disputed
payments described in subsection XI(i), the Federal Tobacco Legislation Offset, the Litigating Releasing Parties Offset and the offsets for claims over described in subsections
XII(a)(4)(B) and XII(a)(8), to the extent that such adjustments, reductions or offsets would
apply to the corresponding payment due from the Original Participating Manufacturers.
1-R1087

[IX(i)](4) For purposes of this subsection (i), the 1997 (or 1998, as applicable) Market Share (and 125 percent thereof) of those Subsequent Participating Manufacturers that
either (A) became a signatory to this Agreement more than 60 days after the MSA Execution Date or (B) had no Market Share in 1997 (or 1998, as applicable), shall equal zero.
[IX]G) Order of Application of Allocations, Offsets, Reductions and Adjustments. The
payments due under this Agreement shall be calculated as set forth below. The "base amount"
referred to in clause "First" below shall mean

13

[/] (1) in the case of payments due from Original Participating Manufacturers, the base
amount referred to in the subsection establishing the payment obligation in question; and
[/] (2) in the case of payments due from a Subsequent Participating Manufacturer, the base
amount referred to in subsection (i)(2) for such Subsequent Participating Manufacturer.
In the event that a particular adjustment, reduction or offset referred to in a clause below does not
apply to the payment being calculated, the result of the clause in question shall be deemed to be
equal to the result of the immediately preceding clause. (If clause "First" is inapplicable, the
result of clause "First" will be the base amount of the payment in question prior to any offsets,
reductions or adjustments.)
[IXG))] First: the Inflation Adjustment shall be applied to the base amount of the payment
being calculated;
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[IXG))] Second: the Volume Adjustment . .. shall be applied to the result of clause "First" ;
[IXG))] Third: the result of clause " Second" shall be reduced by the Previously Settled
States Reduction;
[IX(j))] Fourth: the result of clause "Third" shall be reduced by the Non-Settling States
Reduction;
[IX(j))] Fifth: in the case of payments due under subsections IX c 1) and I

ults of clause

ourth . . . hall be apportion d among th

to their respe tive Allocabl

c 2 the re-

ettling tate pro rat.a in proportion

hares and the resulting amounts for each particular

tiling tat

hall th n be add d tog th r to fonn such ettling tat s Allocated Paym nt. In the case of
payments due under subsection IX(i) that correspond to payments due under subsections IX(c)(l)
or IX(c)(2), the results of clause "Fourth" for all such payments due from a particular Subsequent
Participating Manufacturer ... shall be apportioned among the Settling States pro rata ... , and the
resulting amounts for each particular Settling State shall then be added together. (In the case of
all other payments made pursuant to this Agreement, this clause "Fifth" is inapplicable. ;
[IX(j))] Sixth: the NP

Adjustment hall be applied to th r suits of clause Fifth pursu-
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ant to subsections IX(d)(l) and (d)(2) (or, in the case of payments due from the Subsequent Participating Manufacturers, pursuant to subsection IX(d)( 4)) ;
[IX(j))] Seventh: in the case of payments due from the Original Participating Manufacturers to which clause "Fifth" (and therefore clause "Sixth") does not apply, the J_R1089 result of
clause "Fourth" shall be allocated among the Original Participating Manufacturers according to
their Relative Market Shares. In the case of payments du from the Original Participating Manu-

facturer to which clause Fifth applies:
[/] (A) the Allocated Payments of all ettling tates determined pursuant to claus

(prior to reduction pursuant to clause

Fifth

beth ) shall be added together;

[/] (B) the resulting sum shall be allocated among the Original Participating Manufacturers

according to their Relative Market Shares ... ;
[/] (C) the

ailable

M djustment (as determined pursuant to clause

ixth ) ball be

allocated among the Original Participating Manufacturers pursuant to sub ection IX d 3 ;
[/] (D) the respective result of step (C) above for each Original Participating Manufacturer
shall be subtracted from the respective result of step (B) above for such Original Participating Manufacturer; and
[/] (E) the r ulting payment amount du from each Original Participating

anufacturer

shall then be allocated among the ettling tates in proportion to the re pective results of
clause

ixth for each ettling tate.

The offsets described in clauses "Eighth" through "Twelfth" shall then be applied separately
against each Original Participating Manufacturer's resulting payment shares (on a Settling State
by Settling State basis) according to each Original Participating Manufacturer' s separate entitlement to such offsets, if any, in the calendar year in question. (In the case of payments due from
Subsequent Participating Manufacturers, this clause "Seventh" is inapplicable.);
[IX(j))] Eighth: the offset for miscalculated or disputed payments described in subsection
XI(i) (and any carry-forwards arising from such offset) shall be applied to the results of clause
"Seventh" (in the case of payments due from the Original Participating J_R1090 Manufacturers)
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or to the results of clause " Sixth" (in the case of payments due from Subsequent Participating
Manufacturers);
[IXG))] Ninth: the Federal Tobacco Legislation Offset ... shall be applied to the results of
clause "Eighth";
[IXG))] Tenth: the Litigating Releasing Parties Offset .. . shall be applied to the results of
clause "Ninth";
[IXG))] Eleventh: the offset for claims over pursuant to subsection XII(a)(4)(8) ... shall
be applied to the results of clause "Tenth";
[IXG))] Twelfth: the offset for claims over pursuant to subsection XIl(a)(8) ... shall be
applied to the results of clause "Eleventh" ; and
[IXG))] Thirteenth: in th case of payment to

bich claus

Fifth applie the

ttling

tate allocat d bares of the pa ments du from each Participating Manufactur r (as such
shares have been determined in step (E) of clause " Seventh" in the case of payments from the
Original Participating Manufacturers or in clause "Sixth" in the case of payments from the Subsequent Participating Manufacturers, and have been reduced by clauses "Eighth" through
"Twelfth") shaJl be added tog ther to ta

the aggregate payment obligation of each Participat-

ing Manufacturer with respect to th payments in question. (In the case of a payment to which
clause "Fifth" does not apply, the aggregate payment obligation of each Participating Manufacturer with respect to the payment in question shall be stated by the results of clause "Eighth.")

1-Rl093

XI.

CALCULATION AND DISBURSEMENT OF PAYMENTS
[XI](a) Independent Auditor to Make All Calculations.
[XI(a)](l) ... [A]n Independent Auditor shall calculate and determine the amount of
all payments owed pursuant to this Agreement, the adjustments, reductions and offsets
thereto (and all resulting carry-forwards, if any), the allocation of such payments, adjust-
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ments, reductions, offsets and carry-forwards among the Participating Manufacturers and
among the Settling States, and shall perform all other calculations in connection with the
foregoing (including, but not limited to, determining Market Share, Relative Market Share,
Base Aggregate Participating Manufacturer Market Share and Actual Aggregate Participating Manufacturer Market Share). [Provisions regarding submission, collection and
confidentiality of information omitted.]
.J..R1094

[XI](b) Identity oflndependent Auditor. The Independent Auditor shall be a major, nationally recognized, certified public accounting firm jointly selected by agreement of the Original Participating Manufacturers and ... the Settling States . . . . . .. .J..R1095 . . . The agreement
retaining the Independent Auditor shall provide that the Independent Auditor shall perform the
functions specified for it in this Agreement, and that it shall do so in the manner specified in this
Agreement. [Provision for compensating the Independent Auditor omitted.]
[XI]( c) Resolution of Disputes. Any dispute contro ersy or claim arising out of or r lat-

ing to calcuJations performed by or any d terminations mad by the Ind pendent uditor including, without limitation, any dispute concerning the operation or application of any of the
adjustments, reductions, offsets, carry-forwards and allocations described in subsection IX(j) or
subsection XI(i)) hall be ubmitted to binding arbitration before a panel of three neutral arbitra-

tors each of wh m hall be a ti rmer Article ill federal judge. Each of the two sides to the dispute shall select one arbitrator. The two arbitrators so selected shall select the third arbitrator.

Tb arbitration hall be go emed b the United tates Federal Arbjtration ct.

[XI](d) General Provisions as to Calculation of Payments .

..LRllOO

[XI(d)](7) Each Participating Manufacturer shall be obligated to pay by the Payment
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Due Date the undisputed portion of the total amount calculated as due from it by the Independent Auditor's Final Calculation. Failure to pay such portion shall render the Participating Manufacturer liable for interest ... , in addition to any other remedy available under
this Agreement.
[XI(d)](8) As to any disputed portion of the total amount calculated to be due pursuant to the Final Calculation, any Participating Manufacturer that by the Payment Due Date
pays such di puted portion into the Di pu~ d Payments Account ... shall not be liable for

int re t thereon even if the amount disputed was in fact properly due and owing. Any
Participating Manufacturer that by the Payment Due Date does not pay such disputed
portion into the Disputed Payments Account shall be liable for interest ... if the amount
disputed was in fact properly due and owing .

..LR1101

[XI](e) General Treatment of Payments. The

cro

gent may disbur

amounts from

an Account only if permitted and only at such time as permitt d by this greement and the s~
cro Agr m nt. No amounts may be disbursed to a Settling State other than funds credited to
such Settling State' s State-Specific Account (as defined in the Escrow Agreement). The Independent Auditor, in delivering payment instructions to the Escrow Agent, shall specify: the
amount to be paid; the Account or Accounts from which such payment is to be disbursed; the
payee of such payment (which may be an Account); and the Business Day on which such payment is to be made by the Escrow Agent. Except as expres ly provided in subsection f) below

in no ev nt ma any amount be di bur d from an Account prior to Final ppro al.
l..R1102

[XI](f) Disbursements and Charges Not Contingent on Final Approval. Funds may be disbursed from Accounts without regard to the occurrence of Final Approval in the following circumstances and in the following manner:
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[XI(f)](2) Payments to and from Disputed Payments Account. Tb lndepend nt

uditor hall instruct the E cro Agent to credit funds from an ccount to the Disputed
Payments Account when a dispute arises as to such funds and shall instruct the Escrow
Agent to credit funds from the Di puted Payments Account to the appropriate payee when
such dispute i re olved with finality . ... [Notice provisions omitted.]

..LR1109

[XI(f)](6) Determination of amounts paid or held for the benefit of each individual
Settling State. For purposes of subsections (f)(3), (f)(5)(A) and (i)(2), th portion of a pay-

ment that is made or held for the benefit of each individual ettling tate shall be deter-

mined: ... (B) in the case of a payment credited to the Subsection IX(c)(l) Account or the
Subsection IX(c)(2) Account, by the results of clause Twelfth of .lRl 110 subsection
IXG) for each individual Settling State .

.lRllll

[XI](i) Miscalculated or Disputed Payments.
[XI(i)](l) Underpayments .

.lR1113

[XI(i)(l)](B) To the extent a dispute as to a prior payment is resolved with finality against a Participating Manufacturer:
[/] (i) ... where the disputed amount has been paid into the Disputed Payments
Account ... , the Independent Auditor shall instruct the Escrow Agent to
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transfer such amount to the applicable payee Account(s);
[/] (ii) . .. where the disputed amount has not been paid into the Disputed Payments Account and ... was identified prior to the Payment Due Date ... by
delivery of a statement . . . identifying such dispute, the Independent Auditor
shall calculate interest on the disputed amount from the Payment Due Date .. .
and the allocation of such amount and interest among the applicable payees,
and shall provide notice of the amount owed (and the identity of the payor and
payees) ... ; and
[/] (iii) in all other cases, the .lR1114 procedure described in subsection (ii)
shall apply, except that the applicable interest rate shall be the Prime Rate.
[XI(i)](2) Overpayments.
[XI(i)(2)](A) If a dispute as to a prior payment is resolved with finality in
favor of a Participating Manufacturer where the disputed amount has been paid into
the Disputed Payments Account ... , the Independent Auditor shall instruct the Escrow Agent to transfer such amount to such Participating Manufacturer.
[XI(i)(2)](B) If ... a dispute as to a prior payment is resolved with finality in
favor of a Participating Manufacturer where the disputed amount has been paid but
not into the Disputed Payments Account, such Participating Manufacturer shall be
entitled to a continuing dollar-for-dollar offset as follows :
[IX(i)(2)(B)](i) .. . in the case of offsets arising from payments under .. .
IX(b) or IX(c)(1 ), subsequent payments under any of such subsections; in the
case of offsets arising from payments under ... IX(c)(2), subsequent payments
under such subsection or ... .lR1115 ... under ... IX(c (1 ;
[IX(i)(2) B)] ii) in the case of offs ts ... against paym nts under ...

IX c th offset ... shall be apportioned among th

ettling tate pro rata in

proportion to th ir re pecti e share of such payments ... determined pursuant
to step E of clau

venth

.. . payments due from the riginal Participatin
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Manufacturer

or .1R1116 clause "Sixth ( .. . payments du from the Subse-

quent Participating Manufacturers) of sub ection IXG) (e cept

here the offset

arises from an o erpayment applicable olely to a particular Settling State);

..LR.1133

XVIII. MISCELLANEOUS

1-R1140

[XVIII](j) Amendment and Waiver. This Agreement may be amended by a written instrument executed by all Participating Manufacturers affected by the amendment and by all Settling States affected by the amendment. The tenns of any such amendment shall not be nforc -

able in any

ttling tate that is not a signatory to such am nd.ment. The waiver of any rights

conferred hereunder shall be effective only if made by written instrument executed by the waiving party or parties. The waiver by any party of any breach of this Agreement shall not be
deemed to be or construed as a waiver of any other breach, whether prior, subsequent or contemporaneous, nor shall such waiver be deemed to be or construed as a waiver by any other party .

..LR.1142

[XVIIl](n) Governing Law. This Agr ement otb r than th

crow Agr ement) shalJ

go emed by the law of the relevant ettling tate, without regard to the conflict of law rules of
such Settling State. . . . [Provisions for Escrow Agreement omitted.]
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J_R1891
EXHIBIT B
FORM OF ESCROW AGREEMENT

This Escrow Agreement is entered into as of _ _ _ _ _ _ _, 1998 by the undersigned
State officials (on behalf of their respective Settling States), the undersigned Participating
Manufacturers and _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ as escrow agent (the "Escrow Agent").
WI1NESSETH:
WHEREAS, the Settling States and the Participating Manufacturers have entered into a
settlement agreement entitled the "Master Settlement Agreement" (the "Agreement"); and
WHEREAS, the Agreement requires the Settling States and the Participating Manufacturers to enter into this Escrow Agreement.
NOW, THEREFORE, the parties hereto agree as follows:
SECTION 1.

Appointment of Escrow Agent.

The Settling States and the Participating Manufacturers hereby appoint _ _ _ _ _ __
to serve as Escrow Agent under this Agreement on the terms and conditions set forth herein, and
the Escrow Agent, by its execution hereof, hereby accepts such appointment and agrees to
perform the duties and obligations of the Escrow Agent set forth herein. The Settling States and
the Participating Manufacturers agree that the Escrow Agent appointed under the terms of this
Escrow Agreement shall be the Escrow Agent as defined in, and for all purposes of, the
Agreement.
SECTION 2.

Definitions.

(a) Capitalized terms used in this Escrow Agreement and not otherwise defined herein
shall have the meaning given to such terms in the Agreement.
(b) "Escrow Court" means the court of the State of New York to which the Agreement is
presented for approval, or such other court as agreed to by the Original Participating Manufacturers and a majority of those Attorneys General who are both the Attorney General of a Settling
State and a member of the NAAG executive committee at the time in question.
SECTION 3.

Escrow and Accounts.

(a) All funds received by the Escrow Agent pursuant to the terms of the Agreement shall
be held and disbursed in accordance with the terms of this Escrow Agreement. Such funds and
any earnings thereon shall constitute the "Escrow" and shall J_Rl892 be held by the Escrow
Agent separate and apart from all other funds and accounts of the Escrow Agent, the Settling
States and the Participating Manufacturers.
(b)

The Escrow Agent shall allocate the Escrow among the following separate accounts
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(each an "Account" and collectively the "Accounts"):
Subsection VI(B) Account
Subsection VI(C) Account (FIRST)
Subsection VI(C) Account (SUBSEQUENT)
Subsection VIII(B) Account
Subsection VIII(C) Account
Subsection IX(B) Account (FIRST)
Subsection IX(B) Account (SUBSEQUENT)
Subsection IX(C)(l) Account
Subsection IX(C)(2) Account
Subsection IX(E) Account
Disputed Payments Account
State-Specific Accounts With Respect To Each Settling State In Which
State-Specific Finality Occurs.

AU amounts credited to an Account hall be retained in such ccount until disbursed
therefrom in accordance with the provisions of this E row greement pursuant to (i) written
instruction from the Independent Auditor or (ii written instructions from all of the following:
aU of the Original Participating Manufacturers· all of th ub quent Participating Manufacturers
that contributed to such amounts in such Account; and all of the ettling tate (collectively the
row Parties . In the event of a conflict, instructions pursuant to clause (ii) shall govern
(c)

over instructions pursuant to clause (i).
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1-R1328
EXHIBITT

MODEL STATUTE
Section

Findings and Purpose. 1

(a) Cigarette smoking presents serious public health concerns to the State and to the
citizens of the State. The Surgeon General has determined that smoking causes lung cancer,
heart disease and other serious diseases, and that there are hundreds of thousands of tobaccorelated deaths in the United States each year. These diseases most often do not appear until
many years after the person in question begins smoking.
(b) Cigarette smoking also presents serious financial concerns for the State. Under
certain health-care programs, the State may have a legal obligation to provide medical assistance
to eligible persons for health conditions associated with cigarette smoking, and those persons
may have a legal entitlement to receive such medical assistance.
(c) Under these programs, the State pays millions of dollars each year to provide medical assistance for these persons for health conditions associated with cigarette smoking.
(d) It is the policy of the State that financial burdens imposed on the State by cigarette
smoking be borne by tobacco product manufacturers rather than by the State to the extent that
such manufacturers either determine to enter into a settlement with the State or are found
culpable by the courts.
(e) On _ _ _ , 1998, leading United States tobacco product manufacturers entered
into a settlement agreement, entitled the "Master Settlement Agreement," with the State. The
Master Settlement Agreement obligates these manufacturers, in return for a release of past, present and certain future claims against them as described therein, to pay substantial sums to the
State (tied in part to their volume of sales); to fund a national foundation devoted to the interests
of public health; and to make substantial changes in their advertising and marketing practices and
corporate culture, with the intention of reducing underage smoking.
It would be contrary to the policy of the State if tobacco product manufacturers who
(f)
determine not to enter into such a settlement could use a resulting cost advantage to derive large,
short-term profits in the years before liability may arise without ensuring that the State will have
an eventual source of recovery from them if they are proven to have acted culpably. It is thus in
the interest of the State to require that such 1-R1329 manufacturers establish a reserve fund to
guarantee a source of compensation and to prevent such manufacturers from deriving large,
short-term profits and then becoming judgment-proof before liability may arise.

[A State may elect to delete the "findings and purposes" section in its entirety. Other changes or
substitutions with respect to the "findings and purposes" section (except for particularized state procedural or technical requirements) will mean that the statute will no longer conform to this model.]
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Section

. Definitions.

(a) "Adjusted for inflation" means increased in accordance with the formula for inflation
adjustment set forth in Exhibit C to the Master Settlement Agreement.
(b) "Affiliate" means a person who directly or indirectly owns or controls, is owned or
controlled by, or is under common ownership or control with, another person. Solely for purposes of this definition, the terms "owns," "is owned" and "ownership" mean ownership of an
equity interest, or the equivalent thereof, of ten percent or more, and the term "person" means an
individual, partnership, committee, association, corporation or any other organization or group of
persons.
(c) "Allocable share" means Allocable Share as that term is defined in the Master Settlement Agreement.
(d)
"Cigarette" means any product that contains nicotine, is intended to be burned or
heated under ordinary conditions of use, and consists of or contains (1) any roll of tobacco
wrapped in paper or in any substance not containing tobacco; or (2) tobacco, in any form, that is
functional in the product, which, because of its appearance, the type of tobacco used in the filler,
or its packaging and labeling, is likely to be offered to, or purchased by, consumers as a cigarette; or (3) any roll of tobacco wrapped in any substance containing tobacco which, because of
its appearance, the type of tobacco used in the filler, or its packaging and labeling, is likely to be
offered to, or purchased by, consumers as a cigarette described in clause (1) of this definition.
The term "cigarette" includes "roll-your-own" (i.e., any tobacco which, because of its appearance, type, packaging, or labeling is suitable for use and likely to be offered to, or purchased by,
consumers as tobacco for making cigarettes). For purposes of this definition of "cigarette," 0.09
ounces of "roll-your-own" tobacco shall constitute one individual "cigarette."
(e) "Master Settlement Agreement" means the settlement agreement (and related documents) entered into on _ _ _ , 1998 by the State and leading United States tobacco product
manufacturers.
(f) "Qualified escrow fund" means an escrow arrangement with a federally or State
chartered financial institution having no affiliation with any tobacco product manufacturer and
having assets of at least $1,000,000,000 where such arrangement requires that such financial
institution hold the escrowed funds' principal for the benefit of releasing parties and prohibits the
tobacco product manufacturer placing the funds into escrow from using, accessing or directing
the use of the funds' principal except as consistent with section _(b )-(c) of this Act.
..LR1330

(g) "Released claims" means Released Claims as that term is defined in the Master Settlement Agreement.
(h) "Releasing parties" means Releasing Parties as that term is defined in the Master Settlement Agreement.
(i)

"Tobacco Product Manufacturer" means an entity that after the date of enactment of
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this Act directly (and not exclusively through any affiliate):
(1) manufactures cigarettes anywhere that such manufacturer intends to be sold in
the United States, including cigarettes intended to be sold in the United States through an
importer (except where such importer is an original participating manufacturer (as that
term is defined in the Master Settlement Agreement) that will be responsible for the payments under the Master Settlement Agreement with respect to such cigarettes as a result of
the provisions of subsections II(mm) of the Master Settlement Agreement and that pays the
taxes specified in subsection II(z) of the Master Settlement Agreement, and provided that
the manufacturer of such cigarettes does not market or advertise such cigarettes in the
United States);

(2) is the first purchaser anywhere for resale in the United States of cigarettes
manufactured anywhere that the manufacturer does not intend to be sold in the United
States; or
(3)

becomes a successor of an entity described in paragraph (1) or (2).

The term "Tobacco Product Manufacturer" shall not include an affiliate of a tobacco
product manufacturer unless such affiliate itself falls within any of (1) - (3) above.

'Units old m ans the number of individual cigarette sold in the tate by th applicable tobacco product manufactur r whether directly or through a distributor retailer or imilar intermediary or intermediaries during th year in question as measured by excise tax collected by th tate on pack or roll-your-own tobacco containers bearing the exci tax stamp
of th tale. The [fill in name of responsible state agency] shall promulgate such regulations as
(i)

are necessary to ascertain the amount of State excise tax paid on the cigarettes of such tobacco
product manufacturer for each year.
Section _. Requirements.

Any tobacco product manufacturer selling cigarettes to consumers within the State
(whether directly or through a distributor, retailer or similar intermediary or intermediaries) after
the date of enactment of this Act shall do one of the following :
..LR1331

(a) become a participating manufacturer (as that term is defined in section II(ij) of the
Master Settlement Agreement) and generally perform its financial obligations under the Master
Settlement Agreement; or
(b) (1) place into a qualified escrow fund by April 15 of the year following the year in
question the following amounts (as such amounts are adjusted for inflation) -1999: $.0094241 per unit sold after the date of enactment of this Act;2

[All per unit numbers subject to verification]
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2000: $.0104712 per unit sold after the date of enactment of this Act; 3
for each of 2001 and 2002: $.0136125 per unit sold after the date of enactment
of this Act;
for each of 2003 through 2006: $.0167539 per unit sold after the date of enactment of this Act;
for each of 2007 and each year thereafter: $.0188482 per unit sold after the
date of enactment of this Act.
(2) A tobacco product manufacturer that places funds into escrow pursuant to paragraph
(1) shall receive the interest or other appreciation on such funds as earned. Such funds themselves shall be released from escrow only under the following circumstances -(A) to pay a judgment or settlement on any released claim brought against such tobacco product manufacturer by the State or any releasing party located or residing in the
State. Funds shall be released from escrow under this subparagraph (i) in the order in
which they were placed into escrow and (ii) only to the extent and at the time necessary to
make payments required under such judgment or settlement;
(B) to the extent that a tobacco product manufacturer establishes that the amount it
was required to place into escrow in a particular year was greater than the State's allocable
share of the total payments that such manufacturer would have been required to make in
that year under the Master Settlement Agreement (as determined pursuant to section
IX(i)(2) of the Master Settlement Agreement, and before any of the adjustments or offsets
described in section IX(i)(3) of that Agreement other than the Inflation Adjustment) had it
been a participating J_R1332 manufacturer, the excess shall be released from escrow and
revert back to such tobacco product manufacturer; or
(C) to the extent not released from escrow under subparagraphs (A) or (B), funds
shall be released from escrow and revert back to such tobacco product manufacturer
twenty-five years after the date on which they were placed into escrow.
(3) Each tobacco product manufacturer that elects to place funds into escrow pursuant to
this subsection shall annually certify to the Attorney General [or other State official] that it is in
compliance with this subsection. The Attorney General [or other State official] may bring a civil
action on behalf of the State against any tobacco product manufacturer that fails to place into escrow the funds required under this section. Any tobacco product manufacturer that fails in any
year to place into escrow the funds required under this section shall -(A) be required within 15 days to place such funds into escrow as shall bring it into
compliance with this section. The court, upon a finding of a violation of this subsection,
may impose a civil penalty [to be paid to the general fund of the state] in an amount not to
exceed 5 percent of the amount improperly withheld from escrow per day of the violation
[The phrase "after the date of enactment of this Act" would need to be included only in the calendar year in which the Act is enacted.]
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and in a total amount not to exceed 100 percent of the original amount improperly withheld
from escrow;
(B) in the case of a knowing violation, be required within 15 days to place such
funds into escrow as shall bring it into compliance with this section. The court, upon a
finding of a knowing violation of this subsection, may impose a civil penalty [to be paid to
the general fund of the state] in an amount not to exceed 15 percent of the amount
improperly withheld from escrow per day of the violation and in a total amount not to
exceed 300 percent of the original amount improperly withheld from escrow; and
(C) in the case of a second knowing violation, be prohibited from selling cigarettes
to consumers within the State (whether directly or through a distributor, retailer or similar
intermediary) for a period not to exceed 2 years.
Each failure to make an annual deposit required under this section shall constitute a separate violation. 4

4

[A State may elect to include a requirement that the violator also pay the State's costs and attorney's fees incurred during a successful prosecution under this paragraph (3).)
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